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The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial 
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime 
Financial Crisis 
ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR. 
Since the subprime financial crisis began in mid-2007, banks and 
insurers around the world have reported $1.1 trillion of losses.  Seventeen 
large universal banks account for more than half of those losses, and nine 
of them either failed, were nationalized or were placed on government-
funded life support.  To prevent the collapse of global financial markets, 
central banks and governments in the U.S., U.K. and Europe have 
provided $9 trillion of support to financial institutions.    
Given the massive losses suffered by universal banks, and the 
extraordinary governmental assistance they have received, they are clearly 
the epicenter of the global financial crisis.  They were also the main 
private-sector catalysts for the credit boom that precipitated the crisis.  
During the past two decades, governmental policies in the U.S., U.K. and 
Europe encouraged consolidation and conglomeration within the financial 
services industry.  Domestic and international mergers among commercial 
and investment banks produced a leading group of seventeen large 
complex financial institutions (LCFIs).  Those LCFIs dominated domestic 
and global markets for securities underwriting, syndicated lending, asset-
backed securities (ABS), over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives, and 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).   
Universal banks pursued an “originate to distribute” (OTD) strategy, 
which included (i) originating consumer and corporate loans, (ii) 
packaging loans into ABS and CDOs, (iii) creating OTC derivatives whose 
values were derived from loans, and (iv) distributing the resulting 
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securities and other financial instruments to investors.  LCFIs used the 
OTD strategy to maximize their fee income, reduce their capital charges, 
and transfer to investors the risks associated with securitized loans. 
Securitization enabled LCFIs to extend huge volumes of home 
mortgages and credit card loans to nonprime borrowers.  By 2006, LCFIs 
turned the U.S. housing market into a system of “Ponzi finance,” in which 
borrowers kept taking out new loans to pay off old ones.  When home 
prices fell in 2007, and nonprime homeowners could no longer refinance, 
defaults skyrocketed and the subprime financial crisis began. 
Universal banks also followed reckless lending policies in the 
commercial real estate and corporate sectors.  LCFIs included many of the 
same aggressive loan terms (including interest-only provisions and high 
loan-to-value ratios) in commercial mortgages and leveraged corporate 
loans that they included in nonprime home mortgages.  In all three 
markets, LCFIs believed that they could (i) originate risky loans without 
screening borrowers and (ii) avoid post-loan monitoring of the borrowers’ 
behavior because the loans were transferred to investors.  However, LCFIs 
retained residual risks under contractual and reputational commitments. 
Accordingly, when securitization markets collapsed in mid-2007, universal 
banks were exposed to significant losses. 
Current regulatory policies—which rely on “market discipline” and 
LCFIs’ internal “risk models”—are plainly inadequate to control the 
proclivities in universal banks toward destructive conflicts of interest and 
excessive risk-taking.  As shown by repeated government bailouts during 
the present crisis, universal banks receive enormous subsidies from their 
status as “too big to fail” (TBTF) institutions.  Regulation of financial 
institutions and financial markets must be urgently reformed in order to 
eliminate (or greatly reduce) TBTF subsidies and establish effective 
control over LCFIs. 
 
 2009 THE DARK SIDE OF UNIVERSAL BANKING 965 
ARTICLE CONTENTS 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 966 
II.  CONSOLIDATION AND CONVERGENCE AMONG FINANCIAL 
CONGLOMERATES INTENSIFIED RISKS IN DOMESTIC AND 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL MARKETS AFTER 1990 .............................. 972 
A.  THE RE-ENTRY OF COMMERCIAL BANKS INTO SECURITIES  
MARKETS ........................................................................................ 972 
B.  CONSOLIDATION IN THE BANKING AND SECURITIES INDUSTRIES ........ 975 
C.  CONVERGENCE BETWEEN THE ACTIVITIES OF BANKS AND  
SECURITIES FIRMS .......................................................................... 980 
D.  RISING LEVELS OF SYSTEMIC RISK IN DOMESTIC AND GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL MARKETS ..................................................................... 994 
III.  UNIVERSAL BANKS WERE THE PRIMARY PRIVATE-SECTOR 
CATALYSTS FOR THE SUBPRIME FINANCIAL CRISIS ............ 1002 
A.  AN UNSUSTAINABLE CREDIT BOOM OCCURRED IN THE U.S.  
BETWEEN 1991 AND 2007 ............................................................. 1002 
B.  FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES PROMOTED THE CREDIT BOOM,  
WHICH EXPOSED HOUSEHOLDS, NONFINANCIAL BUSINESSES AND 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS TO CATASTROPHIC LOSSES .................. 1008 
C.  FINANCIAL CONGLOMERATES BECAME THE EPICENTER OF THE 
SUBPRIME FINANCIAL CRISIS ........................................................ 1043 
IV.  CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS ............................. 1046 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
The Dark Side of Universal Banking: Financial 
Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime 
Financial Crisis 
ARTHUR E. WILMARTH, JR.∗ 
Remember this crisis began in regulated entities . . . . 
This happened right under our noses.1 
God knows, some really stupid things were done by 
American banks and by American investment banks . . . . To 
policy makers, I say where were they?  They approved all 
these banks . . . .We gave [consumers] weapons of mass 
destruction to borrow too much . . . .”2 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The global economy is currently experiencing the “most severe 
financial crisis since the Great Depression.”3  The ongoing crisis has 
battered global financial markets and has triggered a world-wide 
                                                                                                                          
∗  Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School, Washington, DC.  I wish to 
thank Dean Fred Lawrence and the George Washington University Law School for a summer research 
grant that supported my work on this Article.  I am most grateful for the excellent research assistance 
provided by my former students, Christopher Scott Pollock and Blake Reese, and also by Germaine 
Leahy, Head of Reference for the Jacob Burns Law Library.  Finally, I greatly appreciate very helpful 
comments by, and conversations with, Larry Cunningham, Theresa Gabaldon, Anna Gelpern, Ann 
Graham, Patricia McCoy, Larry Mitchell, Heidi Schooner, and Michael Taylor about various topics 
discussed in this Article.  Unless otherwise indicated, this Article includes developments through April 
15, 2009. 
1 Jill Drew, Frenzy, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2008, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, 
WPOST File (quoting Paul S. Atkins, former member of the Securities and Exchange Commission). 
2 Edward Evans & Christine Harper, Dimon Blames Banks, Regulators for Debt Problems, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Jan. 29, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601208&sid= 
afYmYskaGvTk (quoting remarks by Jamie Dimon, Chief Executive Officer of JP Morgan Chase, at 
the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland). 
3 Markus K. Brunnermeier, Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch, 2007–08, 23 J. ECON. 
PERSPECTIVES No. 1, 77, 77 (Winter 2009); see also Stijn Claessens et al., What Happens during 
Recessions, Crunches and Busts? (Dec. 1, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1318825 
(describing the current “financial turmoil” as “the most severe global financial crisis since the Great 
Depression”); Diana I. Gregg, World Is in Recession in 2009 in Wake of Financial Sector Crisis, 92 
BANKING REP. (BNA) 48 (Jan. 6, 2009), available at LEXIS, News Library, BNABNK File (citing 
World Bank assessment that the current financial crisis is the “most serious since the 1930s”); Speech 
by Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben S. Bernanke at the Council on Foreign Relations, Mar. 10, 
2009, available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20090310a.htm 
[hereinafter Bernanke CFR Speech] (acknowledging that “[t]he world is suffering through the worst 
financial crisis since the 1930s”). 
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recession.4  Global stock market values declined by $35 trillion during 
2008 and early 2009, and global economic output is expected to fall in 
2009 for the first time since World War II.5 
In the United States, where the crisis began, markets for stocks and 
homes have suffered their steepest downturns since the 1930s and have 
driven the domestic economy into a steep and prolonged recession.6  The 
total market value of publicly-traded U.S. stocks slumped by more than 
$10 trillion from October 2007 through February 2009.7  In addition, the 
value of U.S. homes fell by an estimated $6 trillion between mid-2006 and 
the end of 2008.8  U.S. gross domestic product declined sharply during the 
second half of 2008, and 4.4 million jobs were lost during 2008 and the 
first two months of 2009.9  In early 2009, the U.S. appeared to be “trapped 
in a vortex of plunging consumer demand, rising joblessness, and a 
deepening crisis in the banking system.”10   
                                                                                                                          
4 See, e.g., Anthony Faiola, Downturn Accelerates as It Circles the Globe, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 
2009, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File (reporting that “the burst of the biggest 
credit bubble in history” had led to a weakening of “real economies around the world”); Gregg, supra 
note 3 (stating that the financial crisis “has left no country unaffected”); Joanna Slater, Year-End 
Review of Markets & Finance 2008—Global Markets Are in for Another Tough Slog, WALL ST. J., Jan. 
2, 2009, at R4, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (reporting that “global stock markets 
collapsed in 2008” as the value of publicly-traded stocks in markets outside the U.S. “fell by almost 
half”). 
5 Shamim Adam, Global Financial Assets Lost $50 Trillion Last Year, ADB Says, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 9, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aZ1kc 
J7y3LDM&refer=worldwide; Anthony Faiola, U.S. Downturn Dragging World Into Recession, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 9, 2009, at A01, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File. 
6 Conor Dougherty & Kelly Evans, Economy in Worst Fall Since ’82—Output Sank 6.2% Last 
Quarter, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2009, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (reporting 
that U.S. gross domestic profit (GDP) recorded its “steepest [quarterly] dropoff since the depths of the 
1982 recession”); Peter A. McKay, Dow Falls 119.15 Points, Losing 12% in February, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 28, 2009, at B1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (reporting that the Dow Jones 
Industrial Average recorded its worst six-month decline since 1932 and had lost more than fifty percent 
of its value since October 2007); Adam Shell, S&P Sinks Beyond November Low; Index’s Bear Market 
Loss Expands to 52.5%, USA TODAY, Feb. 24, 2009, at 1B, available at LEXIS, News Library, 
USATDY File (reporting that the S&P 500 index had lost 52.5% since its peak, “its biggest decline 
since the 1930s”). 
7 Shell, supra note 6 (reporting that “since the October 2007 top, the [U.S.] stock market, as 
measured by the Dow Jones Wilshire 5000, has declined $10.4 trillion in value”). 
8  Dan Levy, U.S. Property Owners Lost $3.3 Trillion in Home Value, BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 3, 
2009, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&refer=home&sid=aE29HSrxA4rI 
(reporting an estimate by Zillow that “[a]bout $6.1 trillion of value has been lost since the housing 
market peaked in the second quarter of 2006”); see also Timothy R. Homan, U.S. Household Net Worth 
Had Record Decline in Fourth Quarter, BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 13, 2009 (reporting that the net worth 
of U.S. households fell by $12.8 trillion between September 30, 2007, and December 31, 2008, due to 
drops in the values of stocks and homes). 
9 See Dougherty & Evans, supra note 6 (reporting that the “[U.S.] gross domestic product 
declined at a 6.2% annual rate in the fourth quarter of 2008”); Peter S. Goodman & Jack Healy, Job 
Losses Hint at Vast Remaking of U.S. Economy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2009, at A1, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, NYT File (reporting that the U.S. “unemployment rate surged to 8.1. percent [in 
February 2009] . . . its highest level in a quarter-century”). 
10 Jeff Zeleny & Edmund L. Andrews, With Grim Job Loss Figures, No Sign That Worst Is Over, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2009, at B1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File; see also Goodman & 
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By March 2009, “the continuing collapse in financial markets around 
the globe reflected an absence of faith” in the ability of governments and 
regulators to deal with the financial crisis.11 The turmoil in financial 
markets reflected deep concerns among investors about the viability of 
major financial institutions.  Commercial and investment banks and 
insurance companies around the world reported more than $1.1 trillion of 
losses between the outbreak of the financial crisis in mid-2007 and March 
2009.  In response to those losses, and to prevent the collapse of the global 
financial system, central banks and governments in the United States 
(U.S.), United Kingdom (U.K.) and Europe provided almost $9 trillion of 
support in the form of emergency liquidity assistance, capital infusions, 
asset purchase programs, and financial guarantees.  U.S. federal agencies 
extended about half of that support.  Neverthless, the ability of global 
financial markets to recover from the present crisis remained in serious 
doubt in April 2009.12   
Seventeen large universal banks accounted for more than half of the 
$1.1 trillion of losses reported by the world’s banks and insurance 
companies.  Twelve of those universal banks suffered serious damage, 
including (i) six institutions that failed or were nationalized to prevent their 
failure, and (ii) three other institutions that were placed on government-
funded life support.13  In view of the huge losses suffered by these 
institutions, and the extraordinary governmental assistance they received, 
they are clearly the epicenter of the global financial crisis.  This Article 
argues that they were also the principal private-sector catalysts for the 
enormous credit boom that led to the crisis. 
Part II of this Article describes the growth of large universal banks and 
                                                                                                                          
Healy, supra note 9 (quoting economist Robert Barbera’s description of “the violent downward 
trajectory” in the U.S. economy). 
11 Neil Irwin, In Free-Fall, Stocks Hit Lowest Mark Since ’97, WASH. POST, Mar. 3, 2009, at A1, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File; see also Michael Lewis & David Einhorn, The End 
of the Financial World As We Know It, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, WK 9, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, NYT File (stating that “the collapse of [the U.S.] financial system . . . inspired not merely a 
national but a global crisis of confidence”). 
12 See infra Part III.C.; see also Timothy R. Homan, IMF Says Global Losses From Credit Crisis 
May Hit $4.1 Trillion, BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 21, 2009 (stating that, according to a report issued by 
the International Monetary Fund, (i) “[w]orldwide losses tied to rotten loans and securitized assets may 
reach $4.1 trillion by the end of 2010 as the recession and credit crisis exact a higher toll on financial 
institutions,” and (ii) “‘[co]nfidence.in the international financial system remains fractured and 
systemic risks elevated’”); Liz Rappaport & Serena Ng, New Fears As Credit Markets Tighten, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 9, 2009, at A1 (quoting a prominent financial executive’s comment that “[t]here’s fear out 
there that’s driving down every asset class simultaneously.  It illustrates a lack of investor confidence in 
the government’s plan for fixing the financial infrastructure”). 
13 See infra notes 421–30 and accompanying text.  As used in this Article, the term “universal 
bank” refers to an organization that has authority to engage, either directly or through affiliates, in the 
banking, securities and insurance businesses.  Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. 
Financial Services Industry, 1975–2000: Competition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 215, 223 n.23.  In addition, unless otherwise indicated, the term “universal bank” is used 
interchangeably with “financial conglomerate” and “large complex financial institution” (LCFI).  
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their success in establishing leadership positions in many sectors of the 
financial markets.  During the past two decades, as explained in Parts II.A. 
and II.B., governmental policies in the U.S., U.K. and Europe encouraged 
massive consolidation and conglomeration within the financial services 
industry.  The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 was a prominent domestic 
example of an international regulatory trend in favor of universal banking.  
Domestic and international mergers among commercial and investment 
banks produced a dominant group of large complex financial institutions 
(LCFIs).  By 2007, as discussed in Part II.C., seventeen LCFIs effectively 
controlled domestic and global markets for debt and equity underwriting, 
syndicated lending, asset-backed securities (ABS), over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives, and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).   
As explained in Part II.D.1., universal banks pursued an “originate-to-
distribute” (OTD) strategy.  The OTD business model included (i) 
originating and servicing consumer and corporate loans, (ii) packaging 
those loans into ABS and CDOs, (iii) creating additional financial 
instruments, including synthetic CDOs and credit default swaps (CDS), 
whose values were derived in complicated ways from the underlying loans, 
and (iv) distributing the foregoing securities and financial instruments to 
investors.  LCFIs used the OTD strategy to maximize their fee income, 
reduce their capital charges, and transfer to investors (at least ostensibly) 
the risks associated with securitized loans and other structured-finance 
products. 
Even before the subprime lending boom began in 2003, some 
observers began to raise questions about the risks posed by the new 
universal banks.  As described in Part II.D.2., LCFIs played key roles in 
promoting the dotcom-telecom boom in the U.S. stock market between 
1994 and 2000, which was followed by a devastating bust from  2000 to 
2002.  Many leading universal banks were also involved in a series of 
scandals involving Enron, WorldCom, investment analysts, initial public 
offerings, and mutual funds during the same period.  Nevertheless, 
Congress did not seriously consider the question of whether financial 
conglomerates threatened the stability of the financial markets and the 
general economy.  Political leaders assumed that federal regulators and 
market discipline would exercise sufficient control over the growing power 
of universal banks. 
As explained in Part III.A., the U.S. (like the U.K. and some European 
nations) experienced an enormous credit boom between 1991 and 2007.  
Within the domestic nongovernmental sector, household debts rose by $10 
trillion (to $13.8 trillion), nonfinancial business debts grew by $6.4 trillion 
(to $10.1 trillion), and financial sector debts increased by $13 trillion (to 
$15.8 trillion).  The credit boom accelerated at a particularly rapid rate 
after 2000, and the financial services industry captured an unprecedented 
share of corporate profits and gross domestic profit.  Governmental 
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policies (including an overly expansive U.S. monetary policy and currency 
exchange rate policies pursued by foreign governments) were important 
factors that encouraged credit growth.   
In addition, as discussed in Part III.B., universal banks were the 
leading private-sector catalysts for the credit boom.  During the past two 
decades, and particularly after 2000, LCFIs used mass-marketing 
programs, automated loan processing, and securitization to extend huge 
volumes of high-risk home mortgage loans and credit card loans to 
nonprime borrowers.  Federal laws facilitated the creation of nationwide 
lending programs by LCFIs, because federal laws preempted state usury 
laws and state consumer protection laws.  Unfortunately, Congress and 
federal regulators did not establish adequate federal safeguards to protect 
consumers against abusive lending practices by federally chartered 
depository institutions and their subsidiaries and agents.  
As described in Part III.B.3., LCFIs played leading roles as direct 
lenders, warehouse lenders and securitizers for nonprime home mortgages.  
The volume of nonprime mortgages rose from $250 billion in 2001 to $1 
trillion in 2006.  Nearly 10 million nonprime mortgages were originated 
between 2003 and mid-2007.  LCFIs used securitization to spur this 
dramatic growth in nonprime lending.  By 2006, LCFIs packaged four-
fifths of subprime mortgages and nine-tenths of “Alt-A” mortgages into 
residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).  As the securitized share 
of nonprime lending increased, lending standards deteriorated.  LCFIs 
increasingly offered subprime mortgages with low payments (based on 
introductory “teaser” rates) for two or three years, followed by a rapid 
escalation of interest rates and payments.  As a practical matter, borrowers 
who accepted such loans were forced to refinance before their “teaser” 
periods expired, and they could do so only as long as home prices kept 
rising.  By 2006, LCFIs had turned the U.S. housing market into a system 
of “Ponzi finance,” in which nonprime borrowers had to keep taking out 
new loans to pay off their old ones.  When home prices stopped rising in 
2006 and collapsed in 2007, nonprime borrowers could not refinance, 
defaults skyrocketed, and the subprime financial crisis began. 
Financial conglomerates aggravated the risks of nonprime mortgages 
by creating multiple financial bets based on those mortgages.  LCFIs re-
securitized lower-rated tranches of RMBS to create CDOs, and then re-
securitized lower-rated tranches of CDOs to create CDOs-squared.  LCFIs 
also created synthetic CDOs and wrote CDS to create additional financial 
bets based on nonprime mortgages.  By 2007, the total volume of financial 
instruments derived from nonprime mortgages was at least twice as large 
as the $2 trillion in outstanding nonprime mortgages.  LCFIs created the 
impression that they were transferring the risks of their lending and 
securitization activities to far-flung investors.  In fact, however, LCFIs 
retained significant exposures to nonprime mortgages because (i) LCFIs 
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kept RMBS and CDOs in their “warehouses,” and (ii) LCFIs transferred 
RMBS and CDOs to off-balance-sheet conduits that relied on the 
sponsoring LCFIs for explicit or implicit support.  Thus, in important 
respects, LCFIs pursued an “originate to not really distribute” strategy,  
due to their overwhelming desire to complete more transactions and earn 
more fees.   
Universal banks created similar risks with their credit card operations.  
While the housing boom lasted, universal banks expanded credit card 
lending to nonprime borrowers and encouraged those borrowers to use 
home equity loans to pay off their credit card balances.  As in the case of 
nonprime home mortgages, LCFIs ignored the risks of nonprime credit 
card loans because they could securitize most of the loans.  However, the 
securitization market for credit card loans shut down in 2008, just as it had 
done for subprime mortgages in 2007.   
As discussed in Part III.B.4., universal banks followed similarly 
reckless lending policies in the commercial real estate and corporate 
sectors.  LCFIs used securitization techniques to promote a dramatic 
increase in commercial mortgage lending and leveraged corporate lending 
between 2003 and mid-2007.  LCFIs used many of the same aggressive 
loan terms (including interest-only provisions and high loan-to-value 
ratios) for commercial mortgages and leveraged corporate loans that they 
used for nonprime home mortgages.  In both markets, as with home 
mortgages, securitization created perverse incentives for lenders and ABS 
underwriters.  Lenders and ABS underwriters (which often were affiliated 
subsidiaries of LCFIs) believed that they could (i) originate risky loans 
without properly screening borrowers and (ii) avoid costly post-loan 
monitoring of the borrowers’ behavior because, in each case, the loans 
were transferred to investors.  Again, however, LCFIs often retained 
residual risk exposures.  This was particularly true in the market for 
leveraged buyouts, because LCFIs frequently agreed to provide “bridge” 
financing if there were not enough investors to complete the transactions.  
Once again, the ability of LCFIs to control their risks was undercut by their 
single-minded focus on maximizing transactions and fees.  Accordingly, 
when the securitization markets for commercial mortgages and leveraged 
corporate loans collapsed in mid-2007, universal banks were exposed to 
significant losses. 
As discussed in Parts III.C. and IV, the massive losses suffered by 
LCFIs, and the extraordinary governmental assistance they have received,  
demonstrate that they bear primary responsibility for the credit boom and 
the global financial crisis.  Current regulatory policies—which rely heavily 
on “market discipline” and LCFIs’ internal “risk models”—are plainly 
inadequate to control the strong tendencies in universal banks toward 
destructive conflicts of interest and excessive risk-taking.  Moreover, 
repeated government bailouts during the present crisis confirm that 
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universal banks receive enormous subsidies from their status as “too big to 
fail” (TBTF) institutions.  Regulation of financial institutions and financial 
markets must be urgently reformed in order to eliminate (or greatly reduce) 
TBTF subsidies and establish effective control over LCFIs. 
II.  CONSOLIDATION AND CONVERGENCE AMONG FINANCIAL 
CONGLOMERATES INTENSIFIED RISKS IN DOMESTIC AND GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL MARKETS AFTER 1990 
A.  The Re-Entry of Commercial Banks into Securities Markets 
The Banking Act of 1933 (popularly known as the “Glass-Steagall 
Act”) built a legal firewall that separated commercial banks from the 
securities industry.14  During the 1980s and 1990s, federal regulators 
opened loopholes in the Glass-Steagall wall in response to growing 
competitive pressures in the financial marketplace.15  In 1987 and 1989, the 
Federal Reserve Board (FRB) allowed bank holding companies to 
underwrite debt and equity securities to a limited extent by establishing 
“Section 20 subsidiaries.”  During the 1990s, the FRB progressively 
relaxed its restrictions on Section 20 subsidiaries.  By 1997, those 
subsidiaries could compete effectively with securities firms for 
underwriting mandates.16   
In response to the FRB’s orders, many large domestic and foreign 
banks established Section 20 subsidiaries, often by acquiring small and 
midsized securities firms.  By mid-1998, Section 20 subsidiaries were 
owned by more than forty-five banking organizations, including all of the 
twenty-five largest U.S. banks.17   
In 1998, the FRB took a more dramatic step by allowing Citicorp, the 
largest U.S. bank holding company, to merge with Travelers, a major 
financial conglomerate that owned a leading securities firm, Salomon 
Smith Barney, as well as subsidiaries engaged in a full range of insurance 
activities.  That merger produced Citigroup, the first U.S. universal bank 
since 1933.18  Neither the Glass-Steagall Act nor the Bank Holding 
Company Act (BHC Act)19 allowed a financial conglomerate like 
                                                                                                                          
14 MELANIE L. FEIN, SECURITIES ACTIVITIES OF BANKS §§ 1.02, 4.01, 4.02 (3d ed. Supp. 2008); 
PATRICIA A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL §§ 7.01, 7.02[1], 7.02[2] (2d ed. 2009); Wilmarth, 
supra note 13, at 318. 
15 FEIN, supra note 14, §§ 1.03–1.05, 4.02–4.03; MCCOY, supra note 14, §§ 7.02–7.03.  
16 FEIN, supra note 14, § 1.04; MCCOY, supra note 14, § 7.04[2][a][ii]; Rajesh P. Narayanan, 
Nanda K. Rangan & Sridhar Sundaram, Welfare Effects of Expanding Banking Organization 
Opportunities in the Securities Arena, 42 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 505, 506–13, 525 n.12 (2002); 
Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 318–20. 
17 Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 319; see also FEIN, supra note 14, § 1.08[A] (listing major bank 
acquisitions of securities firms from 1983 through 2004). 
18 FEIN, supra note 14, § 1.08[B]; Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 220–21, 306. 
19 Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 511, 70 Stat. 133. 
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Citigroup to exist on a permanent basis.  However, based on an exemption 
in the BHC Act, the FRB allowed Citigroup to offer securities and 
insurance services beyond the scope of the BHC Act for up to five years.20  
The FRB’s approval of the Citigroup merger placed great pressure on 
Congress to repeal the Glass-Steagall Act and to amend the BHC Act.  As 
a practical matter, the FRB’s action confronted Congress with “the choice 
of either approving legislation to ratify the Citicorp-Travelers merger or 
forcing a potentially disruptive breakup of a huge financial 
conglomerate.”21   
In November 1999, Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(GLBA), which ratified the Citigroup merger and authorized universal 
banking.  GLBA repealed the anti-affiliation provisions of Glass-Steagall 
and also amended the BHC Act so that commercial banks could affiliate 
with securities firms and insurance companies within a financial holding 
company structure.22 
GLBA’s supporters argued that the statute’s authorization of financial 
holding companies would produce significant benefits for the U.S. 
financial services industry and the broader economy.  The predicted 
benefits included (i) enabling financial holding companies to earn higher 
profits based on favorable economies of scale and scope, (ii) allowing 
financial holding companies to achieve greater safety by diversifying their 
activities, (iii) permitting financial holding companies to offer “one-stop 
shopping” for financial services, resulting in increased convenience and 
lower costs for businesses and consumers, and (iv) enhancing the ability of 
U.S. financial institutions to compete with foreign universal banks.23   
GLBA’s advocates contended that the potential benefits of universal 
banking far outweighed concerns about conflicts of interest or higher risks 
                                                                                                                          
20 FEIN, supra note 14, § 1.08[B]; Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 220–21, 306–07.  The FRB’s 
decision granting a temporary exemption to Citigroup was upheld in Indep. Comm. Bankers of Am. v. 
Bd. of Governors, 195 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 1999).   
21 Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 220–21, 306–07; see also Edward J. Kane, Implications of 
Superhero Metaphors for the Issue of Banking Powers, 23 J. BANKING & FIN. 663, 666 (1999) (stating 
that Citigroup’s leaders “boldly gambled that they [could] dragoon Congress . . . into legalizing their 
transformation” before the FRB’s exemption period expired); Dean Anason, Advocates, Skeptics Face 
Off on Megadeals, AM. BANKER, Apr. 30, 1998, available at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File 
(reporting that Citigroup’s formation “was widely seen as a bid to push lawmakers to enact a sweeping 
overhaul of financial laws,” and quoting Rep. Maurice D. Hinchey’s comment that Citigroup was 
“essentially playing an expensive game of chicken with Congress”). 
22 RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW OF  
BANKING & FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 27–29, 465–70 (4th ed. 2009); MCCOY, supra note 14, §§ 
4.03[3], 7.04[2][b], 7.05; Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 219–22, 319–20. 
23 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 106-44, at 4–6 (1999); 145 CONG. REC. S13783–84 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 
1999) (remarks of Sen. Gramm); 145 CONG. REC. S13880–81 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (remarks of Sen. 
Schumer); 145 CONG. REC. S13909 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Domenici); 145 CONG. 
REC. H11527–28 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (remarks of Rep. Leach); James R. Barth et al., Policy 
Watch: The Repeal of Glass-Steagall and the Advent of Broad Banking, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 191, 198–
203 (2000); João A.C. Santos, Commercial Banks in the Securities Business: A Review, 14 J. FIN. 
SERV. RES. 35, 37–41 (1998). 
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within financial conglomerates, and that those concerns were adequately 
addressed by the statute.24  In contrast, opponents of GLBA argued that the 
new universal banks permitted by GLBA were likely to generate financial 
risks and speculative excesses similar to those that occurred during the 
1920s.  Opponents warned that a removal of Glass-Steagall’s constraints 
might ultimately cause a financial crisis similar in magnitude to the Great 
Depression.25   
As GLBA’s opponents pointed out, the Glass-Steagall Act was 
premised on Congress’ judgment that universal banking had played a 
major role in triggering the Great Depression.  The proponents of Glass-
Steagall concluded that (i) the aggressive entry by commercial banks into 
the securities markets during the 1920s encouraged a reckless underwriting 
of risky loans and speculative securities by banks and securities firms; and 
(ii) the huge expansion of credit produced by such loans and securities 
promoted an unsustainable economic boom, followed by a devastating bust 
that crippled banks, ruined the economy, and inflicted heavy losses on 
unsophisticated and ill-informed investors.26  Based on those conclusions, 
Congress decided to separate commercial and investment banking by 
enacting the Glass-Steagall Act.27   
GLBA’s supporters, however, dismissed the relevance of Glass-
                                                                                                                          
24 See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S13783–84 (daily ed. Nov. 3, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Gramm); id. at 
S13877 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Allard); id. at S13880–81 (remarks of Sen. Schumer); 
145 CONG. REC. H11515 (remarks of Rep. Roukema); 145 CONG. REC. H11527–28 (remarks of Rep. 
Leach); Barth et al., supra note 23, at 199–200. 
25 See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S13871–74 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Wellstone); 
145 CONG. REC. S13896–97 (remarks of Sen. Dorgan); 145 CONG. REC. H11530–31, H11542 (daily 
ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (remarks of Rep. Dingell). 
26 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 73-77, at 3–4, 6–10 (1933) (criticizing the “very great inflation of bank 
credit,” which resulted in “excessive speculation” in stocks and “real-estate inflation and speculation”); 
77 CONG. REC. 3835 (1933) (remarks of Rep. Steagall, declaring that “[o]ur great banking system was 
diverted from its original purposes into investment activities, and its service devoted to speculation and 
international high finance”); 77 CONG. REC. 3726 (remarks of Sen. Glass, asserting that securities 
affiliates of banks “were the most unscrupulous contributors, next to the debauch of the New York 
Stock Exchange, to the financial catastrophe which visited this country and was mainly responsible for 
the depression under which we have been suffering since”).  For contemporary and modern 
assessments of the impact of the credit boom of the 1920s in leading to the Great Depression and the 
Glass-Steagall Act, see, for example, LIONEL ROBBINS, THE GREAT DEPRESSION 30–72 (1934); H. 
PARKER WILLIS & JOHN M. CHAPMAN, THE BANKING SITUATION: AMERICAN POST-WAR PROBLEMS 
AND DEVELOPMENTS 97–118, 535–633 (1934); Charles E. Persons, Credit Expansion, 1920 to 1929 
and Its Lessons, 45 Q. J. ECON. 94 passim (1930); Barry Eichengreen & Kris Mitchener, The Great 
Depression as a Credit Boom Gone Wrong (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 137, 2003), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=959644; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Did Universal Banks Play a 
Significant Role in the U.S. Economy’s Boom-and-Bust Cycle of 1921–33?  A Preliminary Assessment, 
4 CURRENT DEV. MONETARY AND FIN. L. 559, 564–85 (Geo. Wash. U. L. Sch., Pub. L. & Legal 
Theory, Working Paper No. 171, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=838267 [hereinafter 
Wilmarth, Universal Banks]; Arthur E. Wilmarth Jr., Wal-Mart and the Separation of Banking and 
Commerce, 39 CONN. L. REV. 1539, 1559–66 (2007) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Banking and Commerce].  
27 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 73–77 (1933); supra note 26, at 9–10, 16, 18; 77 CONG. REC. 3835 (1933) 
(remarks of Rep. Steagall); 77 CONG. REC. 3725–26 (1933) (remarks of Sen. Glass); 77 CONG. REC. 
4179–80 (1933) (remarks of Sen. Bulkley and Sen. Glass). 
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Steagall’s historical background.28  Some of GLBA’s advocates argued 
that the Glass-Steagall Act was a mistake from the outset.29  Others 
contended that, even if the 1933 legislation originally served a beneficial 
purpose, it had become obsolete and counterproductive due to rapid 
changes in the financial marketplace and the competitive challenges posed 
by foreign universal banks.30  GLBA’s supporters firmly believed that it 
was time to establish a new regime of universal banking in the U.S. 
B.  Consolidation in the Banking and Securities Industries 
The re-entry of banks into the securities business after 1990 was 
accompanied by extensive consolidation within and across both industry 
sectors.  During the 1980s and 1990s, the states and the federal government 
enacted laws that removed legal barriers to intrastate and interstate bank 
mergers and bank branching.  Those laws encouraged a dramatic 
consolidation within the banking industry.31  More than 5,400 mergers took 
place in the U.S. banking industry from 1990 to 2005, involving more than 
$5.0 trillion in banking assets.32  In seventy-four of those mergers, both the 
acquiring bank and the target bank had assets exceeding $10 billion.33   
As a consequence of the bank merger wave, the share of U.S. banking 
assets held by the ten largest banks more than doubled, rising from twenty-
                                                                                                                          
28 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 106-74 (pt. 1), at 6–7 (1999); S. REP. NO. 106-44, at 3–4 (1999); 145 
CONG. REC. S13876 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999) (remarks of Sen. Hagel); id. at S13880 (remarks of Sen. 
Schumer); id. at S13906–07 (remarks of Sen. Mack); id. at S13907 (remarks of Sen. Lieberman); id. at 
S13912–13 (remarks of Sen. Gramm); id. at H11532–33 (remarks of Rep. Bliley). 
29 For example, Senator Phil Gramm, the chief Senate sponsor of GLBA, denounced the Glass-
Steagall Act as a misguided statute from the outset.  In his view, Congress was frightened by the 
Depression and was driven by populist “demagoguery” to impose a “punitive” and “artificial separation 
of the financial sector of our economy.”  145 CONG. REC. S13913 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1999).  Similarly, 
Senator Joe Lieberman argued that the Glass-Steagall Act created “inefficiencies and unnecessary 
barriers in our economy.”  Id. at S13907; see also id. at S13876 (remarks of Sen. Hagel, criticizing the 
“artificial barriers” created by Glass-Steagall); id. at H11514 (remarks of Rep. Dreier, applauding 
GLBA for “tak[ing] us beyond . . . the curse of Glass-Steagall”). 
30 See id. at S13886 (remarks of Sen. Dodd); id. at S13890 (remarks of Sen. Bryan); id. at S13895 
(remarks of Sen. Leahy). 
31 Astrid A. Dick, Nationwide Branching and Its Impact on Market Structure, Quality, and Bank 
Performance, 79 J. BUS. 567, 570 (2006); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Good to Be True?  The 
Unfulfilled Promises Behind Big Bank Mergers, 2 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 1, 11 (1995).  Federal 
banking agencies also encouraged consolidation by liberalizing their bank merger policies.  Gerald A 
Hanweck & Bernard Shull, The Bank Merger Movement: Efficiency, Stability and Competitive Policy 
Concerns, 44 ANTITRUST BULL. 251, 257–58 (1999); Wilmarth, supra, at 71. 
32 Kenneth D. Jones & Robert Oshinsky, The Effect of Industry Consolidation and Deposit 
Insurance Reform on the Resiliency of the U.S. Bank Insurance Fund, 5 J. FIN. STABILITY 57, 58 
(2009). 
33 Id.  Five additional mega-mergers occurred in the U.S. banking industry in 2006.  See Top Bank 
and Thrift Deals Completed in 2006, AM. BANKER, Feb. 13, 2007, at 12A, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, AMBNKR File (listing five mergers in which the acquiring and target banks each held assets 
of more than $10 billion).  
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five percent in 1990 to fifty-five percent in 2005.34  The three largest U.S. 
banks—Citigroup, Bank of America (BofA) and JP Morgan Chase 
(Chase)—expanded rapidly after 1990, and each bank held more than $1.5 
trillion of assets at the end of 2007.  Wachovia, the fourth largest U.S. 
bank, also grew rapidly, and its assets exceeded $780 billion at the end of 
2007.35   
Extensive consolidation also occurred in European banking markets 
after 1990.  Nearly 1,800 bank mergers took place in the Euro zone and the 
United Kingdom (U.K.) from 1990 to 2001.36  An additional 350 bank 
mergers were completed in the European Union (EU) from 2002 to 2006.37  
As in the United States, a number of very large bank mergers were 
completed in the U.K. and Europe, including three mergers from 1992 to 
1999 among leading U.K. banks (HSBC-Midland, Lloyds-TSB and Royal 
Bank of Scotland-National Westminster) and two combinations among 
four of the largest French banks (BNP-Paribas and Credit Agricole-Credit 
Lyonnais); a merger between two major Swiss banks, which produced 
UBS; and the 2007 acquisition of ABN AMRO, the largest Dutch bank, by 
a group of three European banks led by Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS).38 
In addition to the consolidation that took place among commercial 
banks, large banks also acquired securities firms.  Following the 
deregulation of the U.K. securities industry as part of London’s “Big 
Bang” of 1986, U.S. and European banks aggressively entered U.K. 
                                                                                                                          
34 Jones & Oshinsky, supra note 32, at 58.  Similarly, the share of domestic deposits held by the 
ten largest U.S. banks rose from seventeen percent in 1990 to forty-five percent in 2005.  Id. 
35 Kenneth D. Jones & Chau Nguyen, Increased Concentration in Banking: Megabanks and Their 
Implications for Deposit Insurance, in 14 FIN. MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS NO. 1, 1, at 
3–8 (Feb. 2005) (describing rapid growth among the largest banks from 1990 to 2003).  Compare 
Market Monitor: Bank and Thrift Holding Companies with the Most Assets, AM. BANKER, Apr. 15, 
2008, at 8, with Ranking the Banks: Bank and Thrift Holding Companies with the Most Assets, AM. 
BANKER, June 15, 2007, at 11 (showing that (i) Citigroup held $2.2 trillion of assets at the end of 2007, 
compared to $1.1 trillion at the end of 2002; (ii) Bank of America held $1.7 trillion of assets at in 2007, 
up from $660 billion in 2002; (iii) JP Morgan Chase held $1.6 trillion of assets in 2007, compared to 
$760 billion in 2002; and (iv) Wachovia held $780 billion in assets in 2007, up from $340 billion in 
2002).   
36 Dean Amel et al., Consolidation and Efficiency in the Financial Sector: A Review of the 
International Evidence, 28 J. BANKING & FIN. 2493, 2495 tbl.1 (2004) (showing 1355 bank mergers in 
the Euro zone and 419 bank mergers in the U.K. from 1990 to 2001).   
37 See EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, EU BANKING STRUCTURES 13 chart 3 (2007) (listing 
“domestic” and “cross-border” bank mergers occurring within the EU between 2002 through 2006), 
available at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/eubankingstructures2007en.pdf.   
38 Patrick Beitel & Dirk Schiereck, Value Creation at the Ongoing Consolidation of the European 
Banking Market 40–41 app. 3 (Instit. Mergers & Acquisitions, Working Paper No. 05/01, 2001), 
available at http://ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=302645; John Tagliabue, 2 Big Banks in 
France Join Forces, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2002, at W1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File; 
John Tagliabue, 2 of the Big 3 Swiss Banks to Join to Seek Global Heft, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1997, at 
D8, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File; Jason Singer & Carrick Mollenkamp, M&A 
Milestone: $101 Billion Deal for ABN Amro, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 2007, at A1, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, WSJNL File. 
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financial markets and acquired most of Britain’s top investment banks.39  
Similarly, as noted above, U.S. and European banks took advantage of the 
progressive dismantling of the Glass-Steagall Act by acquiring dozens of 
U.S. securities firms.40  For example, Chase acquired several small 
investment banks and subsequently merged with J.P. Morgan, which was 
the commercial bank with the strongest ties to Wall Street.41  Three large 
European banks also established major positions in the U.S. securities 
markets by acquiring Wall Street firms.  Credit Suisse acquired First 
Boston and Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette, while Deutsche Bank acquired 
Bankers Trust (not long after Bankers Trust had absorbed Alex. Brown), 
and UBS purchased PaineWebber.42      
In response to the growing competitive threat posed by commercial 
banks, large securities firms made their own acquisitions.  Smith Barney, 
the securities subsidiary of Travelers, acquired Shearson in 1993 and 
Salomon Brothers in 1997.  The resulting firm, Salomon Smith Barney 
(SSB), became part of Citigroup when Travelers merged with Citicorp in 
1998.43  Morgan Stanley greatly increased in size by combining with Dean 
Witter in 1997.44 
Wall Street firms also secured bank-like powers by acquiring 
depository institutions insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC).  Securities firms purchased industrial loan companies 
(ILCs) and thrift institutions by taking advantage of loopholes in the 
statutes governing bank and thrift holding companies.45  For example, 
Merrill Lynch (Merrill) acquired a thrift institution and an industrial loan 
company during the 1990s.  “By 2006, Merrill’s [subsidiary depository 
institutions] held $80 billion of deposits, and Merrill used those deposits to 
fund $70 billion of commercial and consumer loans.”46  Similarly, Morgan 
                                                                                                                          
39 Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 325 & n.449 (discussing entry by U.S. banks into London’s 
financial markets after the “Big Bang”); Investment Banking: Culture Club, ECONOMIST, July 1, 1995, 
at 66, available at LEXIS, News Library, ECON File (discussing Deutsche Bank’s acquisition of 
Morgan Grenfell, Dresdner Bank’s acquisition of Kleinwort Benson, and Swiss Bank’s acquisition of 
S.G. Warburg).   
40 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
41 Roy C. Smith, Strategic Directions in Investment Banking—A Retrospective Analysis, 14 J. 
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 111, 116 (2001); Steven Lipin et al., Blending Legends: Chase Agrees to Buy J.P. 
Morgan & Co. In a Historic Linkup, WALL ST. J., Sept. 13, 2000, at A1, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, WSJNL File.  
42 RICHARD BOOKSTABER, A DEMON OF OUR OWN DESIGN: MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS, AND THE 
PERILS OF FINANCIAL INNOVATION 75 (2007); Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 323, 376–77. 
43 BOOKSTABER, supra note 42, at 75, 125–26; Smith, supra note 41, at 116; Gary Weiss et al., 
Sandy’s Triumph, BUS. WK., Oct. 6, 1997, at 34, available at LEXIS, News Library, File BUSWK.  
44 Smith, supra note 41, at 118; Peter Truell, Giant Wall Street Merger: The Deal: Morgan 
Stanley and Dean Witter Agree to Merge, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 1997, at A1, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, NYT File.   
45 Wilmarth, Banking and Commerce, supra note 26, at 1569–73, 1584–85, 1590–91; Wilmarth, 
supra note 13, at 423–24.   
46 Wilmarth, Banking and Commerce, supra note 26, at 1591; see also Matthias Rieker, Merrill’s 
Retail Banking Strategy Seen Paying Off, AM. BANKER, June 12, 2003, at 20, available at LEXIS, 
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Stanley and Lehman Brothers (Lehman) purchased thrifts and ILCs, and 
Goldman Sachs (Goldman) acquired an ILC.47  At the end of 2006, 
Morgan Stanley controlled over $45 billion of deposits, while Lehman held 
over $20 billion in deposits and Goldman held more than $10 billion of 
deposits.48   
By acquiring ILCs and thrift institutions, large securities firms gained 
the ability to offer FDIC-insured deposits, to make commercial and 
consumer loans, and to engage in other traditional banking activities 
(including trust services).  Securities firms viewed FDIC-insured deposits 
as essential competitive weapons because those deposits provided a low-
cost, subsidized source of funding for their lending and investment 
activities.  By 2006, the four largest securities firms—Merrill, Morgan 
Stanley, Goldman and Lehman (hereinafter the “big four”)—had become 
de facto universal banks.49   
In order to increase their deposit insurance subsidy, financial 
conglomerates established sweep account programs that moved cash 
balances from customer accounts at their broker-dealer subsidiaries into 
FDIC-insured deposit accounts at their depository institution subsidiaries.  
“A 2004 study estimated that sweep account programs created $350 billion 
of FDIC-insured deposits that otherwise would have been held in 
uninsured money-market mutual funds (MMMFs) at brokerage firms.”50  
FDIC-insured deposits pay interest rates that are typically much lower, and 
earn spreads that are substantially greater, than the rates and spreads 
applicable to MMMFs.51  FDIC-insured deposits pay comparatively low 
interest rates because they are protected against loss by the FDIC’s deposit 
                                                                                                                          
News Library, File AMBNKR (reporting that Merrill Lynch relied on FDIC-insured bank deposits to 
provide fifty-one percent of its funding in 2003, compared with fourteen percent in 1998). 
47 See Bank and Thrift Holding Companies with the Most Deposits, AM. BANKER, June 18, 2007, 
at 12, available at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File [hereinafter 2006 Bank and Thrift Deposits] 
(listing Morgan Stanley and Lehman Brothers as thrift holding companies); The Industrial Bank 
Holding Company Act of 2007: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Financial Serv., 110th Cong. 9–11 
(2007) (statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, FDIC), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news 
/news/speeches/archives/2007/chairman/spapr2507a.html [hereinafter 2007 Bair Statement] (noting 
Morgan Stanley, Goldman and Lehman as owners of ILCs).  
48 2006 Bank and Thrift Deposits, supra note 47 (showing that Morgan Stanley’s thrift held 
almost $31 billion of deposits and Lehman’s thrift held almost $18 billion of deposits at the end of 
2006); 2007 Bair Statement, supra note 47 (showing that ILCs owned by Morgan Stanley, Goldman 
Sachs and Lehman Brothers held deposits of $16.6 billion, $11.0 billion and $2.6 billion, respectively, 
at the end of 2006).   
49 Wilmarth, Banking and Commerce, supra note 26, at 1590; see Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 
411, 423–25, 447–49; see also George Pennacchi, Deposit Insurance, Bank Regulation, and Financial 
System Risks, 53 J. MONETARY ECON. 1, 15 (2006).   
50 Wilmarth, Banking and Commerce, supra note 26, at 1591; see also Pennacchi, supra note 49, 
at 15. 
51 Wilmarth, Banking and Commerce, supra note 26, at 1591; see also Jed Horowitz, Merrill Taps 
U.S. Bank Chief, WALL ST. J., Feb. 26, 2008, at B11, available at LEXIS, News Library, File WSJNL 
(reporting that “[Merrill] sweeps uninvested cash in clients’ brokerage accounts into bank accounts, 
which generally pay lower interest rates than traditional money-market accounts”). 
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insurance fund and by the potentially unlimited taxpayer guarantee that 
stands behind that fund.52   
MMMFs pay significantly higher rates, compared to bank deposits, 
because they are not insured by the FDIC and are protected only by the 
much weaker insurance scheme administered by the Securities Investor 
Protection Corporation (SIPC).53  In addition, unlike FDIC-insured 
deposits, MMMFs cannot be used to fund loans and must be invested in 
                                                                                                                          
52 The FDIC’s Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) held $52.8 billion as of March 31, 2008, but 
declined to $18.9 billion at the end of 2008.  During 2008, 25 FDIC-insured institutions with assets of 
$372 billion failed.  In addition, more than 250 other institutions with assets of $160 billion were 
placed on the “problem” list.  The FDIC recorded $40.2 in loss provisions during 2008 to reflect actual 
and expected losses from failures of FDIC-insured institutions.  Those loss provisions caused the drop 
in the DIF’s balance.  Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., FDIC Q. Banking Profile, 4th Qtr. 2008, at 14, 15. tbls.I-
B & II-B.  Under 12 U.S.C. § 1824(a), the FDIC is authorized to borrow up to $30 billion from the 
United States Treasury to cover shortfalls in the DIF.  In March 2009, due to the declining balance in 
the DIF, Senator Christopher Dodd, chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, introduced a bill to 
increase the FDIC’s line of credit at the Treasury to as much as $500 billion.  Damian Paletta, U.S. 
News: Bill Seeks to Let FDIC Borrow up to $500 Billion, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2009, at A3, available 
at LEXIS, News Library, File WSJNL.   
Even before the current financial crisis, there was “little doubt that, in practice, the full faith and 
credit of the United States stands behind the FDIC.”  Joe Peek & James A. Wilcox, The Fall and Rise 
of Safety Net Subsidies, in TOO BIG TO FAIL: POLICIES AND PRACTICES IN GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS 
169, 180 (Benton E. Gup ed., 2004).  For example, during the thrift crisis of the 1980s, Congress passed 
a resolution in 1987, declaring that “it is the sense of the Congress that it should reaffirm that deposits 
up to the statutorily prescribed amount in federally insured depository institutions are backed by the full 
faith and credit of the United States.”  Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86, 
§ 901(b), 101 Stat. 657.  Congress ultimately spent $132 billion of taxpayer funds to protect thrift 
depositors and resolve thrift failures.  Wilmarth, Banking and Commerce, supra note 26, at 1589.  In 
view of the extraordinary financial assistance provided to FDIC-insured banks by the federal 
government during the present crisis, there can no longer be any doubt that the federal government 
effectively guarantees the payment of all FDIC-insured deposits.  See infra Part III.C.    
53 Unlike the FDIC, the SIPC is not a government agency.  Instead, it is a nonprofit corporation 
whose members are securities broker-dealers.  SIPC’s members pay assessments to generate the 
insurance fund administered by the SIPC.  At the end of 2007, the SIPC fund contained only $1.5 
billion, and the SIPC is authorized to borrow only $1 billion from the United States Treasury.  
SECURITIES INVESTOR PROTECTION CORPORATION, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 4, 8, available at 
http://www.sipc.org/pdf/SIPC_Annual_Report_2007_FINAL.pdf; see also LOUIS LOSS & JOEL 
SELIGMAN, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 60–61, 879 (5th ed. 2004) (explaining the 
purpose and role of the SIPC).  In 2008, the discovery of a massive Ponzi scheme orchestrated by 
Bernard Madoff exposed the SIPC to potential claims by investors that potentially could far exceed its 
insurance fund.  See Jane J. Kim, The Madoff Fraud Case: Burned Investors Won’t Find Strong Safety 
Net, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2008, at A8, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (“Some 
industry watchers question whether SIPC has enough in reserves to cover potential claims in the 
Madoff liquidation.”).  Moreover, in contrast to the FDIC, which has authority to examine FDIC-
insured banks and to provide financial assistance to failing banks, the SIPC has no power to examine or 
rehabilitate its members.  Instead, the SIPC’s sole responsibility is to liquidate insolvent broker-dealers 
and to pay a narrow range of qualifying claims presented by the insolvent firms’ customers.  For 
example, the SIPC does not protect customers from losses due to declines in the market value of 
securities or from fraud or breach of contract committed by broker-dealers.  See Per Jebsen, How to Fix 
Unpaid Arbitration Awards, 26 PACE L. REV. 183, 223–25 (2006) (stating that the SIPC does not cover 
claims for fraud); Thomas W. Joo, Who Watches the Watchers? The Securities Investor Protection Act, 
Investor Confidence, and the Subsidization of Failure, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1093–97, 1105–06 
(1999) (noting that the SIPC fund does not provide “insurance” for claims “based on declines in the 
market value of securities, fraud or breach of contract by the debtor” and that the “SIPC cannot 
rehabilitate an insolvent member firm, but must liquidate it”). 
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short-term, highly-rated, and low-yielding debt securities.54  Thus, FDIC-
insured deposits are doubly attractive to financial conglomerates because 
they provide a subsidized, low-cost source of funding and can be used to 
finance commercial and consumer loans.55 
C.  Convergence Between the Activities of Banks and Securities Firms 
Deregulation and consolidation spurred a growing convergence 
between the activities of the largest banks and securities firms during the 
past decade.  Both sets of institutions pursued similar strategies in an effort 
to achieve dominant positions in the capital markets.56  In the global 
markets for debt and equity securities, the top-ten underwriters in 2000 
included the “big three” U.S. banks (Citigroup, Chase and BofA), three 
major foreign universal banks (Credit Suisse, Deutsche and UBS), and the 
“big four” U.S. securities firms.57  This “top-ten” group of global securities 
underwriters remained unchanged during 2001–2007, except that Barclays, 
a leading U.K. bank, replaced BofA as a top-ten underwriter during the last 
three years of that period.58  The top-ten underwriters accounted for nearly 
                                                                                                                          
54 Wilmarth, Banking and Commerce, supra note 26, at 1591.    
55 Id.; Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 424–25, 448–49.  A 2006 comment letter filed by the Securities 
Industry Association with the FDIC stated that: 
Bank subsidiaries have added significant value and versatility to SIA member corporate groups, 
because member owned banks hold idle funds swept from brokerage accounts [into] deposits. . . . This 
has provided a reliable and low cost source of deposits to fund traditional banking products and 
services offered to customers of the corporate group . . . . 
Wilmarth, Banking and Commerce, supra note 26, at 1592 (quoting Letter to the FDIC, from the 
Securities Industry Association, (Oct. 10, 2006), in Comments on Industrial Loan Companies and 
Industrial Banks, Comment No. 71, at 3, available at http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/ 
federal/2006/06comilc.html). 
56 See, e.g., Elyas Elyasiani et al., Convergence and Risk-return Linkages Across Financial 
Service Firms, 31 J. BANKING & FIN. 1167, 1168–69, 1184–87 (2007) (providing empirical evidence of 
“convergence across [financial institutions] of different types as well as effective inter-industry 
competition, particularly between large banks and securities firms”); see also Joel F. Houston & Kevin 
J. Stiroh, Three Decades of Financial Sector Risk, Fed. Res. Bank N.Y. Staff Rep. No. 248, at 1–4, 9–
10, 17–22, 31–32 (Mar. 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=891171 
(finding “an increased correlation in the returns across financial industries, indicating a growing 
convergence among financial service providers”). 
57 Smith, supra note 41, at 116–21; Year-End Review of Underwriting: 2001 Underwriting 
Rankings, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2002, at R19 (“Global Stocks and Bonds” tbl.) (copy on file with the 
Connecticut Law Review) [hereinafter 2001 Global Underwriting Rankings] (listing the top ten global 
underwriters of stocks and bonds during 2001); see also supra note 35 & 49 and accompanying text 
(identifying the three largest U.S. banks and the four largest U.S. securities firms). 
58 2001 Global Underwriting Rankings, supra note 57 (showing that the top ten list of global 
underwriters remained the same during 2000 and 2001); Year-End Review of Markets & Finance: 2003 
Underwriting Rankings, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2004, at R17 (“Global Stocks and Bonds” tbl.) (copy on 
file with the Connecticut Law Review) [hereinafter 2003 Global Underwriting Rankings] (showing that 
the top ten global underwriters remained the same in 2002 and 2003); Year-End Review of Markets & 
Finance: 2005 Underwriting Rankings, WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2006, at R10 (“Global Stocks and Bonds” 
tbl.) (copy on file with the Connecticut Law Review) [hereinafter 2005 Global Underwriting Rankings] 
(showing that the top global underwriters remained the same in 2005, except that Barclays replaced 
BofA as a top ten underwriter in 2005); Year-End Review of Markets & Finance: 2006 Underwriting 
Rankings, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2007, at R18 (“Global Stocks and Bonds” tbl.) (copy on file at the 
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three-fifths of the global proceeds from underwriting debt and equity 
securities during 2005–2007.59  Citigroup became the world’s leading 
underwriter of stocks and bonds in 2001 and retained that position through 
the end of 2007.60    
The leading global underwriters of stocks and bonds also became the 
dominant providers of other financial products, including syndicated loans, 
asset-backed securities, over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).  Based on total fees for investment 
banking services, the top twenty global investment banks in 2007 included 
all of the eleven institutions named above (the “top eleven global 
underwriters”), along with Wachovia and several large foreign universal 
banks, including HSBC and BNP Paribas.61  As shown below, large 
universal banks sought to maximize their fee-based revenues by pursuing 
an “originate to distribute” (OTD) business strategy, in which they (i) 
originated and serviced loans, (ii) underwrote ABS and CDOs based on 
those loans, (iii) created additional financial instruments (including OTC 
derivatives) whose values were related in complex ways to the underlying 
loans, and (iv) distributed the resulting securities and other financial 
instruments to investors.  The following sections provide a brief overview 
of the primary fee-based products and services provided by universal 
banks. 
1.  Syndicated Lending 
In order to fund syndicated loans, large banks organize groups of 
                                                                                                                          
Connecticut Law Review) [hereinafter 2006 Global Underwriting Rankings] (showing that the top 
global underwriters remained the same in 2006, except that Barclays continued to rank among the top 
ten underwriters in place of BofA); Year-End Review of Markets & Finance: 2007 Underwriting 
Rankings, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2008, at R18 (“Global Stocks and Bonds” tbl.) (copy on file at the 
Connecticut Law Review) [hereinafter 2007 Global Underwriting Rankings] (showing that the top 
global underwriters remained the same in 2007, except that Barclays continued to rank among the top 
ten underwriters in place of BofA). 
59 2005 Global Underwriting Rankings, supra note 58 (“Global Stocks and Bonds” tbl.) (showing 
that the top ten underwriters received fifty-eight percent of the global proceeds for underwriting stocks 
and bonds in 2005); 2006 Global Underwriting Rankings, supra note 58 (“Global Stocks and Bonds” 
tbl.) (showing that the top ten underwriters received fifty-eight percent of such proceeds during 2006); 
2007 Global Underwriting Rankings, supra note 58 (“Global Stocks and Bonds” tbl.) (showing that the 
top ten underwriters received fifty-seven percent of such proceeds during 2007).  
60 Randall Smith, Deals & Deal Makers: Citigroup Unseats Merrill Lynch as Busiest 
Underwriter, WALL ST. J., Dec. 28, 2001, at C1; Randall Smith, Year End Review of Markets and 
Finance 2006: Underwriting Shifts Into Overdrive, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2007, at R18, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (reporting that “Citigroup held its No. 1 ranking among [global] 
underwriters for a sixth consecutive year”); Randall Smith, Credit Woes Take Toll on Underwriting, 
WALL ST. J., Jan. 3, 2008, at R18, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (reporting that 
“Citigroup led the ranks of the busiest underwriters” in 2007).  In 2008, Citigroup fell to third place 
among global debt and equity underwriters, behind Chase and Barclays.  Randall Smith, Year-End 
Review of Markets & Finance 2008: Stock and Bond Issuance Shrivels, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2009, at 
R13, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File. 
61 See Lisa Kassenaar, The Reckoning, BLOOMBERG MARKETS MAGAZINE, Apr. 2008, at 1 
(“Bloomberg 20” tbl.). 
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financial institutions and investors in a manner that resembles the 
formation of an underwriting syndicate for an offering of debt securities.  
As a practical matter, lead banks for syndicated loans (also known as agent 
banks or arranger banks) occupy a role similar to managing underwriters 
for offerings of debt securities.  Lead banks underwrite syndicated loans 
for the purpose of distributing portions of those loans to investors, and lead 
banks seek to retain the smallest possible pieces of those loans on their 
balance sheets.62 
Lead banks negotiate the terms of a syndicated loan with the borrower 
and then sell portions of the loan to banks and other institutional investors 
who agree to join the syndicate.  Lead banks also take responsibility for 
servicing the loan, including (i) collecting payments from the borrower and 
distributing those payments to syndicate members, (ii) monitoring the 
borrower’s performance of the loan agreement, and (iii) negotiating 
changes in the loan agreement or enforcing the agreement against a 
defaulting borrower.63   
The global syndicated lending market is “the largest source of 
corporate funds in the world”64 and “reached an all-time high [in 2006] 
with issuance of over $3.5 trillion.”65  A recent study determined that 
Chase, Citigroup and BofA were the top three lead banks in the global 
syndicated loan market from 2003 through 2006.  Other major banks in 
that market included BNP Paribas, RBS, HSBC, Barclays, Credit Agricole, 
Deutsche, Societe Generale, Credit Suisse and Wachovia.66    
The U.S. syndicated loan market, which represents the largest segment 
of the global market, has exceeded $1 trillion in most years since 1996, 
with peak volumes above $1.6 trillion in 2006 and 2007.67  Chase, BofA 
                                                                                                                          
62 Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 379; see also Mitchell Berlin, Dancing with Wolves: Syndicated 
Loans and the Economics of Multiple Lenders, FED. RES. BANK OF PHILA. BUS. REV., 3rd Qtr. 2007, at 
1, 2 (describing the loan syndication process); Benjamin C. Esty, Structuring Loan Syndicates: A Case 
Study of the Hong Kong Disneyland Project Loan, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 2001, at 80, 81–83 
(2001) (describing the loan syndication process).  For example, a senior officer in Chase’s syndicated 
lending operation stated that “[w]e are investment bankers, not commercial bankers, which means that 
we underwrite to distribute, not to put a loan on our balance sheet.”  Esty, supra, at 80 (quoting Matt 
Harris).  
63 Berlin, supra note 62, at 2, 5–7; Yener Altunbas & Alper Kara , Does Concentrated Arranger 
Structure in US Syndicated Loan Markets Benefit Large Firms? 2 (Aberdeen Bus. Sch., Working Paper 
No. 2, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1009536). 
64 Esty, supra note 62, at 80.  
65 Altumbas & Kara, supra note 63, at 1–3; see also Esty, supra note 62, at 80 (reporting that the 
global syndicated loan market increased from $400 billion in 1990 to $2.2 trillion in 2000). 
66 Miguel A. Ferreira & Pedro P. Matos, When Banks Are Insiders: Evidence from the Global 
Syndicated Loan Market 10, 34 tbl.1 (FDIC Center for Fin. Res., Working Paper No. 17, 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1113406. 
67 Berlin, supra note 62, at 2 (providing data for the U.S. syndicated lending market from 1997 
through 2006, showing that the size of the market exceeded $1 trillion in each of those years except 
2002 and 2003); 2006 Global Underwriting Rankings, supra note 58 (“Loan-Book Managers” tbl.) 
(reporting $1.67 trillion of U.S. syndicated loans  in 2006); 2007 Global Underwriting Rankings, supra 
note 58 (“Loan-Book Managers” tbl.) (reporting $1.77 trillion of U.S. syndicated loans in 2007).  In 
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and Citigroup controlled about three-fifths of the U.S. syndicated lending 
market from 2000 through 2007.68  During the same period, Wachovia, 
Credit Suisse, Deutsche, UBS, Barclays, RBS and Wells Fargo also ranked 
among the largest U.S. syndicated lenders.69   
From the late 1990s through 2007, the “big four” securities firms were 
increasingly significant competitors in the syndicated lending market, 
particularly with regard to leveraged loans, which are higher-yielding, 
higher-risk loans.70  From 2004 to 2007, the leveraged syndicated lending 
market expanded rapidly in response to (i) demand by investors for higher-
yielding investments, and (ii) demand by private equity firms for financing 
in order to complete leveraged buyout transactions (LBOs).  The global 
leveraged lending market grew from $250 billion in 1996 to $700 billion in 
2004, $900 billion in 2005, $1.2 trillion in 2006, and $1.6 trillion in 2007.71  
This dramatic growth in leveraged lending fueled a global boom in 
LBOs.72  The total value of global LBOs exceeded $1.8 trillion between 
                                                                                                                          
2008, the volume of U.S. syndicated loans declined to $760 billion.  See Year-End Review of Markets 
& Finance 2008: 2008 Underwriting Rankings, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2009, at R 13 (“Syndicated Loans” 
tbl.) (copy on file with the Connecticut Law Review).   
68 2001 Global Underwriting Rankings, supra note 58 (“Loan-Book Managers” tbl.) (showing 
that the three banks controlled sixty-seven percent of the U.S. syndicated lending market in 2000 and 
seventy percent of that market in 2001); 2003 Global Underwriting Rankings, supra note 58 (“Loan-
Book Managers” tbl.) (showing that the market shares for the same three banks were sixty-six percent 
in 2002 and fifty-nine percent in 2003); 2005 Global Underwriting Rankings, supra note 58 (“Loan-
Book Managers” tbl.) (showing that the market shares for the same three banks were sixty-six percent 
in 2004 and sixty-three percent in 2005); 2007 Global Underwriting Ranking, supra note 58 (“Loan-
Book Managers” tbl.) (showing that the market shares for the same three banks were sixty percent in 
2006 and fifty-seven percent in 2007).  
69 For market-share data for the top lenders in the U.S. syndicated loan market from 2001 through 
2007, see “Loan-Book Manager” tables in the 2001, 2003, 2005, and 2007 “Global Underwriting 
Rankings,” supra note 58.   
70 The term “leveraged loan” is generally used to refer to a loan in the amount of $100 million or 
more that is made to a company with non-investment grade bonds outstanding or that carries a yield of 
at least 125 basis points above a risk-free benchmark rate.  Thus, leveraged loans are higher-yielding, 
higher-risk loans.  Edward I. Altman, Global Debt Markets in 2007: New Paradigm or the Great 
Credit Bubble?, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Summer 2007, at 17, 24.  For discussions of the competition 
for syndicated loans between large commercial banks and major securities firms, see, for example, 
Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 326–27, 411; Todd Davenport, Perspectives on a Crunch, AM. BANKER, 
Aug. 6, 2007, at 1 (reporting that the ten largest participants in the leveraged syndicated loan market 
during the first half of 2007 were Chase, BofA, Citigroup, Wachovia, Credit Suisse, Deutsche, UBS, 
Goldman, Merrill and Lehman); Emily Thornton, The New Merrill Lynch, BUS. WK., May 5, 2003, at 
80, 85 (reporting that Merrill Lynch had significantly expanded its syndicated lending activities during 
2002); 2007 Global Underwriting Rankings, supra note 58 (“Loan-Book Managers” tbl.) (reporting 
that Goldman, Lehman and Merrill ranked among the top ten U.S. syndicated lenders during 2007).  
71 Comm. on the Global Fin. System, Private Equity and Leveraged Finance Markets 11 graph 
2.2, 17–21 (CGFS Papers, Working Paper No. 30, 2008), available at www.bis.org/publ/cgfs30.htm 
[hereinafter 2008 CGFS Private Equity Paper]. 
72 See Viral V. Acharya et al., Private Equity: Boom and Bust?, 19 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Fall 
2007, at 44, 44–46, 49–50; Altman, supra note 70, at 17, 24–25.  More than half of the leveraged loans 
issued in the U.S. and Europe between 2004 and 2007 were used to finance LBOs and other corporate 
transactions, including recapitalizations, mergers and acquisitions.  See 2008 CGFS Private Equity 
Paper, supra note 71, at 13, 14 graph 2.6.  
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2004 and 2007.73   
During the same period, lead banks for syndicated leveraged loans 
frequently entered into “firm-commitment underwriting[s],” in which they 
agreed to provide bridge loans to the borrowers before they finished the 
syndication process.74  Lead banks incurred significant “warehouse risk” in 
making such commitments, because they were obliged to hold the bridge 
loans on their balance sheets if they could not successfully complete the 
syndication.75  Lead banks nevertheless eagerly accepted that risk because 
they expected to earn significant fees from (i) arranging and overseeing the 
syndicated loans, and (ii) providing associated investment banking services 
(e.g., underwriting high-yield debt and providing merger advice) to private 
equity firms and other sponsors of LBO transactions.76     
2.  Securitization of Consumer and Commercial Loans  
  a.  Overview of the Securitization Process 
Securitization has enabled universal banks to increase significantly the 
volume of their consumer and commercial lending activities.  Banks 
traditionally provided loans by acting as intermediaries between depositors 
and borrowers.  Banks collected deposits to fund their lending activities 
and monitored the performance of borrowers by retaining loans on their 
balance sheets.77  However, for two reasons, traditional on-balance-sheet 
lending activities became significantly less profitable and less appealing 
for large banks during the past three decades.  First, as consumers gained 
access to alternative investment vehicles like mutual funds, they demanded 
higher yields on their deposits and were less likely to invest their savings 
in deposits.  Retail deposits therefore became a more expensive and less 
reliable source of funding for banks.78  Second, banks are required to 
maintain capital reserves based on the assets held on their balance sheets, 
including loans.  The implementation of stricter capital requirements for 
U.S. and foreign banks after 1980 made it much more costly for banks to 
                                                                                                                          
73 2008 CGFS Private Equity Paper, supra note 71, at 20 graph 3.2; see also Steven N. Kaplan & 
Par Stromberg, Leveraged Buyouts and Private Equity 23 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Winter 2009, at 121, 
126–27 (stating that “[f]rom 2005 through June 2007, CapitalIQ recorded a total of 5,188 buyout 
transactions at a combined enterprise value of over $1.6 trillion”). 
74 2008 CGFS Private Equity Paper, supra note 71, at 14–16; see also id. at 14 n.9 (noting that 
most public issuances of high-yield bonds are similarly made through firm-commitment 
underwritings).  
75 Id. at 15–16. 
76 EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, LARGE BANKS AND PRIVATE EQUITY-SPONSORED LEVERAGED 
BUYOUTS IN THE EU 16–17, 26–27 (2007), available at www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/largebanksand 
privateequity200704en.pdf [hereinafter 2007 ECB PRIVATE EQUITY LBO REPORT]; 2008 CGFS 
Private Equity Paper, supra note 71, at 14–15. 
77 Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 227–29. 
78 Id. at 239–41; Christine M. Bradley & Lynn Shibut, The Liability Structure of FDIC-Insured 
Institutions: Changes and Implications, 18 FDIC BANKING REV., No. 2, at 1, 2 (2006).  
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hold loans on their balance sheets.79   
Securitization addressed both of the foregoing problems.  
Securitization allowed banks to reduce their reliance on deposits and to 
obtain funding for their loans through the capital markets.  By using 
securitization techniques, banks converted illiquid loans into asset-backed 
securities (ABS) that could be sold to investors.80  Securitization also 
enabled banks to move loans off their balance sheets and thereby reduce 
their regulatory capital requirements.81   
Securitization offered at least three additional benefits to lenders.  
First, banks with less than a “AAA” credit rating could use securitizations 
to create ABS that qualified for “AAA”-ratings.82  Second, banks earned 
substantial fees for originating and securitizing loans and could earn 
additional fees by servicing the loans held in securitized pools.83  Third, 
securitization permitted banks to transfer to investors much of the credit 
risk associated with the securitized loans.84 
The securitization process begins when a bank (referred to as the 
                                                                                                                          
79 Charles W. Calomiris & Joseph R. Mason, Credit Card Securitization and Regulatory 
Arbitrage, 26 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 5, 8–9 (2004); Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 403–06, 457–61.  
80 Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in 
Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 535–36 (2002); Arnoud W.A. Boot & Anjan V. 
Thakor, The Accelerating Integration of Banks and Markets and Its Implications for Regulation 12–13 
(Amsterdam Ctr. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 2008-02, 2009), available at http:// 
ssrn.com/abstract=1108484. 
81 FEIN, supra note 14, § 13.01, at 13–4; STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ ET AL., SECURITIZATION, 
STRUCTURED FINANCE AND CAPITAL MARKETS § 7.04, at 155 (2004); Calomiris & Mason, supra note 
79, at 8; Eggert, supra note 80, at 547.  However, banks remained subject to special capital charges if 
they retained credit risk for a portion of the securitized loans by giving credit enhancements (for 
example, by agreeing to hold a “first loss” junior tranche in the ABS or to buy back loans that did not 
satisfy criteria specified by the securitization documents).  Risk-Based Capital Guidelines: Final Rule, 
66 Fed. Reg. 59,614, 59,619–25 (Nov. 29, 2001); FEIN, supra note 14, §§ 13.04, 13.05. 
82 SCHWARCZ ET AL., supra note 81, § 1.03, at 8–16; Joshua D. Coval et al., The Economics of 
Structured Finance 23 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Winter 2009, at 3, 3–7; Eggert, supra note 80, at 545–
46.  
83 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, CREDIT RISK 
TRANSFER: DEVELOPMENTS FROM 2005 TO 2007, at 7 (2008), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/joint21.htm [hereinafter 2008 BASEL CRT REPORT]; FEIN, supra note 14, § 
13.01, at 13–4; Robert DeYoung & Tara Rice, How Do Banks Make Money? The Fallacies of Fee 
Income, 28 ECON. PERSPECTIVES 34, 35–36, 39, 42 (2004); Adam B. Ashcraft & Til Schuermann, 
Understanding the Securitization of Subprime Mortgage Credit 5 (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working 
Paper No. 07-43, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1071189.   
84 FEIN, supra note 14, § 13.01, at 13-4; Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind 
Eye: Wall Street Finance of Predatory Lending, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2039, 2048–49 (2007).  Before 
2000, securitization structures often attempted to mitigate the lender’s risk-shifting incentives by 
requiring the lender to retain the most junior tranches in structured-finance ABS while selling more 
senior tranches of the ABS to investors.  Because the most junior tranches would bear the first losses 
from any defaults on the pooled loans, the lender would retain a significant portion of the credit risk if 
it kept those tranches.  However, during the subprime lending boom, as discussed below, lenders were 
able to sell many of the junior tranches in their MBS by packaging them into CDOs that were sold to 
hedge funds and other institutional investors who wanted the higher yields offered by such securities.  
See Engel & McCoy, supra note 84, at 2065–68 (explaining that lenders were frequently able to 
transfer the riskiest tranches of ABS to hedge funds and other investors); see also infra notes 317, 337 
and 339 and accompanying text. 
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“sponsor”) transfers loans that it has originated, or purchased from others, 
to a special-purpose entity (SPE).  The SPE is structured so that it will be 
shielded from potential claims arising out of the sponsor’s bankruptcy.  
The SPE creates a loan pool (sometimes by combining the sponsor’s loans 
with loans sold by other lenders), and the SPE sells that pool to a second 
SPE, typically organized as a trust.  The role of the second SPE is to 
manage the loan pool and to issue ABS that confer rights to receive cash 
flows from the pooled loans.  The second SPE (the “SPE issuer”) hires an 
investment bank (frequently an affiliate of the sponsor) to underwrite the 
sale of ABS to investors.  After the underwriting has been completed, the 
proceeds paid by investors for the ABS are transferred to the sponsor in 
payment for the loans.  Also, in many cases, the SPE issuer hires the 
sponsor to act as servicing agent for the securitized loans.85   
In early securitizations of home mortgages during the 1970s and 
1980s, the residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) were structured 
as pass-through certificates that represented undivided pro rata interests in 
the pooled mortgages.  However, pass-through certificates were 
unattractive to many investors because they were long-term securities that 
were subject to both prepayment risk and interest rate risk.  To attract a 
broader group of investors, securitization sponsors created structured-
finance RMBS, which allocated rights to receive cash flows from the 
pooled mortgages among various “tranches.”  Typically, the holders of 
tranches of an issue of RMBS were given (i) rights to receive income flows 
from specified sources (e.g., from payments of principal or interest on the 
pooled mortgages) and/or (ii) superior or subordinate rights to receive 
payment in relation to other tranches of the same issue of MBS.86   
                                                                                                                          
85 For discussions of the securitization process, see, for example, Gary B. Gorton & Nicholas S. 
Souleles, Special Purpose Vehicles and Securitization, in THE RISKS OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 549, 
549–51, 555–65 (Mark Carey & René M. Stulz eds., 2006); SCHWARCZ ET AL., supra note 81, § 1.03; 
Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 83, at 2–11; Engel & McCoy, supra note 84, at 2045–48; 
Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2185, 2206–10 (2007) 
[hereinafter Peterson, Predatory Finance]; David E. Vallee, A New Plateau for the U.S. Securitization 
Market, FDIC OUTLOOK (Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation), Fall 2006, at 3, 3–4, available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/regional/ro20063q/na/t3q2006.pdf; Jennifer E. Bethel et al., Legal 
and Economic Issues in Litigation Arising from the 2007-2008 Credit Crisis 5–15 (Harvard Law & 
Econ., Discussion Paper No. 612, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1096582; Jan A. Kregel, 
Changes in the U.S. Financial System and the Subprime Crisis 7–12 (Levy Econ. Inst., Working Paper 
No. 530, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1123937. 
86 For discussions of the differences between traditional pass-through securitizations and 
contemporary structured securitizations, see, for example, Peterson, Predatory Finance, supra note 85, 
at 2200–04; Kregel, supra note 85, at 5–9; Gregory A. Krohn & William R. Gruver, The Complexities 
of the Financial Turmoil of 2007 and 2008, at 8–10 (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1282250.  The term “structured finance” generally refers to the use of pooling and tranching 
to create various classes of ABS from a pool of debt instruments.  INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: CONTAINING SYSTEMIC RISKS AND RESTORING FINANCIAL 
SOUNDNESS 56 box 2.1 (Apr. 2008), available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ 
gfsr/2008/01/pdf/text.pdf [hereinafter April 2008 IMF GFS REPORT]; Coval et al., supra note 82, at 3, 
6; Sarai Criado & Adrian van Rixtel, Structured Finance and the Financial Turmoil of 2007-2008: An 
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During the past decade, most RMBS and other types of ABS were 
divided into three general classes of tranches—senior, mezzanine and 
junior.  Senior tranches were given the highest priority to receive cash 
flows from payments on the pooled loans until those securities were fully 
paid, and cash flows then trickled down sequentially to the mezzanine and 
junior tranches.  Conversely, losses on the pooled loans were allocated first 
to the junior tranches, then to the mezzanine tranches, and last to the senior 
tranches.  Underwriters structured their securitizations in consultation with 
credit rating agencies so that the desired credit rating could be obtained for 
each tranche.  Securitizations were typically structured so that the senior 
tranches received AAA-ratings, the mezzanine tranches received at least 
the lowest investment-grade rating (BBB-), and the junior tranches 
(including equity tranches) were unrated.  In addition, underwriters 
frequently obtained credit enhancements for senior tranches to ensure that 
those tranches qualified for AAA-ratings.  Credit enhancements included 
over-collateralization (i.e., issuing ABS with a lower face value than the 
par value of the pooled loans), agreements by lenders to buy back loans 
that defaulted early, or third-party guarantees against loss (e.g., insurance 
provided by monoline insurers).87   
During the late 1980s, federal banking agencies and courts issued a 
series of rulings that authorized commercial banks to securitize loans that 
they originated or purchased from others.88  Regulators also permitted 
nonbank subsidiaries of bank holding companies to securitize loans 
originated by affiliated banks.89  As a consequence of those rulings and the 
enactment of GLBA in 1999, commercial banks and bank holding 
companies gained broad authority to compete directly with investment 
banks in securitizing loans and in underwriting or investing in ABS.90 
                                                                                                                          
Introductory Overview 11 (Banco de Espana, Occasional Paper No. 0808, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1260748.     
87 For discussions of the structuring techniques and credit enhancements used in securitizations, 
see, for example, STAFF OF THE SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN 
THE COMM’N STAFF’S EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 6–10 (2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf; Engel & McCoy, supra note 84, at 
2046–48; Peterson, Predatory Finance, supra note 85, at 2204–05, 2209–10; Ashcraft & Schuermann, 
supra note 83, at 29–34; Bethel et al., supra note 85, at 9–11, 13–15; Gary B. Gorton, The Subprime 
Panic, 15 EUROPEAN FIN. MGMT. 10, 17–23 (2009).  In order to avoid regulation under the Securities 
Act of 1933 and the Investment Company Act of 1940, the issuers and underwriters of ABS were 
required to sell either (i) investment-grade ABS or (ii) ABS offered in private placements to qualified 
institutional buyers under the SEC’s Rule 144A.  See SCHWARCZ ET AL., supra note 81, § 6.01, at 129–
30, 135–36, § 6.02, at 139–41. 
88 E.g., Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034, 1049 (2d Cir. 1989); FEIN, supra note 14, § 
13.02[A] (discussing orders issued in 1986 and 1987 by the OCC); 12 C.F.R. § 1.3(g) (2008). 
89 E.g., Sec. Indus. Ass’n v. Fed. Reserve Sys., 839 F.2d 47, 67 (2d Cir. 1988); FEIN, supra note 
14, § 13.02[B]. 
90 FEIN, supra note 14, § 13.02; Kregel, supra note 85, at 10–11.  For example, under the OCC’s 
regulations, national banks may invest in RMBS and other ABS if those securities have investment-
grade ratings.  12 C.F.R. §§ 1.2(m)–(n), 1.3(e)–(f) (2008).   
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  b.  The Rapid Expansion of Securitization Markets after 1990 
Securitization markets experienced explosive growth after 1990.  
Government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) issued the first RMBS in the 
early 1970s, and the issuance of RMBS by GSEs grew steadily thereafter.91  
The total amount of outstanding RMBS issued by GSEs nearly quadrupled 
from 1991 through 2007, rising from $1.13 trillion to $4.3 trillion.92   
The GSEs’ success with RMBS encouraged banks and other financial 
institutions to pursue their own securitization strategies.  Beginning in the 
late 1970s, banks and securities firms began to issue “private label” 
RMBS.  Private label RMBS were backed by residential real estate loans 
that did not conform to Fannie Mae’s and Freddie Mac’s underwriting 
guidelines, including “jumbo” mortgages, adjustable-rate mortgages 
(ARMs), “subprime” and “Alt-A” mortgages, home equity loans, and 
home equity lines of credit (HELOCs).93  Banks and securities firms also 
issued ABS backed by other types of consumer loans, including credit card 
loans, auto loans, manufactured home loans, and student loans.94  The total 
outstanding amounts of private label RMBS and consumer ABS increased 
more than tenfold during 1991–2007, rising from $300 billion to $3.2 
trillion.  The 2007 figure included $2.52 trillion of private label RMBS and 
                                                                                                                          
91 Congress established several GSEs to promote residential mortgage lending, including (i) the 
Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA or Ginnie Mae), which purchase home mortgages 
insured by the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration and issue RMBS 
backed by those loans, and (ii) the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA or Fannie Mae) and 
the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC or Freddie Mac), which purchase 
conventional fixed-rate home mortgages and issue RMBS backed by those loans.  E.g., Richard S. 
Carnell, Handling the Failure of a Government-Sponsored Enterprise, 80 WASH. L. REV. 565, 573–80 
(2005); Richard K. Green & Susan M. Wachter, The American Mortgage in Historical and 
International Context, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 93, 95–100 (2005); Peterson, Predatory Finance, supra note 
85, at 2195–99.  The federal government placed Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac in conservatorship in 
September 2008 to prevent their failure, after both GSEs suffered large losses due to accelerating 
delinquencies and defaults on mortgages they held or guaranteed.  See David J. Reiss, Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac and the Future of Federal Housing Finance Policy: A Study of Regulatory Privilege, at 1–
4, 10–27 (Brooklyn Law School Leg. Stud. Paper No. 134), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1357337. 
92 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FED. RES. STATISTICAL RELEASE Z.1: FLOW 
OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, FOURTH QUARTER 1996, at 77 tbl.L.125 (1997) 
[hereinafter 1996 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT] (providing figure for year-end 1991); BD. OF GOVERNORS 
OF THE FED. RES. SYS., FED. RES. STATISTICAL REL. Z.1: FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, FOURTH QUARTER 2007, at 78 tbl.L.125 (2008) [hereinafter 2007 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT] 
(providing amount for year-end 2007).  
93 Engel & McCoy, supra note 84, at 2045–46 n.32; Peterson, Predatory Finance, supra note 85, 
at 2198–2200, 2214–15.  Prior to their nationalization in 2008, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac primarily 
engaged in purchasing and securitizing “conforming” fixed-rate mortgages that satisfied maximum size 
limits and other underwriting guidelines established by Congress.  Reforming the Regulation of 
Government Sponsored Entities: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs, 110th Cong. 2 & n.2 (2008) (statement of Willaim B. Shear, Director of Financial Markets and 
Community Investment, Government Accountability Office); David J. Reiss, The Federal 
Government’s Implied Guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac: Uncle Sam Will Pick Up the Tab, 
42 GA. L. REV 1019, 1032 & nn.55–56 (2008). 
94 Vallee, supra note 85, at 4–6; Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 388–90, 403. 
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$680 billion of ABS backed by other types of consumer credit.95   
At the end of 2007, GSE-issued RMBS and private label RMBS 
accounted for almost two-thirds of all outstanding home mortgages, while 
consumer ABS accounted for more than a quarter of all outstanding 
consumer loans.96  The securitized share of both sectors increased 
significantly during 1991–2007.97 
During the past decade, large financial conglomerates significantly 
expanded their presence in securitization markets, and big commercial 
banks became more closely linked to the capital markets.98  For example, 
Lehman and Bear Stearns were the top underwriters for private label 
RMBS during 2004–2007, while Citigroup was the top underwriter for 
ABS backed by other types of consumer debt.  Other leading underwriters 
of RMBS and ABS during 2004–2007 included Chase, BofA, Credit 
Suisse, Deutsche, Goldman, Morgan Stanley, Merrill, RBS, UBS and 
Wachovia.99  Thus, the top underwriters of RMBS and ABS included the 
five largest Wall Street securities firms and several of the world’s leading 
                                                                                                                          
95 1996 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 77 tbl.L.126 (providing year-end 1991 data 
for issuers of (i) federal agency and GSE-issued RMBS backed by privately-issued collateralized 
mortgage obligations (CMOs), (ii)  privately-issued RMBS, and (iii) privately-issued ABS backed by 
consumer debt); 2007 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 79 tbl.L.126 (providing year-end 
2007 data for issuers of same types of RMBS and ABS). 
96 2007 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 78 tbl.L.125, 79 tbl.L.126, 94 tbl.L.218 
(showing that GSE-issued RMBS and private label RMBS accounted for $6.8 trillion of the $10.5 
trillion in outstanding home mortgages at the end of 2007); id. at 96 tbl.L.222 (showing that ABS 
issuers accounted for $680 billion  out of $2.55 trillion in outstanding consumer loans at the end of 
2007).  
97 In 1991, GSE-issued RMBS and private label RMBS accounted for less than half of the 
outstanding home mortgages ($1.13 trillion of $2.85 trillion), while consumer ABS accounted for only 
one-eighth of outstanding consumer loans ($103 billion of $797 billion). 1996 FLOW OF FUNDS 
REPORT, supra note 92, at 77 tbls.L.125 & L.126, 92 tbl.L.218 and 94 tbl.L.222. 
98 See Arnoud W.A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, The Accelerating Integration of Banks and 
Marekts and Its Implications for Regulation 6–10, 15–16 (Amsterdam Ctr. L. & Econ., Working Paper 
No. 2008-02, Mar. 18, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1108484 [hereinafter Boot & 
Thakor, Banks and Markets]; Claudio Borio, The Financial Turmoil of 2007?: A Preliminary 
Assessment and Some Policy Considerations 11–12 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 
251, Mar. 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1132776; DeYoung & Rice, supra note 83, at 
35–36, 39.  
99 See Paul Menchaca, Lehman Repeats as RMBS Champ, ASSET SECURITIZATION REP., Jan. 7, 
2008, available at LEXIS, News Library, ASTSRP File (listing top RMBS underwriters during 2007); 
Donna Mitchell, Citi Holds Lead in ’06 as Top Arranger: Countrywide Reprises Top Issuer Role, 
ASSET SECURITIZATION REP., Jan. 8, 2007, available at Lexis, News Library, ASTSRP File (listing top 
ABS underwriters for 2006); Donna Mitchell, More 08 Deals Seen from Strong Consumer ABS: 
Growth of 20% Could Happen for Autos and Cards; JPMorgan Ends Year Atop Lead Manager Heap, 
ASSET SECURITIZATION REP., Jan. 7, 2008, available at LEXIS, News Library, File Name ASTSRP 
(listing top ABS underwriters for 2007); Allison Pyburn, Bear Stearns Jeads RMBS League Tables 
Again, ASSET SECURITIZATION REP., Jan. 8, 2007, available at LEXIS, News Library, ASTSRP File 
(listing top RMBS underwriters during 2006); Alison Pyburn, RMBS Grows a Robust $200bln in 2005, 
with Bear Top Arranger, ASSET SECURITIZATION REP., Jan. 9, 2006, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, ASTSRP File (reporting on top RMBS underwriters during 2004 and 2005); Allison Pyburn, 
US ABS Market Reaches $1 Trillion Dollar Mark in 2005, ASSET SECURITIZATION REP., Jan. 9, 2006, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, ASTSRP File (reporting on top ABS underwriters during 2004 and 
2005. 
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universal banks.100  
Building on their experience with RMBS and consumer ABS, financial 
conglomerates securitized large amounts of commercial mortgages.  The 
volume of outstanding commercial mortgage-backed securities (CMBS) 
rose from $100 billion in 1996 to $360 billion in 2003 and $780 billion in 
2007.101  Annual issuances of CMBS exceeded $200 billion in 2006, and 
again in 2007.102  Due in substantial part to the rapid growth of CMBS, the 
total amount of U.S. commercial mortgages rose from $1.05 trillion in 
1996 to $3.3 trillion in 2007.103  The top underwriters of CMBS included 
Morgan Stanley, Wachovia, BofA, Lehman and Citigroup.104  
Beginning in the late 1980s, universal banks and securities firms began 
to offer a new type of securitization vehicle known as cash flow 
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).  Cash flow CDOs are structured-
finance entities that issue tranched securities backed by pools of RMBS, 
other types of ABS and syndicated corporate loans.  Cash flow CDOs 
backed by RMBS and other types of ABS are frequently referred to as 
“ABS CDOs” and effectively represent a re-securitization of previously 
securitized debt.  In a typical ABS CDO, mezzanine tranches from RMBS 
or other ABS are pooled together and re-securitized so that most of the 
tranches of the ABS CDO qualify for “AAA” credit ratings.105   
CDOs backed by syndicated corporate loans are generally referred to 
                                                                                                                          
100 In 2007, the twelve top underwriters of private-label RMBS included the five largest U.S.  
securities firms (Goldman, Lehman, Merrill, Morgan Stanley and Bear Stearns), the three largest U.S. 
banks (BofA, Chase and Citigroup), and four large foreign universal banks (Credit Suisse, Deutsche, 
RBS and UBS).  The aggregate share of the private-label RMBS market held by those twelve 
underwriters exceeded eighty percent.  Allen Ferrell et al., Legal and Economic Issues in Subprime 
Litigation (Harvard John Olin Center Discussion Paper 02/2008, Feb. 21, 2008), at 73 tbl.2, available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1096582; see supra notes 35 & 49 and accompanying text (identifying the 
three largest U.S. banks and the four largest U.S. securities firms).  Bear Stearns ranked as the fifth 
largest U.S. securities firm prior to its collapse and acquisition by Chase in 2008.  Takahiko Hyuga, 
Merrill Lynch’s Thain Says Bear Rescue Averted Risk (Update 1), BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 8, 2008, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aUL4t3BinbRk#. 
101 See 1996 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 77 tbl.L.126 (showing outstanding 
CMBS backed by multifamily residential mortgages and other commercial mortgages at the end of 
1996); 2007 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 79 tbl.L.126 (showing same information at the 
end of 2003 and 2007).  
102 Gabrielle Stein, Banks Face Write-downs on CMBS Market Unease, ASSET SECURITIZATION 
REP., Mar. 3, 2008, available at LEXIS, News Library, ASTSRP File [hereinafter Stein, CMBS Market 
Unease] (reporting that Morgan Stanley underwrote $32.4 billion of CMBS that year, accounting for 
14.5% of a CMBS market totaling more than $230 billion); Poonkulali Thangavelu, Jolt Extends to 
CMBS/CDOs, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, Sept. 10, 2007, available at LEXIS, News Library, NMN File 
(stating that $203 billion of CMBS was issued in 2006). 
103 See 1996 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 91 tbl.L.217 (showing outstanding 
multifamily residential mortgages and other commercial mortgages at the end of 1996); 2007 FLOW OF 
FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 93 tbl.L.217 (showing same information at the end of 2007).  
104 Stein, CMBS Market Unease, supra note 102 (identifying top underwriters of CMBS during 
2007). 
105 Criado & van Rixtel, supra note 86, at 23–25; Douglas J. Lucas et al., Collateralized Debt 
Obligations and Credit Risk Transfer (Yale Int’l Ctr. for Fin., Working Paper No. 07-06, 2007), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=997276.  
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as collateralized loan obligations (CLOs).  During 2001–2007, most CLOs 
were organized as structured-finance vehicles that managed pools of 
leveraged syndicated loans and sold tranched securities to institutional 
investors, including insurance companies and asset managers.106  The rapid 
growth in CLOs for leveraged loans helped to fuel the spectacular boom in 
global LBOs during 2004–2007.107  
About $1.22 trillion of cash flow CDOs were issued in global markets 
during 2002–2007, of which about fifty-five percent were ABS CDOs and 
the rest were CLOs.108  Citigroup, Merrill and Wachovia were the top U.S. 
managers of ABS CDOs during 2004–2007, and they collectively managed 
more than $300 billion of ABS CDOs during that period.109  The U.S. 
market was by far the dominant market for CDOs, accounting for about 
three-quarters of the global issuance of CDOs.110   
3.  Over-the-Counter Derivatives and Synthetic CDOs 
Like the securitization markets, markets for OTC derivatives111 
enjoyed spectacular growth rates after 1990.  OTC derivatives are used to 
manage and transfer risks, and to engage in speculation, with respect to 
interest rates, currency rates, equity stocks, debt obligations, commodities, 
and other assets, indices, rates or events.112  The aggregate notional values 
                                                                                                                          
106 2008 BASEL CRT REPORT, supra note 83, at 34–35; see also Altman, supra note 70, at 24; 
2008 CGFS Private Equity Paper, supra note 71, at 5, 27–29. 
107 2008 BASEL CRT REPORT, supra note 83, at 34–35; Altman, supra note 70, at 24 & n.19; see 
also supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text (discussing LBO boom). 
108 AM. SECURITIZATION FORUM ET AL., RESTORING CONFIDENCE IN THE SECURITIZATION 
MARKETS 31 exh. 13 (Dec. 3, 2008), available at http://www.sifma.org/capital_markets/docs/Survey-
Restoring-confidence-securitization-markets.pdf (showing that $675 billion of ABS CDOs (“structured 
finance”) and $543 billion of CLOs were issued in global markets from 2002 through 2007).    
109 See Allison Pyburn, U.S. CDO Market Posts Gains Through 2005, ASSET SECURITZATION 
REP., Jan. 9, 2006 (providing data for 2004 and 2005); Gabrielle Stein, Market Sees Murky Outlook for 
U.S. CDOs in 2008, ASSET SECURITIZATION REP., Jan. 7, 2008 (providing data for 2006 and 2007). 
110 See SEC. INDUS. & FIN’L MKTS. ASS’N, GLOBAL CDO MARKET ISSUANCE DATA, at “By 
Currency” tbl., http://www.sifma.org/research/pdf/SIFMA_CDOIssuanceData2008q3.pdf (showing 
that CDOs denominated in U.S. dollars accounted for about three-quarters of all CDOs issued in global 
markets from 2005 through 2007). 
111 A derivative is a financial instrument whose value is derived from a specified asset, index, rate 
or event, which is referred to as the “underlying.”  OTC derivatives are customized contracts, which are 
individually negotiated between a dealer (usually a large bank or securities firm) and an end-user 
(usually a smaller financial institution, business firm or institutional investor).  In contrast, exchange-
traded derivatives are standardized contracts (primarily futures and options) that are traded on 
organized exchanges regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and the SEC.  
See René M. Stulz, Should We Fear Derivatives?, 18 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Summer 2004, at 173, 
173–78 (defining derivatives and discussing forward contracts, options, swaps, derivatives pricing, and 
derivatives markets); Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 332–33 & nn.485–87 (discussing exchange-traded 
derivatives, OTC derivatives, and their regulation).  At the end of 2007, the aggregate notional values 
of OTC derivatives and exchange-traded derivatives in the global markets were $595 trillion and $79 
trillion, respectively.  BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BIS QUARTERLY REVIEW, A103 tbl.19, A108 
tbl.23A (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/qtrpdf/r_qt0812.htm.  
112 Frank Partnoy & David A. Skeel, Jr., The Promise and Perils of Credit Derivatives, 75 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 1019, 1021–24 (2007); Stulz, supra note 111, at 180–82 (discussing why firms use 
derivatives); Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 332–33, 337, 352–53. 
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of outstanding OTC derivatives in global markets increased exponentially 
during the past two decades, rising from $7 trillion in 1989 to $88 trillion 
in 1999 and $595 trillion in 2007.113  Gross market values of OTC 
derivatives—an alternative measure of their economic significance—are 
considerably smaller than notional values114 but nevertheless confirm the 
importance of OTC derivatives.  At the end of 2007, the gross market 
values of outstanding OTC derivatives in global markets were $16 trillion, 
equal to one-ninth of the total market values of all outstanding equity and 
debt securities in worldwide markets.115   
Congress has generally exempted OTC derivatives from oversight by 
the SEC and the CFTC, as long as such derivatives are sold only to 
institutional investors and sophisticated individuals having a high net 
worth.116  Approximately three-quarters of OTC derivatives are financial 
derivatives, a category that includes swaps and forwards on interest rates, 
currency rates, equities and commodities.117  Federal banking agencies 
                                                                                                                          
113 Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 334 n.489 (citing 1989 and 1999 figures); BANK FOR INT’L 
SETTLEMENTS, supra note 111, at A103 tbl.19 (providing 2007 figure). 
114 The notional value of a derivative determines the stream of payments that each counterparty is 
obligated to make under the contract.  For example, the notional value of an interest rate swap serves as 
the multiplier for the fixed or floating interest rate that each party has agreed to pay under the contract.  
FEIN, supra note 14, § 14.05; Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 334 n.491.  Banks and other public 
companies are required to disclose both the notional value and the “fair value” of their derivatives 
under Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) Nos. 119 and 133.  The disclosure of “fair 
value” under SFAS No. 133 is based on mark-to-market principles.  See Li Wang et al., The Value-
Relevance of Derivatives Disclosures by Commercial Banks: A Comprehensive Study of Information 
Content Under SFAS Nos. 119 and 133, 25 REV. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & ACCT. 413, 415–16 (2005) 
(discussing the history of these SFAS Nos. 119 and 133, and evaluating the usefulness of notional and 
fair value derivative disclosures); Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 473–74 & n.1124 (discussing the 
application of market-value principles to derivatives).  However, SFAS No. 133 has been criticized as 
being “so . . . complex as to be incomprehensible.”  FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW 
DECEIT AND RISK CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 160 (2003); accord, Wang et al., supra, at 
416 (discussing the complexity of SFAS No. 133 and its notoriety for being highly esoteric).   
115 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 111, at A103 tbl.19 (providing figure for OTC 
derivatives); SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MARKETS ASS’N, FACT BOOK 2008, at 78 [hereinafter SIFMA FACT 
BOOK 2008] (reporting that global equity and debt securities had a total market value of $144 trillion at 
the end of 2007).   
116 See FEIN, supra note 14, § 14.01[B] at 14–14, § 14.05 at 14–41 to 14–42; THOMAS LEE 
HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 22.7[1] at 529 (5th ed. 2005); PARTNOY, supra note 
114, at 295; Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 333 n.488 (discussing the lack of CFTC and SEC supervisory 
authority over OTC dealers); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., CREDIT DERIVATIVES: 
CONFIRMATION BACKLOGS INCREASED DEALERS’ OPERATIONAL RISKS, BUT WERE SUCCESSFULLY 
ADDRESSED AFTER JOINT REGULATORY ACTION, GAO-07-716, at 9–10 (2007), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07716.pdf [hereinafter GAO CREDIT DERIVATIVES REPORT] 
(discussing lack of authority by CFTC and SEC to regulate OTC derivatives). 
117 BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 111, at A103 tbl.19 (showing that OTC derivatives 
with a total notional value of $595 trillion were outstanding at the end of 2007, of which $462 trillion 
were financial derivatives, including $393.1 trillion related to interest rates, $56.2 trillion related to 
foreign exchange rates, $8.5 trillion related to equities and $8.45 trillion related to commodities).   The 
two most basic types of OTC financial derivatives are forward contracts (including swaps) and option 
contracts.  A forward gives both counterparties reciprocal rights and obligations to buy or sell the 
underlying at a specified price on a future date.  An option gives one counterparty the right (but not the 
obligation) to purchase from or sell to the other counterparty the underlying at a specified price on a 
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have authorized banks to offer a wide variety of OTC derivatives to 
qualified customers.118 
Credit derivatives were the fastest-growing category of OTC 
derivatives during the past decade, rising from only $180 million in 1997 
to $1 trillion in 2001, $14 trillion in 2005 and $58 trillion at the end of 
2007.119  Credit derivatives are financial instruments designed to transfer 
credit risk from one party to another with respect to specified debt 
obligations.120  The most common form of credit derivative is a credit 
default swap (CDS).  A CDS is a contract under which one party (the 
protection seller) agrees to make a specified payment to the other 
counterparty (the protection buyer) if a defined credit event occurs on the 
referenced debt obligation (e.g., a bankruptcy filing or other default on 
payment by the issuer).   In exchange, the protection buyer agrees to pay a 
periodic fee to the protection seller.121   
The principal types of credit derivatives are single-name CDS, index 
trades (also known as index CDS), and synthetic CDOs.122  A single-name 
CDS is a swap written with reference to a single issuer of debt.  An index 
trade is a swap written with reference to an index based on a specified 
group of debt obligations issued by multiple issuers.  Debt obligations 
specified in an index trade are often linked by a common industry, 
geographic region and/or credit quality (e.g., investment grade or 
noninvestment grade).123   
A synthetic CDO is a structured-finance vehicle that issues securities 
backed by a managed pool of CDS.  A synthetic CDO is similar to a 
securitization, because it is managed by an SPE and issues tranched 
securities representing senior, mezzanine and subordinate interests in the 
managed pool of CDS.124  In contrast to a cash flow CDO, a synthetic CDO 
does not hold the underlying debt obligations but instead holds CDS that 
                                                                                                                          
future date.  See Frank Partnoy, The Shifting Contours of Global Derivatives Regulation, 22 U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 421, 424–28 (2001) (discussing options and forwards); Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 333 
n.485 (same).   
118 See FEIN, supra note 14, § 14.05. 
119 Kyle Brandon & Frank A. Fernandez, Financial Innovation and Risk Management: An 
Introduction to Credit Derivatives, 15 J. APPLIED FIN. No 1, Spring 2005, at 52, 52, 53 (fig. 1) 
(providing figures for 1997 and 2001); BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, supra note 111, at A103 tbl.19 
(providing figure for 2007). 
120 David Mengle, Credit Derivatives: An Overview, ECON. REV. (Fed. Res. Bank of Atlanta, 
GA), 4th Qtr. 2007, at 1. 
121 Id. at 1–3; Partnoy & Skeel, supra note 112, at 1021–23.  
122 In 2006, single-name CDS accounted for thirty-three percent of the notional value of 
outstanding credit derivatives, while index trades and synthetic CDOs accounted for thirty-eight 
percent and seventeen percent, respectively.  Criado & van Rixtel, supra note 86, at 30–37; Mengle, 
supra note 120, at 7–8. 
123 GAO CREDIT DERIVATIVES REPORT, supra note 116, at 5, 6 tbl.1; Criado & van Rixtel, supra 
note 86, at 34–35, 42.  
124 Criado & van Rixtel, supra note 86, at 37–38 (fig.8); Gorton, supra note 87, at 26–29; Partnoy 
& Skeel, supra note 112, at 1027–29.  
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provide credit protection for the designated obligations.125  Recent 
estimates indicate that synthetic CDOs hold pools of CDS with several 
trillion dollars of notional value.126  
Large financial conglomerates dominate the markets for OTC 
derivatives in the same manner as they control other sectors of the financial 
markets.  In 2006, the twenty top global derivatives dealers included the 
top eleven global underwriters listed above as well as Bear Stearns and 
several large foreign universal banks (including Société Générale, BNP 
Paribas, RBS and HSBC).127  During 2003–2006, the twenty largest global 
counterparties for CDS included almost all of the same institutions and 
American International Group (AIG).128    
D.  Rising Levels of Systemic Risk in Domestic and Global Financial 
Markets  
1.  The Adverse Impact of Financial Conglomeration on Systemic Risk 
in Financial Markets 
Consolidation and convergence among financial conglomerates after 
1990 produced a significant increase in systemic risk in both U.S. and 
global financial markets.  By 2007, as shown above in Part II.C., sixteen 
large complex financial institutions (LCFIs)—including the four largest 
U.S. banks (BofA, Chase, Citigroup and Wachovia), the five largest U.S. 
securities firms (Bear Stearns, Goldman, Lehman, Merrill and Morgan 
Stanley), and seven major foreign universal banks (Credit Suisse, 
Deutsche, Barclays, RBS, HSBC, BNP Paribas and Societe Generale)—
collectively dominated the markets for debt and equity securities, 
syndicated loans, securitizations, structured-finance products and OTC 
                                                                                                                          
125 Criado & van Rixtel, supra note 86, at 37. 
126 See GAO CREDIT DERIVATIVES REPORT, supra note 116, at 6 tbl.1, 7 fig.1 (stating that, at the 
end of 2006, synthetic CDOs represented sixteen percent of the global credit derivatives market and the 
global market had an aggregate notional value of $34.5 trillion); see also Neil Shah, Trouble for Banks, 
Insurers May Lurk in Synthetic CDOs, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2008, at C1, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, WSJNL File (reporting that, “[b]y various estimates, [synthetic CDOs] have sold insurance on 
the equivalent of between $1.25 trillion and $6 trillion in bonds”).  
127 Gareth Gore, Special Report: Institutional Investor End-User Survey 2006; Steady at the Top, 
19 RISK, No. 6, June 2006, at 62, 63 (“Top 20 Dealers Overall” tbl.); see also supra notes 57–61 and 
accompanying text (identifying the top eleven global underwriters between 2000 and 2007).  
128 Mengle, supra note 120, at 10 tbl.4; see also Timothy F. Geithner, Remarks at the Economic 
Club of New York (June 9, 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/ 
speeches/2008/tfg080609.html (stating that the Federal Reserve Bank of N.Y. had met with seventeen 
dealer institutions, which controlled more than ninety percent of the credit derivatives market); Press 
Release, Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Statement Regarding June 9 Meeting on Over-the-Counter 
Derivatives (June 9, 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/ 
2008/ma080609.html (providing weblink to list of seventeen dealers, which included the top eleven 
global underwriters as well as BNP Paribas, Dresdner Kleinwort, HSBC, RBS, Societe Generale and 
Wachovia). 
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derivatives.129  In addition, AIG—the largest U.S. life insurer and the 
second largest U.S. property and casualty insurer—established a “Financial 
Products” business group that became a leading provider of CDS and 
securities lending services.130   
LCFIs followed a common business strategy based on an “originate to 
distribute” (OTD) model.  As further described below in Part III, the OTD 
strategy consisted of several steps, including (i) originating consumer and 
corporate loans, (ii) packaging those loans into structured-finance ABS and 
CDOs, (iii) creating additional financial instruments, including synthetic 
CDOs and CDS, whose values were derived in complex ways from the 
underlying loans, and (iv) distributing the resulting securities and other 
financial instruments to investors and off-balance-sheet entities sponsored 
by the selling institution.131   
LCFIs adopted the OTD business model in order to (i) maximize fee 
income, (ii) reduce their capital charges, and (iii) transfer to investors (at 
least ostensibly) the risks associated with securitized loans and structured-
finance products.  The OTD model enabled LCFIs to collect fees at each 
stage of the OTD process, including (a) originating, securitizing and 
servicing loans, and (b) structuring and selling additionally securities and 
other financial instruments (e.g., cash flow CDOs, synthetic CDOs and 
CDS) based on those loans.132  Fee income at the largest U.S. banks 
(including BofA, Chase and Citigroup) rose from 40% of total earnings in 
1995 to 76% of total earnings in 2007.133 
The OTD strategy also enabled financial conglomerates to reduce their 
capital requirements.134  Perhaps most importantly, the OTD approach also 
offered financial conglomerates the apparent benefit of shifting to investors 
                                                                                                                          
129 See supra notes 57–61, 66–70, 99–100, 104, 109, 127–28 and accompanying text (identifying 
the top global underwriters of debt and equity securities, the leading syndicated lenders, the major 
underwriters of private label RMBS, ABS, CMBS and CDOs, and the top dealers in OTC derivatives).  
130 See American International Group: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/ 
kohn20090305a.htm (testimony of Donald L. Kohn, FRB Vice Chairman); Carol J. Loomis, AIG: The 
Company That Came to Dinner, FORTUNE, Jan. 19, 2009, at 70; Gretchen Morgenson, A.I.G.: Where 
Taxpayers’ Dollars Go to Die, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2009, § BU, at 1; Robert O’Harrow Jr. and Brady 
Dennis, Downgrades and Downfall, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 2008, at A01.  
131 See, e.g., Antje Berndt & Anurag Gupta, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in the 
Originate-to-Distribute Model of Bank Credit 1–2 (Working Paper, Nov. 2008) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1290312; Borio, supra note 98, at 9–13; Amiyatosh K. Purnanandam, 
Originate-to-Distribute Model and the  Sub-Prime Mortgage Crisis 1–6 (Working Paper, Feb. 8, 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1167786; 2008 BASEL CRT REPORT, supra note 83, at 2, 7–8, 25–
27, 41–42, 45.   
132 2008 BASEL CRT REPORT, supra note 83, at 2, 7–8, 25–27, 41–42; see supra Parts II.C.2. & 
II.C.3.  
133 Tom Lauricella, Crumbling Profit Center: Financial Sector Showing Life, but Don’t’ Bank on 
Long-Term Revival, WALL ST. J., Mar. 24, 2008, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL 
File. 
134 See supra note 81 and accompanying text; infra notes 317, 337 and 339 and accompanying 
text. 
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the risks associated with securitized loans and other structured finance 
products.135  However, as large financial conglomerates pursued similar 
OTD and fee-maximizing strategies, their collective exposures to financial 
risks—including credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk and systemic risk—
increased dramatically.136  
Even before the subprime lending boom accelerated in 2004, analysts 
found that an increased reliance by U.S. banking organizations on 
nontraditional, fee-based lines of business (including securitization and 
other investment banking activities) increased the volatility of their 
earnings and increased their exposure to the risk of insolvency.137  One 
study concluded that, between 2001 and 2004, an increased involvement 
by large U.S. banks in investment banking, securitization, and sales of 
loans, derivatives and other assets produced a significant rise in the overall 
risk of those banks, as measured by the volatility of their stock market 
returns.138   
Other studies determined that consolidation and conglomeration in the 
U.S. and European banking industries generated higher levels of systemic 
risk on both sides of the Atlantic.139  In particular, analysts found that 
growing convergence among the activities of banks, securities firms and 
insurance companies since the early 1990s intensified the risk that losses in 
one sector of the financial services industry would spill over into other 
sectors and produce a systemic financial crisis.140        
                                                                                                                          
135 2008 BASEL CRT REPORT, supra note 83, at 41–42; Borio, supra note 98, at 4, 10–11. 
136 See, e.g., Brunnermeier, supra note 3, at 77–82; Raghuram G. Rajan, Has Finance Made the 
World Riskier?, 12 EUR. FIN. MGMT. 499, 502, 508–24 (2006); 2008 BASEL CRT REPORT, supra note 
83, at 25–27; see also infra Parts III.B.3. and III.C. 
137 See generally Robert DeYoung & Tara Rice, Noninterest Income and Financial Performance 
at U.S. Commercial Banks, 39 FIN. REV. 101 (2004) (reviewing performance by U.S. banks during 
1989–2001); Kevin Stiroh, New Evidence on the Determinants of Bank Risk, 30 J. FIN. SERV. RES. 237 
(2006) (studying the performance of U.S. bank holding companies during 1997–2004); Kevin Stiroh & 
Adrienne Rumble, The Dark Side of Diversification: The Case of US Financial Holding Companies, 30 
J. BANKING & FIN. 2131 (2006) (reviewing performance of U.S. financial holding companies during 
from 1997 through 2002). 
138 Stiroh, supra note 137, at 237–39, 252–59. 
139 See generally Gianni De Nicoló & Myron L. Kwast, Systemic Risk and Financial 
Consolidation: Are They Related?, 26 J. BANKING & FIN. 861 (2002) (studying performance of U.S. 
large complex banking organizations (LCBOs) from 1988 through 1999); Gianni De Nicoló et al., Bank 
Consolidation, Internationalization, and Conglomeration: Trends and Implications for Financial Risk, 
13 FIN. MKTS, INSTS. & INSTRUMENTS 173, 174–76, 189–90, 198, 205–12 (2004) (reviewing 
performance of the world’s 500 largest financial institutions from 1993 through 2000); Martin Schüler, 
The Threat of Systemic Risk in European Banking, 41 Q. J. BUS. & ECON. 145 (2002) (reviewing 
performance of the largest European banks from 1980 through 2001, and determining that  
interconnections among European banks increased significantly between 1986 and 2001, resulting in a 
greater potential for systemic risk). 
140 De Nicoló et al., supra note 139, at 174–76, 189–90, 197–98, 205–12 (analyzing growing 
conglomeration and increased systemic risk in banking systems of the U.S., Western Europe and other 
developed countries from 1993 through 2000); Elyasiani et al., supra note 56, at 1168–69, 1186–87 
(reviewing performance of U.S. banks, securities firms and life insurers from 1991 through 2001); 
Houston & Stiroh, supra note 56, at 1–4, 9–10, 17–22, 31–32 (analyzing performance of same three 
groups of financial institutions from 1975 through 2005 and determining that systemic risk in the U.S. 
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A recent comprehensive study reviewed the performance of more than 
1,300 banks (including commercial and investment banks) in 101 countries 
between 1995 and 2007.  The authors found that larger and faster-growing 
banks had a greater involvement in nontraditional activities, produced 
higher percentages of fee income, and relied more heavily on wholesale 
(non-deposit) funding.  In addition, banks with higher shares of fee income 
and wholesale lending also showed significantly higher risks of 
insolvency.141  The authors concluded that “banking strategies that rely 
preponderantly on non-interest income or non-deposit funding are indeed 
very risky.”142  
2.  The Unheeded Lessons of the Dotcom-Telecom Bubble and the 
Collapse of Enron and WorldCom 
Further evidence of the risks posed by financial conglomerates 
appeared during the boom-and-bust cycle that occurred in the U.S. 
economy from 1994 through 2002.  In future work, I intend to undertake a 
more detailed analysis of the role played by universal banks during that 
period, which witnessed the rise and fall of many Internet (“dotcom”) and 
telecommunications (“telecom”) firms.143  For present purposes, this 
Article provides a brief overview of the conflicts of interest, promotional 
pressures, speculative risk-taking and exploitation of investors that many 
financial conglomerates displayed during the dotcom-telecom episode.144   
As described above, the relaxation and removal of Glass-Steagall 
barriers enabled large commercial banks to become major players in the 
investment banking business after 1990.145  Intensifying competition 
between commercial banks and securities firms stimulated a spectacular 
growth in the issuance of corporate securities during the late 1990s.  Total 
underwritings and private placements of corporate securities in U.S. 
financial markets almost quadrupled, from $600 billion to $2.2 trillion, 
                                                                                                                          
financial sector increased significantly during that period, because “financial firms bec[a]me more 
similar and increasingly exposed to common shocks,” including a “series of broad shocks . . . that had a 
large common impact” on all three sectors after 1997, id. at 2, 31).  
141 Asli Demirguc-Kunt & Harry Huizinga, Bank Activity and Funding Strategies: The Impact on 
Risk and Return 5–7, 10–11, 14–24, 27–29 (CentER Discussion Paper No. 2009–09, Jan. 2009), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1350235.  
142 Id. at 29. 
143 For insightful overviews of the dotcom-telecom boom and bust, see generally ROGER 
LOWENSTEIN, ORIGINS OF THE CRASH: THE GREAT BUBBLE AND ITS UNDOING (2004); PARTNOY, 
supra note 114; JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE ROARING NINETIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THE WORLD’S 
MOST PROSPEROUS DECADE (2003).  
144 Portions of the discussion in this section are adapted from Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Conflicts of 
Interest and Corporate Governance Failures at Universal Banks during the Stock Market Boom of the 
1990s: The Cases of Enron and WorldCom, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BANKING: A GLOBAL 
PERSPECTIVE 97 (Benton E. Gup, ed., 2007) [hereinafter Wilmarth, Enron and WorldCom].  
145 See supra Parts II.A., II.B (explaining legal developments that relaxed and ultimately repealed 
restrictions in the Glass-Steagall Act, resulting in increased convergence and competition between the 
banking and securities industries during the 1990s). 
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between 1994 and 2001.146  Initial public offerings (IPOs) of stocks soared 
from $28 billion in 1994 to $64 billion in 1999 and $76 billion in 2000.147    
The onrush of newly-issued securities contributed to a stock market 
boom from 1994 to 2000, comparable to the great bull market of 1923 to 
1929.  Unfortunately, the stock market boom of the 1990s was followed by 
a rapid decline in stock prices between 2000 and 2002.  During that 
decline, the total value of all publicly traded U.S. stocks fell by forty-five 
percent, from $17.2 trillion to $9.4 trillion, representing the largest 
percentage drop in stock values since the stock market’s collapse between 
1929 and 1932.148 
The steep drop in stock prices accelerated between December 2001 and 
October 2002, as investors reacted to reports of accounting fraud and self-
dealing at many “new economy” firms that had been viewed as “stars” 
during the stock market boom of the 1990s.149  The sudden collapses of 
Enron and WorldCom were especially shocking to investors.  With assets 
of $63 billion and $104 billion, respectively, Enron and WorldCom 
represented the largest U.S. corporate bankruptcies prior to Lehman’s 
collapse in September 2008.150  Enron was widely viewed as the most 
innovative and exciting company in America, due in large part to its 
aggressive expansion into broadband services and its position as one of the 
largest traders of derivatives for energy products and other commodities.151  
WorldCom was considered to be the most promising telecom firm because 
of its rapid growth, as well as its status as the second largest long-distance 
telephone company and the largest provider of Internet-based 
telecommunications services in America.152   
Enron and WorldCom failed because each company’s leaders pursued 
a single-minded policy of boosting the company’s stock price at all costs.  
                                                                                                                          
146 SIFMA FACT BOOK 2008, supra note 115, at 10. 
147 Id. at 9. 
148 Robert J. Gordon, The 1920s and the 1990s in Mutual Reflection, in THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 
IN THE 1990S: A LONG RUN PERSPECTIVE 161, 164, 168–71, 182–83 (Paul W. Rhode & Gianni 
Toniolo, eds., 2006); Eugene N. White, Bubbles and Busts: The 1990s in the Mirror of the 1920s, in 
THE GLOBAL ECONOMY IN THE 1990S: A LONG RUN PERSPECTIVE, supra, at 193, 193–202; BD. OF 
GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYS., FED. RES. STATISTICAL RELEASE: FLOW OF FUNDS 
ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, FOURTH QUARTER 2003, at 90 tbl.L.213 (2004) (showing that the 
market value of domestic corporations declined from $17.2 trillion at the end of 1999 to $9.4 trillion as 
of September 30, 2002); Wilmarth, Universal Banks, supra note 26, at 559.  
149 See, e.g., Anthony Bianco, The Angry Market, BUS. WK., July 29, 2002, at 32, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, BUSWK File; E.S. Browning & Ianthe J. Dugan, Stocks Unwound: Aftermath 
of a Market Mania, WALL ST. J., Dec. 16, 2002, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL 
File; Marcia Vickers et al., The Betrayed Investor, BUS. WK., Feb. 25, 2002, at 104, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, BUSWK File. 
150 Aigbe Akhigbe et al., Contagion Effects of the World’s Largest Bankruptcy: The Case of 
WorldCom, 45 Q. REV. ECON. FIN. 48, 49 (2005); Yalman Onaran & Christopher Scinta, Lehman Files 
Biggest Bankruptcy Case as Suitors Balk (Update 4), Sept. 15. 2008, BLOOMBERG.COM, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a82CD7OMEtWM. 
151 Wilmarth, Enron and WorldCom, supra note 144, at 100–02. 
152 Id. at 112–13. 
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Senior officers at each company pushed subordinates to produce 
continuous growth in assets, revenues and earnings per share, while paying 
little attention to the fundamental quality of the company’s operations.  
When real growth could no longer be sustained, management resorted to 
fraud.153   
Although senior executives were the primary culprits at Enron and 
WorldCom, financial conglomerates were instrumental in financing the 
reckless growth of each company.  During 1998–2001, Citigroup, Merrill, 
Credit Suisse, Chase, Barclays, Lehman and BofA underwrote several 
billion dollars of securities for Enron.154  During the same period, Ctigroup, 
Chase, BofA and Deutsche were leading underwriters for $25 billion of 
WorldCom bonds.  Citigroup and Chase were also principal financial 
advisors for WorldCom acquisitions in which WorldCom issued more than 
$55 billion of its stock to shareholders of acquired firms.155  
Universal banks also orchestrated a myriad of complex transactions 
that aided and abetted Enron’s efforts to mislead investors.  For example, 
Citigroup, Chase, Barclays, Credit Suisse and RBS structured prepaid 
commodity swaps (“prepays”) that allowed Enron to receive disguised 
bank loans while reporting the transactions as cash flow from operations.  
The same banks and Merrill structured fictitious sales of assets by Enron to 
off-balance-sheet SPEs that were actually controlled by a senior Enron 
officer.  Like the prepays, the SPE transactions enabled Enron to overstate 
its cash flow and disguise its debt.  By the time of its failure in late 2001, 
Enron had accumulated $38 billion of actual debt obligations but reported 
only $13 billion of those debts on its balance sheet.156  The banks 
participated in Enron’s prepay and SPE deals even though many bank 
officers recognized that the transactions were inherently deceptive.157 
Universal banks did not participate directly in WorldCom’s massive 
accounting fraud.  However, the banks underwrote a $12 billion public 
offering of WorldCom’s bonds in 2001 while knowing, or having reason to 
know, that WorldCom was encountering serious financial difficulties.158  In 
order to win WorldCom’s business, Citigroup, Chase and BofA provided 
huge financial benefits (in the form of personal loans and allocations of 
shares in underpriced “hot” IPOs) to Bernard Ebbers, WorldCom’s 
chairman.159  Moreover, universal banks that dealt with Enron and 
                                                                                                                          
153 Id. at 100–03, 112–15. 
154 Id. at 110. 
155 Id. at 116, 118–19. 
156 Id. at 103–07.  In addition, Deutsche structured SPE transactions in order to create fictitious 
tax benefits for Enron.  Id. at 107. 
157 Id. at 107–10. 
158 Id. at 115–16, 118–19.  Three of the bank underwriters quietly entered into CDS to reduce 
their credit exposure to WorldCom while the debt offering was in progress.  Id. at 118–19. 
159 Id. at 116–18. 
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WorldCom pressured their investment analysts to keep issuing glowing 
reports about both companies until just before the companies failed.160  In 
several cases, the banks quietly entered into CDS and other transactions to 
reduce their credit exposure to Enron and WorldCom while their analysts 
and investment bankers were still touting the companies’ stock.161 
Universal banks paid more than $17 billion to settle Enron-related and 
WorldCom-related claims filed by the SEC, investors and Enron’s 
bankruptcy estate.162  Federal and state agencies also conducted 
investigations that resulted in the issuance of enforcement orders and 
penalty assessments against universal banks for a wide range of additional 
misconduct related to their securities activities during the dotcom-telecom 
boom and bust.  Those investigations revealed that LCFIs promoted (i) 
conflicts of interest involving securities analysts, (ii) manipulative and 
abusive practices connected with IPOs, and (iii) late trading, market timing 
and other abuses involving mutual funds.163   
For example, universal banks pressured in-house analysts to issue 
biased and misleading reports to investors in order to please corporate 
clients and attract new investment banking deals (especially IPOs).164  
Bank underwriters also made targeted allocations of underpriced shares in 
“hot” IPOs—a practice known as “spinning”—in order to (i) build 
relationships with senior executives who controlled existing or potential 
corporate clients, and (ii) persuade institutional investors to (A) make 
investments in future IPOs and (B) give future brokerage business to the 
underwriters.165  Banks also allowed hedge funds to engage in unlawful 
market timing and late trading in bank-sponsored mutual funds, in return 
                                                                                                                          
160 Id. at 110–12, 119–24. 
161 Id. at 110–12, 118–20.   
162 See id. at 112 (stating that banks paid almost $400 million to settle Enron-related charges filed 
by the SEC and paid an additional $6.9 billion to settle Enron-related claims filed by investors); id. at 
124 (stating that banks paid $6.6 billion to settle claims filed by investors in WorldCom debt); Eric 
Dash, Citigroup Resolves Claims That It Helped Enron Deceive Investors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2008, 
at C3 available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (reporting that banks paid $3.4 billion to settle 
claims filed by Enron’s bankruptcy estate).  
163 Wilmarth, Universal Banks, supra note 26, at 562–63. 
164 See, e.g, JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE 30–32, 249–53, 257–58, 261–70 (2006); DAVID SKEEL, ICARUS IN THE BOARDROOM: 
THE FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS IN CORPORATE AMERICA AND WHERE THEY CAME FROM 167–70, 180–85 
(2005) (describing the corporate culture that caused analysts to issue misleading reports); PARTNOY, 
supra note 143, at 275–91. 
165 E.g., James Fanto, The Continuing Need for Broker-Dealer Professionalism in IPOs, 2 
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L. J. 679, 680–90 (2008); Christine Hurt, Moral Hazard and the Initial Public 
Offering, 26 CARDOZO L. REV. 711, 738–42 (2005); see also Tim Loughran & Jay Ritter, Why Has 
IPO Underpricing Changed Over Time?, 33 FIN. MGMT. 5, 6–7, 31–32 (2004) (finding that, during the 
Internet boom of 1999 to 2000, issuers of IPOs chose underwriters that (i) offered coverage by 
“influential” and “bullish” analysts, and (ii) allocated shares of underpriced IPOs to the issuers’ 
corporate executives); Jonathan Reuter, Are IPO Allocations for Sale? Evidence from Mutual Funds, 61 
J. FIN. 2289, 2290–93, 2322–23 (2006) (finding that, from 1996 to 1099, mutual funds paid 
significantly larger brokerage commissions to investment banks from which they received allocations 
of underpriced shares in IPOs). 
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for the hedge funds’ agreement to (i) make long-term investments in the 
funds and (ii) use the banks’ brokerage services.166      
Twelve banks paid $1.4 billion to settle government accusations of 
illegal activities related to research analysts and IPOs.167  Seven banks paid 
nearly $1.2 billion to settle government charges that they allowed unlawful 
late trading and market timing in mutual funds.168  Two very disturbing 
patterns emerge when one compares the identities of the banks involved in 
the scandals involving research analysts, IPOs and mutual funds with the 
names of the banks most deeply embroiled with Enron and WorldCom.  
First, thirteen out of the sixteen leading global financial conglomerates in 
2007 were involved in at least one of the scandals.169  Second, eleven of 
those thirteen LCFIs were involved in multiple scandals.170 
Thus, leading financial conglomerates were involved in numerous 
scandals during the dotcom-telecom boom-and-bust cycle.  Those scandals 
revealed widespread abuses that resulted from conflicts of interest, 
promotional pressures, speculative financing and exploitation of 
investors—the same types of misconduct that caused Congress to separate 
                                                                                                                          
166 Banks allowed market timing and late trading by hedge funds in order to (i) solicit prime 
brokerage business from hedge funds, and (ii) to make up for the loss of mutual fund assets and 
brokerage activity that resulted from the bursting of the dotcom-telecom bubble in the stock market.  
See James B. McCallum, Mutual Fund Market Timing: A Tale of Systemic Abuse and Executive 
Malfeasance, 12 J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 170, 172–77 (2004).  For additional analysis of market 
timing and late trading abuses, see Paul G. Mahoney, Manager-Investor Conflicts in Mutual Funds, 18 
J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 161, 161–62, 173–77 (2004); see also William B. Birdthistle, Compensating 
Power: An Analysis of Rents and Rewards in the Mutual Fund Industry, 80 TUL. L. REV. 1401, 1405–
07, 1453–60 (2006); Tamar Frankel & Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Mysterious Ways of Mutual 
Funds: Market Timing, 25 ANN. REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 235, 248–69 (2006).    
167 See Rachel McTague & Kip Betz, Research Analysts: Federal, State Securities Regulators, 
NYSE, NASD, Spitzer Finalize Wall Street Settlement, 35 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 730 (May 5, 2003) 
(reporting government settlements with Bear Stearns, Chase, Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Goldman, 
Lehman, Merrill, Morgan Stanley, Chase, UBS and US Bancorp); Valerie Bauerlein & Siobhan 
Hughes, Moving the Market: Improper-Trading Case Settled—Bank of America to Pay $26 Million 
Over Claims Research Was Misued, WALL ST. J., Mar. 15, 2007, at C3, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, WSJNL file (reporting on government settlement with BofA arising out of misconduct during 
2002). 
168 See Thomas R. Smith, Jr., Mutual Funds Under Fire: A Chronology of Developments Since 
January 1, 2003, 7 J. INV. COMPLIANCE 4, 19, 22, 32 (2006) (describing (i) agreement by BofA and 
FleetBoston to pay $675 million to settle market timing and late trading charges, (ii) agreement by 
Bank One to pay $50 million to settle similar charges, and (iii) agreements by UBS and Deutsche to 
pay almost $190 million); BOA, FleetBoston Agree on $675 Million to Resolve SEC, N.Y. Charges 
Over Abuses, 36 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 513, Mar. 22, 2004 (reporting on settlement agreement involving 
BofA and FleetBoston); Randall Smith & Tom Lauricella, Moving the Market: Bear Stearns to Pay 
$250 Million Fine, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17, 2006, at C3, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL file 
(reporting that (i) Bear Stearns agreed to pay $250 million to settle market-timing and late-trading 
charges, and (ii) Merrill paid almost $14 million to settle similar accusations). 
169 See supra notes 129, 154–68 and accompanying text (showing that, of the sixteen LCFIs, all 
but HSBC, BNP Paribas and Societe Generale were involved in at least one scandal).  
170 See supra notes 129, 154–68 and accompanying text (showing that, of the thirteen implicated 
LCFIs, all but Goldman and Morgan Stanley were involved in two or more scandals). 
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commercial and investment banking in 1933.171  Nevertheless, Congress 
did not reconsider the question of whether large financial conglomerates 
threatened the stability of the financial markets and the general economy.  
Political leaders assumed that federal regulators and market discipline 
would exercise sufficient control over the growing power of universal 
banks.  However, the events of 1994–2002 plainly indicated that neither 
regulators nor the financial markets were imposing effective restraints on 
the penchant of LCFIs to assume ever-greater risks in the pursuit of 
profit.172  
III.  UNIVERSAL BANKS WERE THE PRIMARY PRIVATE-SECTOR 
CATALYSTS FOR THE SUBPRIME FINANCIAL CRISIS 
A.  An Unsustainable Credit Boom Occurred in the U.S. Between 1991 and 
2007 
1.  The Magnitude of the Credit Boom 
Between 1991 and 2007, the United States experienced an enormous 
credit boom.  Credit market debts owed by all sectors of the U.S. economy 
more than tripled during that period, rising from $14.1 trillion in 1991 to 
$46.9 trillion in 2007.173  Nongovernmental domestic debts nearly 
quadrupled and rose by $29.6 trillion, accounting for ninety percent of the 
overall debt growth.174  Within the nongovernmental category, household 
sector debts more than tripled, rising by $10 trillion,175 and nonfinancial 
business debts nearly tripled, growing by $6.4 trillion.176  The most 
                                                                                                                          
171 See, e.g., ROBERT KUTTNER, THE SQUANDERING OF AMERICA: HOW THE FAILURE OF OUR 
POLITICS UNDERMINES OUR PROSPERITY 72–85, 90–91, 101–05 (2007); LOWENSTEIN, supra note 143, 
at 4–5, 95–97, 154–55, 174–75, 208, 212–13, 218–19; STIGLITZ, supra note 143, at 140–41, 158–60; 
Wilmarth, Universal Banks, supra note 26, at 560. 
172 See, e.g., CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE TWO TRILLION DOLLAR MELTDOWN 31–35, 54–55 (2008 
rev. ed.); STIGLITZ, supra note 143, at 60–66, 275–76; Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 454–76; Wilmarth, 
Enron and WorldCom, supra note 144, at 99–100, 124–25.  
173 See 1996 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 57 tbl.L.1., lines 2 & 11 (providing 
amount for year-end 1991); 2007 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 58 tbl.L.1, lines 2 & 10 
(providing data for year-end 2007).  Total U.S. debt increased from 225% of GDP in 1992 to 325% of 
GDP in 2007.  WILLIAM A. FLECKENSTEIN & FREDERICK SHEEHAN, GREENSPAN’S BUBBLES: THE 
AGE OF IGNORANCE AT THE FEDERAL RESERVE 174 (fig. 16) (2008). 
174 Domestic nongovernmental debts grew from $10.3 trillion to $39.9 trillion between 1991 and 
2007.  See 1996 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 57 tbl.L.1, line 4 plus line 11, minus line 9 
(providing figure for year-end 1991); 2007 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 58 tbl.L.1., line 
2 plus line 10, minus lines 8 and 9 (providing amount for year-end 2007).  
175 Household sector debts increased from $3.8 trillion to $13.8 trillion between 1991 and 2007.  
See 1996 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 57 tbl.L.1, line 5 (providing amount for year-end 
1991); 2007 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 58 tbl.L.1, line 3 (providing data for year-end 
2007). 
176 Nonfinancial business debts rose from $3.7 trillion to $10.1 trillion between 1991 and 2007.  
See 1996 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 57 tbl.L.1, lines 6, 7 and 8 (providing amount for 
year-end 1991); 2007 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 58 tbl.L.1., lines 4, 5 and 6 (providing 
figure for year-end 2007). 
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dramatic growth, however, occurred with financial sector debts, which  
recorded more than a five-fold increase and expanded by $13 trillion.177 
The credit boom growth accelerated at an even faster rate after 2000.178  
Two-thirds of the rise in household sector debts between 1991 and 2007 
occurred after 2000.179  Similarly almost early three-fifths of the growth in 
both nonfinancial business debts and financial sector debts took place 
between 2000 and 2007.180   
The rapidly growing significance of the U.S. financial services 
industry provides further evidence of the impact of the credit boom.  The 
financial services industry’s share of total domestic corporate profits rose 
“from 10% in the early 1980s to 40% at its peak” in 2007, and the 
industry’s “share of stockmarket value grew from 6% to 19%.”181  During 
the decade ending in 2006, “profits at financial companies rose an average 
of 13.8% a year, compared with 8.5% for nonfinancial companies.”182 
Between 1980 and 2007, domestic financial assets doubled in size relative 
to domestic GDP, largely as a result of expanding debt obligations.183     
This Article focuses primarily on U.S. aspects of the global financial 
                                                                                                                          
177 Financial sector debts grew from $2.8 trillion to $15.8 trillion between 1991 and 2007. See 
1996 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 57 tbl.L.1, line 11 (providing amount for year-end 
1991); 2007 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 58 tbl.L.1, line 10 (providing figure for year-
end 2007). 
178 FLECKENSTEIN & SHEEHAN, supra note 173, at 168–78; see also id. at 175 (fig. 17) 
(describing the rate of debt growth versus GDP growth between 2002 and 2007 as “The Most 
Pronounced Debt Cycle Ever”). 
179 Household sector debts rose by $6.7 trillion (from $7.1 trillion to $13.8 trillion) between 2000 
to 2007.  See BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RES. SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED 
STATES, 4TH QTR. 2002, STATISTICAL REL. Z.1, at 58 tbl.L.1, line 5 [hereinafter 2002 FLOW OF FUNDS 
REPORT] (providing amount for year-end 2000); 2007 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 58 
tbl.L.1, line 3 (providing figure for year-end 2007). 
180 Nonfinancial sector debts rose by $3.6 trillion (from $6.5 trillion to $10.1 trillion) between 
2000 and 2007.  See 2002 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 179, at 58 tbl.L.1., lines 6, 7 and 8 
(providing figure for year-end 2000); 2007 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 58 tbl.L.1, lines 
4, 5 and 6 (providing amount for year-end 2007).  Financial sector debts rose by $7.4 trillion (from $8.4 
trillion to $15.8 trillion) between 2000 and 2007.  See 2002 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 179, 
at 58 tbl.L.1, line 11 (providing data for end of 2000); 2007 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 
58 tbl.L.1, line 10 (providing information for end of 2007). 
181 What Went Wrong—Wall Street’s Crisis; The Financial System, ECONOMIST, Mar. 22, 2008, 
at 91, available at LEXIS, News Library, ECON File [hereinafter What Went Wrong].  For additional  
data about the growth of the U.S. financial sector in recent decades, see Justin Lahart, Has the 
Financial Industry’s Heyday Come and Gone?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 28, 2008, at A2, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, WSJNL File (reporting that domestic financial-sector profits as a percentage of total 
pretax profits grew from thirteen percent in 1980 to twenty-seven percent in 2007); Lauricella, supra 
note 133 (reporting that financial industry stocks accounted for 22.3% of the value of the Standard & 
Poor’s 500-stock index at the end of 2006, compared to thirteen percent at the end of 1995); Gretchen 
Morgenson, There’s No Superhero in the Wings, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2007, § 3, at 1, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (reporting that financial sector profits accounted for thirty-one percent 
of total U.S. corporate earnings in 2007, up from twenty percent in 1990). 
182 Lauricella, supra note 133. 
183 What Went Wrong, supra note 181; see also Lauricella, supra note 133, at chart 2 (showing 
that domestic financial assets were equal to ten times domestic GDP in 2007, compared to five times 
GDP between 1960 and 1980). 
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crisis.  However, the U.S. was not the only country to experience a credit 
boom in recent years.  Similar credit expansions occurred in the United 
Kingdom (U.K.) and several European countries.184  The U.K.’s credit 
boom most closely resembles the U.S. experience.  In the U.K., as in the 
U.S., the advent of widespread securitization and other financial 
innovations significantly increased the availability of credit to higher-risk 
consumers, promoters of LBOs and commercial real estate developers.185  
In both nations, the credit boom resulted in a sharp increase in the ratio of 
household debts to disposable income, with the U.K. ratio reaching a level 
even higher than in the U.S.186  As in the U.S., the U.K. credit boom 
produced a rapid growth in financial sector debt and financial industry 
profits.187  In both countries, LCFIs boosted profits by using financial 
innovations (including structured financial instruments and off-balance-
sheet vehicles) to increase their leverage.188  Leading universal banks in 
both nations suffered huge losses, and some LCFIs failed or were 
effectively nationalized by early 2009.189 
                                                                                                                          
184 See, e.g., Jack Ewing et al., What’s Dragging Europe Down, BUS. WK., Mar. 9, 2009, at 36, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, BUSWK File (stating that “Western banks [had decided to] choke 
off easy credit that fueled Asian-style growth” among Eastern European countries, and that many 
European corporations were “deeply in hock” because of a “glut of debt-fueled private equity” 
underwritten by banks); Britain’s Fallen Star: The Economy, ECONOMIST, Feb. 14, 2009, at 65, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, ECON File [hereinafter Britain’s Fallen Star] (discussing how 
Britain’s economic boom from 1991 to 2007 was “fueled by debt—both public and private—and 
involved a star role for City bankers currently vilified for their excesses”); The Party is Definitely 
Over: Ireland’s Economy, ECONOMIST, Mar. 21, 2009, at 51, available at LEXIS, News Library, 
ECON File (discussing Ireland’s severe economic problems resulting from the bursting of “house-price 
and credit booms that were big even by British standards”); see also The Euro Area: A Tricky 
Balancing Act, ECONOMIST, Feb. 7, 2009, at 44, available at LEXIS, News Library, ECON File 
(concluding that the euro area’s economy, which seemed strong at the beginning of the subprime 
financial crisis, was suffering as badly as the U.S. and U.K. economies). 
185 FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE 
GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS 13–16, 29–32 (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/ 
other/turner_review.pdf [hereinafter TURNER REVIEW]; see Paul Langley, Financialization and the 
Consumer Credit Boom, 12 COMPETITION & CHANGE 133, 133–35 (2008) (noting that “one of the 
principal features of Anglo-American economies in recent decades [has been] the boom in consumer 
borrowing,” and contending that financial innovations played a key role in promoting that boom). 
186 INT’L MONETARY FUND, GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: FINANCIAL STRESS AND 
DELEVERAGING: MACROFINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND POLICY 17–18 (2008), available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/gfsr/2008/02/pdf/text.pdf [hereinafter OCTOBER 2008 IMF GFS 
REPORT]; Britain’s Fallen Star, supra note 184 (reporting that British households were carrying the 
heaviest debt burden among G7 economies, with household debt equal to 185% of disposable income 
at the end of 2007); see also infra note 219 and accompanying text (stating that the ratio of household 
debt to disposable income in the U.S. rose to 140% in 2006). 
187 TURNER REVIEW, supra note 185, at 16–18; Stephanie Baker et al., U.K. Banks in Crisis: 
Rewriting the Rules, BLOOMBERG MKTS. MAG., Jan. 2009, at 74, 79 (reporting that the assets of U.K. 
banks tripled to £ 6 trillion between 2001 and 2007); Britain’s Fallen Star, supra note 184. 
188 TURNER REVIEW, supra note 185, at 19–20, 29; What Went Wrong, supra note 181; see infra 
Part III.B.3.d. 
189 Britain’s Fallen Star, supra note 184; What Went Wrong, supra note 181; see infra Part III.C.   
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2.  Causes of the Credit Boom 
Four factors contributed significantly to the credit boom in the U.S.  
First, many have blamed the FRB’s monetary policy under Chairman Alan 
Greenspan for helping to create the U.S. dotcom-telecom bubble of the late 
1990s and the housing bubble of 2003–2006.  Greenspan’s critics argue 
that the FRB followed an excessively lax monetary policy during the 
second half of the 1990s, particularly when the FRB cut short-term rates 
aggressively in 1998 in response to Russia’s debt default and the 
threatened collapse of Long-Term Capital Management, a large hedge 
fund.  Critics contend that the FRB’s rate cuts in 1998 (together with a 
further easing of monetary policy in 1999) helped to promote reckless 
speculation in the stock market at the height of the dotcom-telecom 
bubble.190   
Greenspan’s detractors maintain that the FRB’s monetary policy after 
2000 was even more expansionary and, therefore, inflicted even greater 
damage on the U.S. economy.  A sharp recession followed the bursting of 
the stock market bubble in early 2000.  In response, the FRB cut short-term 
interest rates from 6.5% in January 2001 to 1% in mid-2003—the lowest 
level since 1954—and did not increase rates again until mid-2004.191  
Greenspan and his FRB colleagues believed that ultra-low interest rates 
were needed to avoid a deflationary episode in the U.S. similar to the 
economic problems that Japan suffered during the 1990s after the bursting 
of its own stock market bubble.192  Thus, the FRB’s second episode of low 
interest rates was deliberately intended to offset the effects of the dotcom-
telecom bust, for which the FRB bore significant responsibility.193    
Indeed, Greenspan acknowledged in November 2002 that the FRB’s 
lax monetary policy was designed to boost housing prices.  In testimony 
                                                                                                                          
190 E.g., FLECKENSTEIN & SHEEHAN, supra note 173, at 15–81; KUTTNER, supra note 171, at 
152–60; MORRIS, supra note 172, at 32–33, 49–55, 64–65; ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL 
EXUBERANCE 40–41 (2d ed. 2005); STIGLITZ, supra note 143, at 56–66; Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 
346–48, 370–73, 470–73.    
191 E.g., FLECKENSTEIN & SHEEHAN, supra note 173, at 108–14, 120, 124–29, 141–45; MORRIS, 
supra note 172, at 59, 62–65; Marc Faber, Synchronized Boom, Synchronized Bust, WALL ST. J., Feb. 
18, 2009, at A17, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File; Greg Ip & Jon E. Hilsenrath, Debt 
Bomb: Inside the ‘Subprime’ Mortgage Debacle: Seeds of Excess: How Credit Got So Easy and Why 
It’s Tightening, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2007, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File; 
Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr., Our Subprime Fed, WALL ST. J., Aug. 10, 2007, at A11.   
192 FLECKENSTEIN & SHEEHAN, supra note 173, at 141–45; see also Ben S. Bernanke, Governor 
of the Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the National Economics Club: Deflation: Making Sure “It” 
Doesn’t Happen Here (Nov. 21, 2002), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/ 
speeches/2002/20021121/default.htm (quoted and discussed in FLECKENSTEIN & SHEEHAN, supra note 
173, at 141–42); Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Vice Chairman of the Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the 
Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research: Recessions and Recoveries Associated with Asset-
Price Movements: What Do We Know? (Jan. 12, 2005) at 2, 6, available at http://www.federalreserve. 
gov/boarddocs/speeches/2005/20050112/default.htm. 
193 FLECKENSTEIN & SHEEHAN, supra note 173, at 50–81, 120, 139–49; MORRIS, supra note 172, 
at 59, 62–65. 
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during a congressional hearing, Greenspan stated that the FRB’s policy of 
maintaining low interest rates had led to an increase in housing values, 
which enabled homeowners to withdraw equity from their homes to 
finance personal consumption.  Greenspan argued that consumption funded 
by home equity withdrawals was helping to offset the recessionary effects 
of the dotcom-telecom bust.194   
The FRB’s rate-cutting policy produced short-term interest rates that 
were negative (adjusted for inflation) from October 2002 until April 
2005.195  Critics allege that the FRB’s policy fueled huge credit bubbles in 
the housing market and other sectors of the U.S. economy.196  In the 
opinion of William Fleckenstein—probably Greenspan’s most severe 
critic—“Greenspan bailed out the world’s largest equity bubble with the 
world’s largest real estate bubble.”197  Economist John B. Taylor 
determined that the FRB’s short-term interest rates during 2003–2006 were 
“well below what experience during the previous two decades of good . . . 
macroeconomic performance . . . would have predicted.”198  Taylor also 
concluded that “a higher federal funds rate path would have avoided much 
of the housing boom.”199   
The currency exchange rate policies of Asian and oil exporting nations 
were a second important factor behind the credit boom in the U.S., U.K. 
and other Western countries.  To support their export-driven economies, 
China, Japan, South Korea, and other Asian countries managed exchange 
rates to maintain artificially low values for their currencies versus the 
dollar, the pound sterling and other Western currencies.  Asian countries 
boosted the values of Western currencies by amassing huge foreign 
reserves, including investments in government securities issued by the U.S. 
and other Western nations.  In addition, oil exporting nations invested 
much of their balance-of-trade surpluses in Western financial markets.  As 
a result of these massive investments in Western government securities and 
financial markets by Asian and oil exporting nations, the U.S., U.K. and 
                                                                                                                          
194 Economic Outlook: Hearing Before the J. Economic Comm., 107th Cong. 2 (2002) (statement 
of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board), available at http://www.house.gov/jec/ 
hearings/greenspan11-13-02.pdf; see also FLECKENSTEIN & SHEEHAN, supra note 173, at 139–40 
(quoting and discussing Greenspan’s testimony). 
195 ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION 48 (2008); see also MORRIS, supra note 172, at 
59. 
196 E.g., FLECKENSTEIN & SHEEHAN, supra note 173, at 143–79; MORRIS, supra note 172, at 59, 
62–69; Faber, supra note 191; Ip & Hilsenrath, supra note 191; O’Driscoll, supra note 191. 
197 FLECKENSTEIN & SHEEHAN, supra note 173, at 181; see also SHILLER, supra note 195, at 48 
(stating that the FRB’s “very loose monetary policy” after 2000 and the resulting “real estate boom” 
were “driven by economic conditions that were created by the stock market bubble of the 1990s”). 
198 John B. Taylor, Housing and Monetary Policy 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 13682, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13682.pdf.   
199 Id. at 6.  Similarly, the U.K. government’s fiscal and monetary policies have been criticized for 
promoting unsustainable booms in British residential and commercial real estate markets.  See 
generally Simon Lee, The Rock of Stability? The Political Economy of the Brown Government, 30 
POL’Y STUD. 17, 26–27 (2009); Britain’s Fallen Star, supra note 184. 
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other Western countries were able to maintain their interest rates at low 
levels until 2007, despite increases in their national debts and current 
account deficits.  In the process, abundant credit was provided to Western 
consumers and businesses.200    
Economist Robert Shiller and other observers contend that mass 
psychology provides a third explanation for the credit boom, particularly as 
manifested in the housing sector.201  Shiller points to a “social contagion of 
boom thinking, mediated by the common observation of rapidly rising 
prices . . . . that appear to justify the belief that the boom will continue.”202  
The recent housing bubble resembled previous speculative booms because 
“[housing] price increases encourage[d] belief in ‘new era’ stories, 
promote[d] the contagion of those stories, and so [led] to further price 
increases.”203   
Shiller further maintains that “bubble thinking” explains why (i) the 
FRB did not perceive any problem with its “very loose monetary policy” 
after 2000, (ii) the FRB and other federal bank regulators did not recognize 
the risks created by subprime lending, (iii) the credit ratings agencies 
“persisted in giving AAA ratings to [subprime] mortgage securities,” and 
(iv) bank executives “absolutely did not see the crisis coming.”204  Thus, in 
Shiller’s view, “the very people responsible for oversight were caught up 
in the same high expectations for future home-price increases that the 
general public had . . . . [T]hey [a]ccepted the received wisdom that [the 
housing boom] could not end badly.”205  Similarly, because “U.S. home 
prices increased every year from 1997 to 2006,” the general public 
                                                                                                                          
200 For discussions of the impact of foreign currency exchange rate policies and foreign 
investments in Western securities in promoting low interest rates and abundant credit in the U.S. and 
other Western nations, see, for example, MORRIS supra note 172, at 88–104; DMITRI B. 
PAPADIMITRIOU ET AL., LEVY ECON. INSTIT. BARD COLLEGE, CAN THE GROWTH IN THE U.S. CURRENT 
ACCOUNT DEFICIT BE SUSTAINED? THE GROWING BURDEN OF SERVICING FOREIGN-OWNED U.S. 
DEBT 2 (2006), available at http://www.levy.org/pubs/sa_may_06.pdf; Douglas W. Arner, The Global 
Credit Crisis of 2008: Causes and Consequences 16–17 (AIIFL Working Paper No. 3, Jan. 2009), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1330744; Adrian Blundell-Wignall & Paul Atkinson, The Sub-
Prime Crisis: Causal Distortions and Regulatory Reform, in LESSONS FROM THE FINANCIAL TURMOIL 
OF 2007 AND 2008, at 55, 57–58 (Paul Bloxham & Christopher Kent, eds., Res. Bank of Australia 
2008), available at http://www.rba.gov.au/PublicationsAndResearch/Conferences/2008/index.html; 
Brunnermeier, supra note 3, at 77; W. Max Corden, The World Credit Crisis: Understanding It, and 
What to Do 3–5, 14–18 (Melbourne Instit. Working Paper No. 25/08, Dec. 2008), available at 
http://www.melbourneinstitute.com/wp/wp2008n25.pdf; TURNER REVIEW, supra note 185, at 12–13; Ip 
& Hilsenrath, supra note 191; Mark Whitehouse, Imbalance in Nations’ Savings Clouds Forecasts for 
Recovery, WALL ST. J., Mar. 23, 2009, at A2, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File. 
201 SHILLER, supra note 195, at 4 (maintaining that “the ultimate cause of the global financial 
crisis is the psychology of the real estate bubble,” as manifested in “an epidemic of irrational public 
enthusiasm for housing investments”).  
202 Id. at 41; see also FLECKENSTEIN & SHEEHAN, supra note 173, at 152–55, 173–76; MORRIS, 
supra note 172, at 65–67. 
203 SHILLER, supra note 195, at 45–46.  
204 Id. at 48–54; see also FLECKENSTEIN & SHEEHAN, supra note 173, at 152–61, 173–76. 
205 SHILLLER, supra note 195, at 53–54.  
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concluded that “homes [were] the best investment one [could] make.”206 
The fourth factor behind the enormous—and ultimately 
unsustainable—credit boom was the crucial role played by large financial 
conglomerates.  As explained in the the next section, universal banks were 
the most important private sector catalysts for the credit boom and the 
resulting financial crisis.   
B.  Financial Conglomerates Promoted the Credit Boom, Which Exposed 
Households, Nonfinancial Businesses and Financial Institutions to 
Catastrophic Losses 
During the past two decades—and especially after 2000—universal 
banks used innovative financial products to provide huge amounts of high-
risk credit to marginal borrowers in the household and business sectors.  In 
addition, universal banks created massive debt burdens within the financial 
sector, because they (i) provided large amounts of credit to nonbank 
financial institutions and (ii) used financial innovations to increase their 
own leverage.  The FRB’s lax monetary policies encouraged LCFIs to 
originate and distribute a wide variety of debt instruments that continued to 
feed the credit boom.  By 2007, the health of the U.S. economy relied on a 
massive confidence game—indeed, some might say, a Ponzi scheme207—
operated by its leading financial institutions.  The continued success of this 
game depended upon the willingness of investors to keep buying new debt 
instruments that would enable overstretched borrowers to expand their 
consumption and service their debts.  When investor confidence in the 
solvency of subprime borrowers was severely shaken in the summer of 
2007, the game collapsed and a severe financial crisis began.  Thus, as 
FRB Chairman Bernanke acknowledged in February 2009: 
The principal cause of the economic slowdown was the 
collapse of the global credit boom and the ensuing financial 
crisis, which has affected asset values, credit conditions, and 
consumer and business confidence around the world.  The 
immediate trigger of the crisis was the end of the housing 
booms in the United States and other countries and the 
associated problems in mortgage markets, notably the 
                                                                                                                          
206 Id. at 64, 65; see also FLECKENSTEIN & SHEEHAN, supra note 173, at 157, 156 (stating that 
“[i]n the real estate bubble, it was assumed that . . . prices [would] continue to get higher indefinitely” 
and “participants started to feel truly invincible”). 
207 See FLECKENSTEIN & SHEEHAN, supra note 173, at 176–78 (quoting November 15, 2007 
report by Robert Campbell, which alleged that banks and mortgage companies had “effectively turned 
the U.S. housing market into a system of Ponzi finance” because they made “trillions of dollars” of 
high-risk mortgage loans to “millions of Americans who had little or no chance of making payments on 
those loans to maturity.”); see also infra notes 303 and 407 and accompanying text (discussing 
conditions of “Ponzi finance” created in the housing and LBO markets by LCFIs’ aggressive 
underwriting of nonprime residential mortgages and leveraged corporate loans).   
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collapse of the U.S. subprime mortgage market.208 
1.  The Explosion of Household Debt after 1990 
Household mortgage debt nearly quadrupled between 1991 and 2007, 
rising from $2.7 trillion to $10.5 trillion.209  Four-fifths of this growth in 
residential mortgage debt took place after 2000.210  As a consequence of 
this huge increase in mortgage debt, homeowners’ equity as a percentage 
of the market value of household real estate declined from 60.5% in 1991 
to 47.9% in 2007.211 
Non-mortgage consumer credit (including credit card loans, auto loans 
and student loans) more than tripled between 1991 and 2007, increasing 
from $800 billion to $2.55 trillion.212  More than half of this growth in 
consumer credit occurred after 2000.213  The growth rate for consumer 
credit was somewhat less rapid than mortgage debt, because homeowners 
drew heavily on the equity in their homes to pay down their credit card 
debts and other consumer loans.214   
For example, a study by Alan Greenspan and James Kennedy 
estimated that homeowners used home equity extractions (i.e., proceeds 
from home sales and refinancings) to pay off $935 billion of non-mortgage 
                                                                                                                          
208 Semiannual Monetary Report to the Congress: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, 
Housing and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009), available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/ 
newsevents/testimony/bernanke20090224a.htm (testimony by Ben S. Bernanke , FRB Chairman). 
209 See 1996 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 92 tbl.L.218, line 2 (providing amount for 
year-end 1991); 2007 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 94 tbl.L.218, line 2 (providing figure 
for year-end 2007). 
210 Household mortgage debt increased by $5.6 trillion (from $4.9 trillion to $10.5 trillion) 
between 2000 and 2007, accounting for eighty-two percent of the $7.8 trillion increase in mortgage 
debt from 1991 to 2007.  See 1996 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 92 tlb.L.218, line 2 
(providing data for year-end 1991); 2002 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 179, at 94 tbl.L.218, line 
2 (providing amount for year-end 2000); 2007 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 94 tbl.L.218, 
line 2 (providing figure for year-end 2007). 
211 BD. OF GOVERNORS OF FED. RES. SYS., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 
4TH QTR. 1997, at 104 tbl.B.100, line 52 (providing amount for year-end 1991); 2007 FLOW OF FUNDS 
REPORT, supra note 92, at 102 tbl.B.100, line 50 (providing figure for year-end 2007). 
212 1996 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 94 tbl.L.222, line 1; 2007 FLOW OF FUNDS 
REPORT, supra note 92, at 96 tbl.L.222, line 1. 
213 Consumer credit rose from $800 billion at the end of 1991 to $1.59 billion at the end of 2000 
and further increased to $2.55 trillion at the end of 2007.  See 1996 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra 
note 92, at 94 tbl.L.222, line 1 (providing amount for year-end 1991); 2002 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, 
supra note 179, at 96 tbl.L.222, line 1 (providing figure for year-end 2000); 2007 FLOW OF FUNDS 
REPORT, supra note 92, at 96 tbl.L.222, line 1 (providing data for year-end 2007).  
214 See Alan Greenspan & James Kennedy, Sources and Uses of Equity Extracted from Homes, 24 
OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 120, 122, 139 (2008).  In addition, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA) 
made nonmortgage consumer loans less attractive to homeowners, because the TRA ended the 
deductibility of interest paid on consumer loans while preserving the deductibility of interest paid on 
loans secured by residential real estate.  The TRA encouraged homeowners to use mortgage 
refinancings and home equity loans to pay off nonmortgage consumer loans in order to increase their 
ability to deduct their interest payments from their taxable income.  See PAUL MUOLO & MATHEW 
PADILLA, CHAIN OF BLAME: HOW WALL STREET CAUSED THE MORTGAGE AND CREDIT CRISIS 36 
(2008); Souphala Chomsisengphet & Anthony Pennington-Cross, The Evolution of the Subprime 
Mortgage Market, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 31, 38 (2006). 
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consumer credit during 1991–2006.215  The same study estimated that 
homeowners withdrew $1.15 trillion from their home equity to finance 
personal consumption during 1991–2006.216  Because most of the 
consumer debt that homeowners repaid from home equity had originally 
been incurred for consumption of goods and services, homeowners 
effectively relied on home equity withdrawals to finance more than $2 
trillion of their personal consumption during 1991–2006.217  Three-quarters 
of those home equity withdrawals occurred during the housing boom of 
2001–2006.218 
The tremendous growth in all types of consumer debt during 1991–
2007 was reflected in the rising debt burdens of U.S. households.  Total 
household debt as a percentage of disposable personal income rose from 87 
percent in 1990 to 140 percent in 2006.219  Mortgage debt, the largest 
component of household debt, rose from 58 percent to 102 percent of 
disposable income during the same period.220   
Not surprisingly, the savings rate of U.S. households moved in the 
opposite direction from their debt burden, falling from about eight percent 
in 1992 to just above zero in 2006.221  Many households (especially those 
below the wealthiest quintile) relied on increased borrowings and reduced 
savings to compensate for the relatively slow growth in their income.222  
The share of total U.S. household income earned by the top twenty percent 
of households rose significantly between 1990 and 2005, but the share 
earned by each of the lower quintiles declined.223  Individuals in the 
highest quintile of incomes achieved substantial gains in their inflation-
adjusted earnings from 1973 to 2005, but individuals at or below the 
seventieth percentile recorded very modest gains during the same period.224  
Thus, middle and lower income households increased their borrowings to 
                                                                                                                          
215 Greenspan & Kennedy, supra note 214, at 131 tbl.2, line 5, 139. 
216 Id. at 131 tbl.2, line 9, 140. 
217 Id. at 131 tbl.2, lines 5 and 9, 139–40. 
218 Id. at 131 tbl.2, lines 5 and 9. 
219 Aldo Barba & Massimo Pivetti, Rising Household Debt: Its Causes and Macroeconomic 
Implications—A Long-Period Analysis, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 113, 115 tbl.1 (2009). 
220 Id. (showing that consumer credit rose from 19% to 25% of disposable income, and other 
household debts increased from 9% to 12% of disposable income, between 1990 and 2006). 
221 Karen E. Dynan & Donald L. Kohn, The Rise in U.S. Household Indebtedness: Causes and 
Consequences, fig.1 (Fin. & Econ. Discussion Ser. Working Paper 207–37), available at 
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2007/200737/200737pap.pdf; see also Barba & Pivetti, supra note 
219, at 123 (stating that households’ net savings as a percentage of disposable net income fell from 
10% in 1980 to 0.5% in 2005).  
222 KUTTNER, supra note 171, at 16, 20–30, 37–40; Barba & Pivetti, supra note 219, at 123–27. 
223 Barba & Pivetti, supra note 219, at 123 tbl.4. 
224 David H. Autor, Explaining Trends in Wages, Work, and Occupations, 261 CHICAGO FED 
LETTER (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/fedletter/cflapril2009_ 
261.pdf; Janet L. Yellen, Economic Inequality in the United States, FRBSF ECON. LETT. No. 2006-33-
34, at 2, fig. 1 (Dec. 1, 2006), available at http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/2006/ 
el2006-33-34.pdf; see also KUTTNER, supra note 171, at 16, 20. 
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offset the impact of stagnant incomes.  However, by doing so they became 
increasingly exposed to shocks from adverse changes in their family 
situation or macroeconomic conditions.225 
As discussed below, vulnerable households were able to increase their 
debt burdens because financial innovations—including securitization and 
automated processing for residential mortgages and credit card loans—
significantly expanded their access to credit.226  As also described below, 
lenders increasingly marketed nonprime mortgages and nonprime 
consumer loans to lower income groups during the past decade.  As a 
result, significantly higher percentages of households in the lowest three 
income quintiles gained access to credit in 2004, compared to 1983.227  
Unfortunately, wider access to credit produced much higher debt burdens 
for lower income groups.  In 2004, household debt burdens were almost 
400% of disposable personal income for the lowest income quintile in 
relation to disposable personal income, nearly 250% for the second lowest 
quintile, and more than 200% for the third lowest quintile.  In contrast, 
household debt burdens for the highest quintile were less than 130%.228  
The excessively high debt burdens carried by low and middle income 
households, and the recent spikes in delinquency and default rates for 
residential mortgages and credit card loans, are the painful legacy of the 
post-1990 credit boom.229 
2.  The Dominant Role of Large, Federally-Chartered Banks in 
Consumer Credit Markets  
LCFIs played leading roles in promoting the post-1990 surge in 
consumer credit, including both residential mortgage debt and 
nonmortgage debt.  Major banks established dominant positions in 
consumer lending markets by creating nationwide credit programs that 
used (i) mass marketing techniques, (ii) highly automated loan processing 
programs, and (iii) computerized credit scoring programs for reviewing 
and approving loan applications in lieu of personal reviews of credit 
files.230  Big banks also funded a growing portion of their consumer 
lending programs by securitizing mortgages and credit cards into RMBS 
                                                                                                                          
225 Dynan & Kohn, supra note 221, at 10, 31–32. 
226 Id. at 17–19; see also infra notes 230–34 and accompanying text (discussing financial 
innovations that encouraged mass-marketing and securitization of mortgages and credit cards). 
227 Barba & Pivetti, supra note 219, at 117, 118 tbl.2; see also infra Part III.B.3. 
228 Id. at 118 tbl.3. 
229 See, e.g., FLECKENSTEIN & SHEEHAN, supra note 173, at 129–30, 152–61, 173–78; Jessica 
Silver-Greenberg, The Credit-Card Blowup Ahead, BUS. WEEK Oct. 20, 2008, at 24, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, BUSWK File; Michelle J. White, Bankruptcy: Past Puzzles, Recent Reforms, 
and the Mortgage Crisis, 8–10, 14, 20 (fig. 2) (Nat’l Bur. Econ. Res. Working Paper 14549, Dec. 
2008). 
230 Robert DeYoung & Tara Rice, How do Banks Make Money? A Variety of Business Strategies, 
ECON. PERSPECTIVES (Fed. Res. Bank of Chi., IL), 4th Qtr. 2004, at 52, 53–56; Wilmarth, supra note 
13, at 388–89.  
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and ABS.231  By the end of 2007, about sixty percent of outstanding 
residential mortgages and about half of outstanding credit card loans were 
securitized.232  Mass marketing, automated processing, credit scoring, and 
securitization enabled big banks to transform consumer lending “from a 
high-touch, relationship-based service to an arms-length, financial 
commodity business.”233 
LCFIs have dominated the markets for residential mortgages and credit 
cards markets since 2000.  In 2001, the top five mortgage lenders were 
Chase, Wells Fargo, BofA, Washington Mutual (Wamu) and Countrywide.  
In the same year, the top ten mortgage lenders controlled almost half of the 
mortgage origination and servicing markets.234  In 2006 and 2007, the top 
five mortgage lenders from 2001, together with Citigroup, controlled a 
majority of both the mortgage origination and mortgage servicing 
markets.235  Similarly, the top five credit card lenders increased their share 
of the credit card market from 60% in 1999 to 71% in 2005.236  In 2008, 
three giant banks—BofA, Citigroup and Chase—controlled more than half 
of the credit card market.237 
The emergence of dominant national lenders for mortgages and credit 
card loans was facilitated by federal preemption of a wide range of state 
laws, including state usury laws, state consumer protection laws, and state 
laws restricting interstate branching.  In 1978, the Supreme Court held that 
a provision of the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. § 85, gave national banks 
“most favored lender” status in their home state and also allowed national 
banks to “export” their home state interest rates to borrowers residing in 
other states.238  In 1996, the Supreme Court upheld a regulation of the 
                                                                                                                          
231 Vallee, supra note 85, at 4–6; Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 389. 
232 2007 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 94 tbl.L.218, lines 2, 18, 19 (showing that 
$10.5 trillion of home mortgages were outstanding at the end of 2007, of which $6.4 trillion were held 
in agency- and GSE-backed mortgage pools or by ABS issuers); BD. GOVERNORS FED. RES. SYS., 
CONSUMER CREDIT, SEPT. 2008, STATISTICAL REL. G.19, Nov. 7, 2008 (“Consumer Credit 
Outstanding” tbl., showing that $970 billion of revolving credit (primarily consisting of credit card 
loans) was outstanding at the end of 2007, of which $450 billion was held in pools of securitized 
assets). 
233 DeYoung & Rice, supra note 230, at 56; see also Wilmarth, supra  note 13, at 389. 
234 Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 389–90 n.751. 
235 Consumer Finance (Mortgages): Top Residential Originators, US BANKER, July 2008, at 34 
(showing that the six institutions controlled 51% of the origination market in 2007); Consumer Finance 
(Mortgages): Top Residential Servicers, US BANKER, July 2008, at 35 (showing that the six banks 
controlled 62% of the servicing market in 2007); Top Residential Originators, AM. BANKER, June 15, 
2007, at 14 (showing that the same six banks controlled 49.5% of the origination market in 2006); Top 
Residential Servicers, AM. BANKER, June 15, 2007, at 14 (showing that the same six institutions 
controlled 58% of the servicing market in 2006).  
236 THE NILSON REPORT, Top Credit Card Issuers, Feb. 2006, at 1 (providing 2005 data); 
Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 390 n.751 (providing 1999 figure). 
237 Daniel Wolfe, Top Issuers, with Less Appetite for Risk, Slashing Credit Lines, AM. BANKER, 
Dec. 2, 2008, at 7. 
238 Marquette National Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 438 U.S. 299 (1978).  For a 
comprehensive analysis of the “most favored lender” and “exportation” doctrines, see Elizabeth R. 
Schiltz, The Amazing, Elastic, Ever-Expanding Exportation Doctrine and Its Effect on Predatory 
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Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), declaring that the 
“interest” which national banks could “export” to other states included all 
fees that were “material to the determination of the interest rate,” including 
numerical periodic rates, annual fees, cash advance fees, bad check fees, 
over-the-limit fees, and late payment fees.  The OCC’s regulation thus 
exempted a wide range of lump-sum fees and charges, as well as numerical 
periodic interest rates, from any regulation under state law.239   
In 1994, Congress adopted legislation that (i) authorized bank holding 
companies to make interstate acquisitions of banks and (ii) empowered 
national banks and state banks to establish interstate branches.  This 
legislation made possible the establishment of large nationwide banking 
organizations.240  In addition, the OCC declared in 1998 that a national 
bank may “export” to other states the “interest” allowed by the law of any 
state in which the bank maintains either its main office or a branch.241   
In combination, the foregoing legal developments effectively 
precluded the states from applying their state usury laws and many other 
state consumer credit laws to loans made by national banks and federally-
chartered thrifts.  Under current federal laws, federally-chartered 
institutions can locate their consumer credit operations in a state (e.g., 
Delaware or South Dakota) that imposes no restrictions on periodic rates or 
on other fees and charges that the OCC determines to be part of “interest” 
for purposes of 12 U.S.C. § 85.  Federally-chartered institutions can also 
“export” those terms of credit to customers residing in all other states, 
regardless of any conflicting laws enacted by those states.242 
In 2004, the OCC issued a regulation that expanded the scope of 
preemption for national banks far beyond matters relating to “interest.”  
The OCC’s regulation seeks to preempt all state laws that “obstruct, 
impair, or condition a national bank’s ability to fully exercise its [f]ederally 
authorized powers” in four broadly-defined areas—real estate lending, 
lending not secured by real estate, deposit-taking, and other 
                                                                                                                          
Lending Regulation, 88 MINN. L. REV. 518 (2004).  In 1980, Congress granted “most favored lender” 
status and “exportation” authority to FDIC-insured state banks and thrift institutions.  Id. at 565–67 
(discussing 12 U.S.C. § 1831d, which applies to all FDIC-insured state banks); id. at 601–03 
(discussing 12 U.S.C. § 1463(g)(1), which applies to federally-chartered thrift institutions).  
239 Smiley v. Citibank (South Dakota), N.A., 517 U.S. 735 (1996) (upholding the validity of 12 
C.F.R. § 7.4001(a)); see also Schiltz, supra note 238, at 560–65 (discussing Smiley and the OCC’s 
expansive interpretation of “interest” under 12 U.S.C. § 85). 
240 See generally MCCOY, supra note 14, § 9.04.; see also id. § 9.04[1] (stating that the 1994 
legislation made “interstate banking truly universal . . . by ending the states’ authority to ban interstate 
banking”). 
241 Schiltz, supra note 238, at 553–56 (discussing OCC Interpretive Letter No. 822, Feb. 17, 
1998). 
242 Id. at 561–65, 618; see also Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1, 80–81 (2008). 
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“operations.”243  The OCC’s regulation thereby “cancels out much state-
level consumer protection law.”244  The regulation is closely similar to 
preemptive rules previously issued by the Office of Thrift Supervision 
(OTS) with respect to lending, deposit-taking and other “operations” of 
federally-chartered thrifts.245    
The OCC issued a second regulation in 2004, which bars state officials 
from initiating any administrative or judicial proceeding to enforce 
applicable laws (state or federal) against national banks.246  The validity of 
that regulation was upheld by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  
However, the Supreme Court recently granted review in that case.247    
A third OCC regulation declared that operating subsidiaries of national 
banks are entitled to the same preemptive immunity from state laws that 
national banks are granted under federal law.  That regulation was upheld 
by the Supreme Court in 2007.248  The OCC and OTS further ruled that 
states could not regulate mortgage brokers and other contract agents who 
arranged loans on behalf of national banks or federal thrifts.249 
As the result of federal statutory preemption and the OCC’s and OTS’s 
preemption rules, “[m]any credit practices that a state may deem 
fraudulent, deceptive, or otherwise unlawful will nonetheless be permitted 
within state borders whenever federally chartered institutions are 
involved.”250  By exempting federally-chartered institutions from most 
state consumer protection laws, federal preemption promoted the 
establishment of huge, federally-chartered banks with nationwide 
consumer lending operations.251 
                                                                                                                          
243 See 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a) (real estate lending); id. § 7.4008 (lending not secured by real estate); 
id.  § 7.4007 (deposit-taking); id. § 7.4009 (other “operations”).  For analysis and critique of the OCC’s 
rules, see Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 242, at 81–82; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The OCC’s 
Preemption Rules Exceed the Agency’s Authority and Present a Serious Threat to the Dual Banking 
System and Consumer Protection, 23 ANN. REV. OF BANKING AND FIN. L. 225 (2004). 
244 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 242, at 82. 
245 See 12 C.F.R. §§ 560.2, 557.11, 545.2, discussed in Wilmarth, supra note 243, at 235, 283–84. 
246 See 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000, discussed in Wilmarth, supra note 243, at 228–29, 327–34. 
247 Clearing House Ass’n  v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 987 
(U.S. Jan. 16, 2009) (No. 08-453.). 
248 Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2007) (upholding the validity of 12 C.F.R. § 
7.4006). 
249 See State Farm Bank, FSB v. Reardon, 539 F.3d 336 (6th Cir. 2008) (upholding OTS ruling 
that permitted a federally-chartered thrift to offer mortgage loans through agents without complying 
with Ohio’s laws governing mortgage brokers); Office of Comptroller Currency, Preemption 
Determination, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,593 (May 23, 2001) (declaring that Michigan’s Motor Vehicle Finance 
Act did not apply to car dealers who arranged automobile loans made by national bank); OCC 
Interpretive Letter No. 1002 (May 13, 2004) (letter from Comptroller of the Currency John D. Hawke, 
Jr., to Georgia Banking Comm’r David G. Sorrell) (declaring that Georgia’s laws governing mortgage 
brokers did not apply to brokers who arranged loans funded at closing by national banks or their 
subsidiaries). 
250 Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 242, at 83. 
251 Consumer Protections in Financial Services: Past Problems, Future Solutions: Hearings 
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 14–15 (2009) (written 
testimony of Professor Patricia A. McCoy), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1367977 [hereinafter 
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Federal preemption significantly undermined the ability of states to 
enforce predatory lending laws.  During the past decade a majority of 
states adopted laws designed to prevent abusive subprime lending 
practices, but the OTS’s and OCC’s preemption rules prevented the states 
from enforcing those laws against federally-chartered banks and their 
subsidiaries.252  As shown below, large federally-chartered depository 
institutions and their affiliates were among the leading providers of 
subprime and Alt-A mortgages between 2001 and 2007.253 
Many commentators have criticized the OCC and OTS for preempting 
state consumer protection laws without establishing adequate federal 
safeguards to protect consumers against abusive lending practices by 
federally chartered depository institutions, their subsidiaries, and agents.254  
Those observers (as well as state regulators) maintain that preemptive 
actions by the OCC and OTS significantly undermined the states’ ability to 
prevent predatory lending and did not provide an effective federal 
substitute for state enforcement.255   
3.  Financial Conglomerates Were the Primary Private-Sector 
Catalysts for the Surge in Nonprime Consumer Lending after 2000 
  a.  LCFIs Were Major Originators and Funders of Nonprime 
Loans 
Nonprime mortgages fall into two basic categories:  “subprime” and 
“Alt-A.”  Those categories do not have strictly defined boundaries.  
                                                                                                                          
McCoy Testimony]; see also Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 242, at 79–84; Wilmarth, supra note 243, 
at 233–37, 279–87, 363–64. 
252 McCoy Testimony, supra note 251, at 12–16; Julia P. Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American 
Dream: Predatory Lending, Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 
1319–22, 1339–53 (2006);Wilmarth, supra note 241, at 233–36, 298–99, 306. 
253 See infra notes 269–77 and accompanying text. 
254 E.g., McCoy Testimony, supra note 251, at 14–23; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 242, at 79–
83, 90–95; Christopher L. Peterson, Preemption, Agency Cost Theory, and Predatory Lending by 
Banking Agents: Are Federal Regulators Biting Off More Than They Can Chew?, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 
515, 516–19, 525–36, 544–51 (2007); Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: 
Unmasking the Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 70–84 (2005); Amanda Quester & Kathleen 
Keest, Looking Ahead After Watters v. Wachovia Bank: Challenges for Lower Courts, Congress, and 
the Comptroller of the Currency, 27 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 187, 194–201, 215–16, 219–21 (2007); 
Wilmarth, supra note 241, at 233–36, 280–87, 298–300, 306–17, 348–56; Binyamin Appelbaum & 
Ellen Nakashima, Banking Regulator Played Advocate Over Enforcer, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 2008, at 
A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File; Nicholas Bagley, Subprime Safeguards We 
Needed, WASH. POST, Jan. 25, 2008, at A19, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File; Robert 
Berner & Brian Grow, They Warned Us, BUS. WEEK, Oct. 20, 2008, at 36, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, BUSWK File; Eric Nalder, Mortgage System Crumbled While Regulators Jousted, SEATTLE 
POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 11, 2008, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, SEAPIN File; Eliot 
Spitzer, Predatory Lenders’ Partner in Crime, WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2008, at A25, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File. 
255 See authorities cited supra in note 254; see also Malini Manickavasagam, Regulatory Reform: 
Regulators Say Congress Could Stem Financial Fraud by Closing Certain Gaps, 41 SEC. REG. & L. 
REP. 501 (2009) (reporting on testimony by state regulators, who pointed out the need for state 
oversight of lending practices when federal regulation is insufficient). 
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However, subprime loans “are generally targeted to borrowers who have 
tarnished credit histories and little savings available for down payments,” 
while Alt-A loans “are made to borrowers with more minor credit quality 
issues or borrowers who are unable or unwilling to provide full 
documentation of [their] assets or income.”256   
Subprime lending increased from $65 billion in 1995 to $160 billion in 
1999 but declined slightly to $138 billion in 2000.257  Subprime lending 
then expanded rapidly beginning in 2001 and peaked between 2004 and 
2006.  Subprime loans increased from $190 billion in 2001 to $540 billion 
in 2004, $625 billion in 2005 and $600 billion in 2006.258  Similarly, Alt-A 
loans rose sharply from $60 billion in 2001 to $200 billion in 2004, $380 
billion in 2005 and $400 billion in 2006.259  Nearly 10 million subprime 
and Alt-A loans were originated from 2003 to mid-2007.260 
From 2001 to 2003, subprime and Alt-A loans represented eleven 
percent of total mortgage originations of $9.0 trillion.261  Prime mortgages 
accounted for most of the mortgages originated between 2001 and 2003, 
due to the refinancing boom created by the FRB’s ultra-low interest rate 
policy.  However, mortgage interest rates began to rise in late 2003, 
leading to a significant reduction in refinancings of prime mortgages.262 
Investor demand for mortgage-related securities remained strong, and the 
mortgage lending industry shifted to nonprime mortgages to maintain their 
deal volume and fees.263   
Consequently, subprime and Alt-A loans accounted for a steadily 
growing share of the residential mortgage market between 2004 and 2006.  
In 2004, subprime and Alt-A loans accounted for a quarter of the total 
mortgage originations of $2.9 trillion.  During 2005 and 2006, subprime 
and Alt-A loans represented a third of the $6.1 trillion in mortgage 
                                                                                                                          
256 Christopher Mayer et al., The Rise in Mortgage Defaults, 23 J. ECON. PERSPS. 27, 27–28 
(2009); see also Gorton, supra note 87, at 12–13 (providing a similar description of subprime 
borrowers, and further explaining that “subprime borrowers typically have a FICO score below 640, 
and at some point were delinquent on some debt repayments in the previous 12 to 24 months, or they 
have filed for bankruptcy in the past few years.”); id. at 13 n.2 (noting that “FICO is a credit score 
developed by Fair Isaac & Company” and that FICO scores range from 300 to 850”); Stephen G. Ryan, 
Accounting in and for the Subprime Crisis 11 (Mar. 2008) (unpublished essay), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1115323 (stating that Alt-A mortgages are generally made to borrowers “with 
FICO scores well above the conforming threshold of 660 but that have higher than conforming loan-to 
value or debt-to-income ratios or less than full documentation/verification of their income and assets.”).   
257 Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 214, at 37 tbl.3.  The decline in subprime 
originations in 2000 was due to the disruption in the securitization markets that followed the Asian debt 
crisis of 1998.  Id. at 40–41; see also MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 42–46, 158, 184. 
258 Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 83, at 2 tbl.1. 
259 Id. 
260 Mayer et al., supra note 253, at 29 tbl.1. 
261 Compare Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 253, at 2 tbl.1, with Gorton, supra note 87, at 18 
tbl.4. 
262 McCoy Testimony, supra note 251, at 8; Ryan, supra note 253, at 8–9; see also supra note 191 
and accompanying text (discussing the FRB’s policy of cutting interest rates between 2001 and 2003). 
263 McCoy Testimony, supra note 251, at 8; Ryan, supra note 256, at 9. 
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originations.264 
An increasing trend toward “private label” securitization spurred this 
rapid growth in nonprime mortgage lending between 2001 and 2006.  The 
share of subprime mortgages packaged into RMBS increased from 50.4% 
to 80.5% during that period, while the share of securitized Alt-A 
mortgages grew from 19% to 91%.265  Virtually all of the RMBS backed 
by nonprime mortgages were “private label” securities underwritten by 
large financial conglomerates.266  
The role of LCFIs in the nonprime mortgage market was not limited to 
securitization.  Beginning in the late 1990s, several LCFIs established 
major positions as direct lenders for subprime and Alt-A mortgages.  
Before 1998, most subprime lenders were nonbank finance companies.   
Those nonbank lenders relied on warehouse lines of credit from LCFIs to 
fund their mortgage origination activities, and they sold their loans to 
LCFIs for securitization.267  However, the Asian and Russian financial 
crises in 1997 and 1998 disrupted the securitization markets, and many of 
the nonbank subprime lenders either failed or decided to sell out to large, 
federally-chartered banks or securities firms.268   
For example, Washington Mutual (Wamu)—the largest U.S. thrift—
purchased Long Beach Mortgage in 1999, Citigroup bought Associates 
First Capital (Associates) in 2000, Chase acquired Advanta in 2001, 
Lehman acquired two subprime lenders in 2000 and 2001, and HSBC 
acquired Household International in 2002.269  Citigroup and HSBC made 
their acquisitions despite the fact that (i) Associates was the subject of a 
federal investigation and ultimately paid a large civil penalty to settle 
charges of predatory lending, and (ii) Household had paid almost $500 
million to settle charges of predatory lending filed by more than a dozen 
                                                                                                                          
264 Compare Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 83, at 2 tbl.1 (providing figures for subprime 
and Alt-A loans from 2004 to 2006), with Gorton, supra note 87, at 18 tbl.4 (providing figures for total 
mortgage originations between 2004 and 2006). 
265 Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 83, at 2 tbl.1 (providing figures for Alt-A mortgages); 
Gorton, supra note 87, at 18 tbl.4 (providing data for subprime mortgages). 
266 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 84, at 2045–48, 2065; Peterson, Predatory Finance, supra 
note 85, at 2221–25; see also Bethel et al., supra note 85, at 11, 73 tbl.2 (identifying major 
underwriters of private label RMBS); infra note 280 and accompanying text (same). 
267 MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 42–46, 57–60, 76–80, 153–58; Chomsisengphet & 
Pennington-Cross, supra note 214, at 39 tbl.5, 40 (showing leading subprime lenders in 1996).  Bear 
Stearns was the only LCFI that acquired a subprime mortgage lender before the mid-1990s.  MUOLO & 
PADILLA, supra note 214, at 237. 
268 MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 45, 81, 85, 128; Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, 
supra note 214, at 40; Michael Hudson, Debt Bomb: Lending a Hand: How Wall Street Stoked the 
Mortgage Meltdown, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2007, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL 
File; Brenda B. White, A Short History of Subprime, MORTGAGE BANKING, Mar. 1, 2006, at 18. 
269 MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 80–81, 85; Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, 
supra note 214, at 40; Hudson, supra note 268; White, supra note 268, at 18. 
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states.270  Similarly, National City, a large Midwestern bank, acquired First 
Franklin, a major subprime lender in 1999.271  Meanwhile, Countrywide, 
the nation’s largest mortgage lender, became a bank holding company 
when it acquired a national bank in 2001.  Countrywide also established a 
securitization unit and expanded aggressively into subprime and Alt-A 
lending.272 
LCFIs made a second round of purchases of nonbank subprime lenders 
in 2006 and 2007, as nonbank lenders encountered increasing problems 
with delinquencies and defaults.  Bear Stearns acquired Encore Credit, 
Morgan Stanley purchased Saxon Mortgage, Deutsche bought MortgageIT, 
and Citigroup bought Argent.273  The acquiring LCFIs essentially wagered 
that they could squeeze more fees and profits out of the subprime lending 
business through “vertical integration”—i.e., by taking over the direct 
lending function as well as the securitization process for nonprime loans.274 
The foregoing acquisitions enabled LCFIs to establish leading 
positions as direct subprime lenders. After 2000, large national banks and 
federal thrifts represented half or more of the top ten subprime lenders.275  
Depository institutions and their subsidiaries and affiliates accounted for 
about half of nonprime loans originated in 2004 and 2005, 54% in 2006, 
                                                                                                                          
270 After acquiring Associates, Citigroup paid $215 million to settle predatory lending charges 
filed by the Federal Trade Commission against the subprime lender.  For discussions of the charges 
filed against Associates First Capital and Household, see Forrester, supra note 252, at 1304–06; 
Wilmarth, supra note 243, at 314–15; Erik Portanger et al., Buying American: HSBC to Acquire Lender 
in Big Bet on U.S. Economy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 15, 2002, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, 
WSJNL File. 
271 MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 23. 
272 Id. at 64–67, 112–25.  Countrywide switched its national bank charter to a federal thrift charter 
in March 2007.  Countrywide’s chairman, Angelo Mozilo, declared that a federal thrift charter would 
create “a more efficient capital structure” by taking advantage of “federal preemption.”  Harry Terris, 
Countrywide Preps ‘Major’ Capital Shift, AM. BANKER, May 15, 2007, at 1, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, AMBNKR File.  Later reports indicated that Countrywide shifted to a federal thrift charter 
because the OTS promised “more flexible” and “less antagonistic” supervision of Countrywide’s 
lending operations.  Appelbaum & Nakashima, supra note 254; see also McCoy Testimony, supra note 
251, at 16 (discussing Countrywide’s switch from OCC to OTS regulation). 
273 In addition, Merrill Lynch purchased First Franklin from National City.  MUOLO & PADILLA, 
supra note 214, at 23–25, 99–100, 146, 195–200; Harry Terris, Citi-ACC: A Bet Vertical Integration 
Still Has Legs, AM. BANKER, Sept. 13, 2007, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File 
(discussing Citigroup’s purchase of ACC Capital Holdings).  
274 MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 23–26, 195, 199–201, 222–23; Todd Davenport, 
What’s Behind Wall Street Players’ Mortgage Deals, AM. BANKER, Aug. 14, 2006, at 1, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File; Terris, supra note 273. 
275 Chomsisengphet & Pennington-Cross, supra note 214, at 39 tbl.5 (showing that Citifinancial 
(Citigroup), Wamu, Countrywide, First Franklin (National City), and BofA ranked among the top-ten 
subprime lenders in 2001, while the same banks (except for BofA), Household (HSBC) and Wells 
Fargo were among the top-ten subprime lenders in 2002 and 2003); Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra 
note 83, at 4 tbl.2 (showing that HSBC, Countrywide, Citigroup, Wells Fargo and First Franklin were 
among the top ten subprime lenders in 2005 and 2006); Paul Muolo, Top Subprime Lenders in 2007, 
NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, May 12, 2008, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NMN File (reporting 
that Countrywide, Wells Fargo, Chase, Wamu and Citifinancial ranked among the top-ten subprime 
lenders in 2007); see also MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 100 (stating that eight of the top 
fifteen subprime lenders were owned by banks at the beginning of 2006). 
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and 79% in 2007.276  The increasing shift in subprime loan originations to 
federally-chartered banks was due in part to the growing importance of 
federal preemption.  Preemption shielded federally-chartered institutions 
from state predatory lending laws, while unaffiliated nonbank lenders 
remained subject to state laws.277 
LCFIs also played essential roles as warehouse lenders and securitizers 
for nonbank subprime lenders.  Bear Stearns, Deutsche, Lehman and 
Salomon Brothers provided warehouse lines of credit and securitization 
services to nonbank lenders during the 1990s.278  The largest nonbank 
lenders for subprime loans between 2001 and 2007—including 
Ameriquest, New Century and Option One—similarly relied on Wall 
Street firms and other LCFIs for warehouse loans and securitization 
services.279  The leading securitizers (i.e., underwriters) of RMBS between 
2004 and 2007 included most of the world’s leading financial 
conglomerates as well as Countrywide and Wamu, two of the largest U.S. 
mortgage lenders.280 
The big RMBS underwriters essentially dictated the flow of nonprime 
lending by aggressively soliciting new loans from nonbank lenders and by 
providing warehouse loans to those lenders on generous terms.281  For 
                                                                                                                          
276 Robert B. Avery et al., The 2007 HMDA Data, FED. RES. BULL., Dec. 2008, at A107, A124–
25 & tbl.11, available at www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/2008/default.htm (showing percentages 
of “higher-priced” loans made in each year by depository institutions and their subsidiaries and 
affiliates); see also id. at A107 n.7 (explaining that the “higher-priced” loans covered in the study 
generally fall into the subprime or Alt-A categories). 
277 McCoy Testimony, supra note 251, at 12–16; see also supra notes 238–55 and accompanying 
text (discussing federal preemption of state predatory lending laws). 
278 MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 39–43, 152–55. 
279 Id. at 96, 100, 152–55, 164–66, 183–84; see also Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 83, at 4 
tbl.2 (showing that New Century, Ameriquest and Option One ranked among the top ten subprime 
lenders between 2005 and 2006); Forrester, supra note 252, at 1350–51 (noting the significant role 
played by federally-chartered banks in providing warehouse loans and securitization services to 
nonbank subprime lenders). 
280 Allison Pyburn, Bear Stearns Heads RMBS League Tables Again, ASSET SECURITIZATION 
REP., Jan. 8, 2007 (reporting that Bear Stearns, Lehman, RBS, Credit Suisse and Chase were the top 
five RMBS underwriters in 2006, while Countrywide was also a significant RMBS underwriter in 2005 
and 2006); Allison Pyburn, RMBS Grows a Robust $200 bn in 2005, with Bear Top Arranger, ASSET 
SECURITIZATION REP., Jan. 9, 2006 (stating that Bear Stearns, Lehman, RBS, UBS and Credit Suisse 
were the top five RMBS underwriters in 2005); Carolyn Sargent & Karen Sibayan, Bear Stearns 
Replaces UBS in Year End Leagues, ASSET SECURITIZATION REP., Jan. 10, 2005, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, ASTRPT File (reporting that Bear Stearns, UBS, Lehman, BofA, Credit Suisse, Morgan 
Stanley, Citigroup, Goldman, RBS and Deutsche were the top 10 RMBS underwriters in 2004); Bethel 
et al., supra note 85, at 73 tbl.2 (showing that Lehman, Bear Stearns, Morgan Stanley, Chase, Credit 
Suisse, BofA, Deutsche, RBS, Merrill, Goldman, Citigroup, UBS, Wamu, Countrywide, Wachovia, 
Barclays and HSBC were the top 17 RMBS underwriters in 2007); see also supra notes 234–35, 129–
30 (identifying Countrywide and Wamu as leading mortgage lenders and identifying the other 
institutions named in this footnote as ranking among the world’s top financial conglomerates).  
281 MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 115–16, 166, 180–91; see also id. at 295 (noting that 
loan brokers “wouldn’t exist without [nonbank wholesale lenders] and wholesalers wouldn’t be able to 
fund loans unless Wall Street was buying”); Engel & McCoy, supra note 84, at 2065 (referring to the 
“Unholy Alliance” between nonbank lenders and LCFIs). 
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example, Citigroup, Morgan Stanley, BofA, Bear Stearns, Deutsche and 
Credit Suisse provided New Century with $15 billion in warehouse lines of 
credit in 2005.282  In late 2006 and 2007, New Century and dozens of other 
nonbank lenders failed when LCFIs cut off their warehouse lines of credit 
and demanded that they repurchase loans that had defaulted soon after 
origination.283  
Thus, in addition to their role as direct nonprime lenders, LCFIs 
provided “fuel to fire the origination machine [for] the subprime industry” 
by providing warehouse lines of credit to nonbank lenders and securitizing 
their loans.284  When LCFIs terminated their warehouse lending programs 
for nonprime loans, the nonprime lending boom collapsed.  In 2007, the 
volume of new subprime loans fell to $180 billion, a seventy percent drop 
from its peak in 2005 and 2006.285  Very few subprime and Alt-A loans 
were originated after mid-2007.  LCFIs could not securitize those loans 
(and therefore shut off their remaining warehouse lines of credit to 
nonbank lenders) after the outbreak of the subprime financial crisis in 
August 2007.286 
  b.  The Riskiness of Nonprime Loans Steadily Increased 
during the Recent Housing Boom 
The risks of nonprime mortgages intensified during the subprime 
lending boom.  Several empirical studies have confirmed that a continuous 
decline in lending standards for subprime mortgages occurred during this 
period.  Those studies also establish strong links between the deterioration 
in lending standards and the rise in delinquency and default rates for 
nonprime loans originated after 2001.287  Delinquency and default rates on 
                                                                                                                          
282 MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 166. 
283 Id. at 171–77, 198–201; Carrick Mollenkamp et al., Mortgage Hot Potatoes: Banks Try to 
Return High-Risk Loans to the Originators, WALL ST. J., Feb. 15, 2007, at A4, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, WSJNL File. 
284 MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 184; see also Lingling Wei, Subprime Lenders May 
Face Funding Crisis, WALL ST. J., Jan. 10, 2007, at B12, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL 
File (describing the dependence of nonbank mortgage companies on warehouse lines of credit from 
LCFIs); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Viewpoint: Agencies Can’t Deny Subprime Culpability, AM. BANKER, 
Oct. 12, 2007, at 11, available at LEXIS, News Library, AMBNKR File (pointing out that (i) 
“wholesale lenders and securitizers, including many of the largest national banks and federal thrifts and 
their affiliates, were the driving forces behind the subprime lending boom,” and (ii) “[w]hen wholesale 
lenders and securitizers stopped financing nondepository lenders, the lenders quickly went out of 
business”). 
285 Paul Muolo, 2007 Subprime Off 70%, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, May 12, 2008, at 1, available 
at LEXIS, News Library, NMN File. 
286 Id.; see also MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 1–2, 5–21, 176–77, 199–203, 242–47, 
250–69, 274; Mayer et al., supra note 256, at 28 (noting that “[n]onprime lending leveled off in 2006, 
dropped dramatically in the first half of 2007, and became virtually nonexistent through most of 
2008”).  
287 See generally Mayer et al., supra note 256; Patrick Bajari et al., An Empirical Model of 
Subprime Mortgage Default from 2000 to 2007, at 5–6, 26–27, 31–34 (Nat’l Bur. Econ. Res., Working 
Paper No. 14625, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org; Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto Van Hemert, 
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subprime mortgages increased every year after 2001, reflecting a 
“monotonic deterioration in loan quality.”288 
The increasing risks of nonprime mortgages were reflected in four key 
characteristics.  First, the percentages of nonprime mortgages with second 
(piggyback) loans rose sharply between 2003 and 2006.289  Piggyback 
loans enabled nonprime borrowers to borrow up to the full appraised value 
of their homes without obtaining purchase mortgage insurance.290  Due to 
the growing use of second loans, a majority of subprime and Alt-A 
mortgages originated in 2006 had combined loan-to-value (CLTV) ratios 
of more than 80%.291 
Second, the percentage of nonprime loans originated with less than full 
documentation of the borrower’s income or assets increased significantly 
between 2003 and 2006.292  Low- and no-documentation loans did not 
require borrowers to verify their ability to pay their debts.  Instead, lenders 
extended such loans based primarily on the borrowers’ FICO credit scores.  
Such loans enabled borrowers (often with encouragement from loan 
officers or brokers) to fabricate their income and assets.293  
Third, the percentage of nonprime mortgages with adjustable interest 
rates (ARMs) rose substantially from 2003 to 2006.294  In contrast to fixed-
rate mortgages, ARMs exposed borrower to “payment shock” each time 
                                                                                                                          
Understanding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis (Dec. 5, 2008), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1020396; Giovanni Dell’Ariccia et al., Credit Booms and Lending 
Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market (Feb. 2008), available at http://papers. 
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1100138); Atif Mian & Amir Sufi, The Consequences of 
Mortgage Credit Expansion: Evidence from the 2007 Mortgage Default Crisis (Nat’l Bur. Econ. Res., 
Working Paper No. 13936, 2008), available at http://www.nber.org. 
288 Demyanyk & Van Helmert, supra note 287, at 3 & fig.2; see also Mayer et al., supra note 256, 
at 40–42 & fig.2. 
289 Compare McCoy Testimony, supra note 251, at 5 fig.2 (showing that subprime loans with 
second loans increased from 10% in 2003 to 31% in 2006, while Alt-A loans with second loans rose 
from 23% to 55%), with Mayer et al., supra note 256, at 32 tbl.2, Panel C (reportng that subprime loans 
with piggyback loans increased from 7% in 2003 to 28% in 2006, while Alt-A loans with piggybacks 
increased from 12% to 42%).  
290 Avery et al., supra note 276, at A111, A117. 
291 McCoy Testimony, supra note 251, at 5 fig.2 (showing that the percentage of subprime loans 
with CLTV ratios above 80% increased from 56% in 2003 to 64% in 2006, while the share of similar 
Alt-A loans rose from 33% to 55%). 
292 Compare McCoy Testimony, supra note 251, at 5 fig.2 (showing that the percentage of 
subprime loans with less than full documentation rose from 36% in 2003 to 45% in 2006, while the 
share of similar Alt-A loans grew from 72% to 81%), with Mayer et al., supra note 256, at 32 tbl.2, 
Panel C (reporting that the percentage of subprime loans with less than full documentation increased 
from 32% in 2003 to 38% in 2006, while the share of similar Alt-A loans rose from 63% to 80%). 
293 MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 86–87, 123–25, 158–62, 197; Dan Levy & Bob Ivry, 
Alt-A Mortgages Next Risk for Housing Market as Defaults Surge, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 12, 2008.  
The use of FICO credit scores to measure the creditworthiness of borrowers became “standard 
practice” in the mortgage industry in the 1990s.  MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 41 & n.6.  
294 Mayer et al., supra note 256, at 31 tbl.2 (showing that the subprime ARMS as a percentage of 
all subprime mortgages rose from 70% in 2003 to 80% in 2006, while Alt-A ARMS as a percentage of 
all Alt-A mortgages increased from 31% to 61%). 
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the interest rates on their mortgages reset.295  More than three-quarters of 
the subprime mortgages originated during this period were ARMs known 
as “2/28” and “3/27” loans.  Those loans offered a fixed “teaser” rate of 
interest for either two or three years.  After the teaser rate period ended, the 
interest rates on 2/28 and 3/27 loans adjusted periodically (usually every 
six months).296  Teaser rates for 2/28 and 3/27 loans were higher than 
interest rates on conforming fixed-rate mortgages, and periodic resets on 
such loans usually produced interest rate increases of several percentage 
points over the life of the loans.297  Alt-A ARMs were usually structured as 
5/25 loans, with a smaller portion structured as 2/28 or 3/27 loans.298  As a 
practical matter, the interest rate escalation schedules for nonprime ARMS 
put considerable pressure on borrowers to refinance their loans before the 
end of the teaser rate period.299 
Fourth, the percentage of “interest only” (IO) ARM subprime loans 
increased significantly from 2003 to 2006, as did the share of Alt-A loans 
that were either IO ARMs or “option ARMs.”300  IO ARMs and option 
ARMs allowed borrowers to defer any payment of principal on their loans 
during the early years of their loans.  IO ARMs and option ARMs therefore 
left borrowers with little or no equity when they needed to refinance at the 
end of the teaser period, unless the market value of their homes had risen 
significantly after they took out their mortgages.  Lenders were unlikely to 
allow nonprime borrowers to refinance their loans if their homes did not 
contain a substantial amount of residual equity.301   
Lacking any effective restraint from federal regulators, nonprime 
lenders extended huge volumes of nonprime ARMs with high-risk features 
                                                                                                                          
295 Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 83, at 16–17.  
296 Id.; Mayer et al., supra note 256, at 30, 31 tbl.2. 
297 Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 83, at 16, 18 tbl.6 (showing that interest rates for 2/28 and 
3/27 loans originated by New Century in 2006 were scheduled to increase by 7% over the life of the 
loans); Mayer et al., supra note 256, at 32 tbl.2, Panel D (showing that teaser rates for 2/28 and 3/27 
subprime loans averaged 7.7% from 2003 to 2007). 
298 Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 83, at 20 tbl.9. 
299 Id. at 16–18; Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 242, at 53–54; Gorton, supra note 87, at 16–17.  
300 Mayer et al., supra note 256, at 32 tbl.2, Panel C (showing that the percentage of IO subprime 
loans inreased from 2% in 2003 to 13% in 2006, while the share of IO Alt-A loans increased from 16% 
to 44% and the portion of Atl-A loans allowing negative amortization rose from 2% to 26%).  IO 
ARMs permit borrowers to pay only the accrued interest and to defer payments of principal for a period 
of up to five years.  An option ARM permits the borrower to choose among several payment plans, 
including a negative amortization plan that allows the borrower to pay no principal and less than the 
accrued interest until the loan reaches 110% or 120% of its original amount, or for up to five years.  
MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 124; Aschraft & Schuermann, supra note 83, at 17; Levy & 
Ivry, supra note 293; Mayer et al., supra note 256, at 33. 
301 Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 83, at 17–18, 23; Mayer et al., supra note 256, at 38–40.  
Nonprime borrowers typically needed to accumulate additional equity in their homes in order to 
refinance their loans, because nonprime lenders required refinancings to satisfy CLTV ratios that were 
lower than the ratios applied to purchase transactions.  See id. at 31 tbl.2, Panel B (showing that the 
average CLTV ratios for subprime and Alt-A purchase loans from 2003 to 2007 were 95%: and 90%, 
respectively, while the average CLTV ratios for subprime and Alt-A refinancing loans were 80% and 
76%, respectively). 
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to “millions of Americans who had little or no chance of making payments 
on those loans to maturity.”302  This lending strategy “effectively turned the 
U.S. housing market into a system of Ponzi finance, where new debt was 
needed to service the old,” and such a system could only last as long as 
housing prices kept rising.303  The complex design of nonprime ARMs, 
including multiple interest rate resets and the lack of equity accumulation, 
meant that borrowers were likely to default if they could not refinance 
before the teaser period expired.304  While the housing boom lasted, many 
nonprime borrowers refinanced their loans (several times, in some cases) 
by taking out new ARMs with similar teaser rate and interest escalation 
features.305  Half of the Alt-A mortgages and nearly two-thirds of the 
                                                                                                                          
302 FLECKENSTEIN & SHEEHAN, supra note 273, at 157–59, 176–77 (quoting report by Robert 
Campbell).  A few federal officials expressed concerns about the growing volumes of nonprime ARMs 
that were made without regard to the borrower’s ability to pay beyond the initial teaser rate period.  See 
Edmund L. Andrews, Fed and Regulators Shrugged as the Subprime Crisis Spread, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
18, 2007, at A1 (citing concerns expressed by FRB Governor Edward Gramlich and Treasury Assistant 
Secretary Sheila Bair during 2000–2002).  However, federal agencies did not adopt any official 
warnings about the dangers of high-risk ARMs until September 2006, when they issued joint 
“guidance” about option ARMs.  Federal agencies issued broader “guidance” in June 2007 concerning 
the need to underwrite ARMs based on the borrowers’ ability to pay the fully amortized interest rate 
instead of the teaser rate.  Id.; see also McCoy Testimony, supra note 251, at 15 & n.41, 17–20 
(“IndyMac, WaMu, and Downey apparently treated the guidances as solely advisory, however, as 
evidenced by the fact that all three made substantial numbers of hazardous loans in late 2006 and in 
2007 in direct disregard of an interagency guidance on nontraditional mortgages issued in the fall of 
2006 and subscribed to by OTS that prescribed underwriting ARMs to the fully indexed rate.”).  
Nevertheless, several large national banks and federal thrifts, which were leading nonprime lenders, 
apparently ignored the agencies’ nonbinding guidance and continued to make high-risk option ARMs 
and subprime loans.  Federal agencies did not adopt binding regulations, which required subprime 
lenders to verify the borrower’s ability to pay the fully amortized interest rate, until June 2008.  See 
McCoy Testimony, supra note 251, at 16–22; see also MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 215, 218 
(describing a speech given by Lewis Ranieri at a “Housing Summit” hosted by the OTS on Dec. 11, 
2006, in which Ranieri warned that “about 40 percent” of the option ARMs being sold in the secondary 
market did not satisfy the federal regulators’ 2006 guidance, which had “no teeth” in any case).   
303 FLECKENSTEIN & SHEEHAN, supra note 173, at 177 (quoting report by Robert Campbell).  See 
Jose Gabilondo, Leveraged Liquidity: Bear Raids and Junk Loans in the New Credit Market, FIU Leg. 
Stud. Res. Paper Ser. Res. Paper No. 08-01, Oct. 2008, at 26–27 (noting economist Hyman Minsky’s 
description of “Ponzi financing” as a lending arrangement in which the borrower must refinance the 
loan in order to pay both principal and accrued interest), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1141955.   
304 See Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 83, at 16–18 (“Without significant income growth 
over the first two years of the loan, it seems reasonable to expect that borrowers will struggle to make 
these higher payments. It begs the question why such a loan was made in the first place.”); Gorton, 
supra note 87, at 13, 16–17, 32 (“The ability of subprime and Alt-A borrowers to sustain their 
mortgage payments depends heavily on house price appreciation because of the need for refinancing”); 
McCoy Testimony, supra note 251, at 8–9 (“Chief among those risks was payment shock—in other 
words, the risk that monthly payments would rise dramatically upon rate reset.”). 
305 See FLECKENSTEIN & SHEEHAN, supra note 173, at 154–55 MORRIS, supra note 172, at 68–69; 
Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 83, at 16–18, 21–23; Gorton, supra note 87, at 13, 16–17, 32; see 
also Yuliya S. Demyanyk, Quick Exits of Subprime Mortgages, 91(2) FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS 
REV., 79, 89–91 (finding that subprime mortgages originated during 2001–06 were terminated by 
refinancing or default at a rate of 50% within two years and 80% within three years), available at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/09/03/Demyanyk.pdf.  In one extreme case involving 
an elderly woman in Hackensack, New Jersey, subprime lenders refinanced her mortgage thirteen times 
between December 1999 and January 2007.  The refinancings were all performed on a “no doc” basis 
and increased the outstanding principal amount from $142,000 to $544,000.  The subprime lenders 
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subprime mortgages originated between 2003 and 2007 were refinancings 
of existing loans.306 
Housing prices rose rapidly from 2001 to 2005, stopped rising in 2006, 
and began to fall sharply in 2007.  At that point, refinancing options 
disappeared for many nonprime borrowers.  Defaults and delinquencies 
accelerated on nonprime loans, and the lending and securitization markets 
essentially shut down for those loans.  By the end of 2008, nearly a quarter 
of subprime mortgages were seriously delinquent or in foreclosure, and a 
fifth of homeowners with mortgages were in a “negative-equity 
position.”307  The virtually simultaneous collapse of housing prices and 
nonprime lending shows that (i) the housing boom was an artificial bubble 
created by increasingly risky loans extended to nonprime borrowers; and 
(ii) the housing bubble was doomed to burst as soon as nonprime 
borrowers were no longer able to refinance their crushing debt burdens.308 
  c.  Securitization of Nonprime Mortgages Created Conflicts of 
Interest that Encouraged Higher-Risk Lending Practices 
As previously discussed, the securitized share of nonprime loans 
increased significantly between 2001 and 2006, during the same period 
when lending standards were declining.309  Five studies have confirmed the 
linkage between higher levels of securitization and higher-risk lending.  
Two studies concluded that lenders were more likely to use lax screening 
methods when they made loans that were likely to be securitized.310  A 
                                                                                                                          
included several LCFIs—“Wells Fargo, Wachovia, IndyMac, Countrywide, . . . Washington Mutual, 
[and] Chase”—as well as nonbank lenders (“Ameriquest, American Brokers Conduit, [and] American 
Home Mortgage Service”).  Abby Aguirre, The Neediest Cases: After a Nightmare of Refinancing, 
Hope, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, at A47.  
306 Mayer et al., supra note 256, at 32 tbl.2, Panel C (showing that 37% of subprime mortgages 
and 50% of Alt-A mortgages during 2003–2007 were purchase loans); see also Demyanyk, supra note 
305, at 83–84, 89–90 (stating that 60% to 70% of a large sample of subprime loans outstanding in 2008 
were refinancings of previous subprime loans). 
307 Kate Berry, Fifth of First- and 2d-Lien Loans Said Underwater, AM. BANKER, Mar. 5, 2009, at 
11; Paul Muolo, MBA Reports a Record Jump in National Delinquency Rate, AM. BANKER, Mar. 6, 
2009, at 11.  For discussions of the collapse of housing prices and refinancing opportunities after 2006, 
see, for example, Gorton, supra note 87, at 31–32; Gregory A. Krohn & William R. Gruver, The 
Complexities of the Financial Turmoil of 2007 and 2008 4–5 (Bucknell Univ. Working Paper Group, 
Paper 10, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1282250; see also supra notes 285–86 and 
accompanying text (discussing the collapse of the nonprime lending and securitization markets in mid-
2007).  
308 FLECKENSTEIN & SHEEHAN, supra note 173, at 168–78; MORRIS, supra note 172, at 65–72; 
Demyanyk & Van Helmert, supra note 287, at 1–8, 28–29; Mian & Sufi, supra note 287, at 1–6, 31–
33; see also Demyanyk, supra note 305, at 89–91 (finding that subprime borrowers were able to 
refinance their loans during the rapid appreciation of home prices during 2003–2004, but subprime 
defaults rose sharply during 2006–2007 when housing prices stopped rising and borrowers were no 
longer able to refinance). 
309 See supra note 265 and accompanying text.  
310 See Uday Rajan et al., The Failure of Models that Predict Failure: Distance, Incentives and 
Defaults, 1–3, 25–28 (Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of Michigan, Research 
Paper No. 1122, 2008), available at papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1296982 (finding 
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third study found that subprime lending standards declined significantly in 
metropolitan areas that experienced entry by large, out-of-market financial 
institutions and other lenders that securitized a larger percentage of their 
loans.311  A fourth study found that communities received higher-risk 
subprime loans and recorded higher default rates if lenders to those 
communities sold off a higher percentage of those loans for 
securitization.312  A fifth study determined that banks which securitized a 
higher percentage of their mortgages during 2006 and 2007 subsequently 
reported significantly higher foreclosure rates and charge-offs on those 
loans.313  
Conflicts of interest created by the OTD model provide the most likely 
explanation for the links between securitization, higher-risk loans and 
rising default rates.  Lenders had perverse incentives to originate high-risk 
nonprime loans for securitization, because they could earn significantly 
higher fees if they sold nonprime loans that were packaged into private 
label RMBS, compared with prime conforming loans that were packaged 
into GSE-issued RMBS.  In turn, lenders offered generous incentives 
(including larger commissions and yield-spread premiums) to encourage 
their loan officers and brokers to generate nonprime loans instead of prime 
conforming loans.314  As long as housing prices continued to rise, lenders 
were generally able to transfer the risks inherent in nonprime loans by 
selling them for securitization.315  
                                                                                                                          
that, as the securitized share of subprime loans increased from 2001 to 2006, lenders and RMBS 
underwriters  relied almost exclusively on “hard information” such as borrowers’ FICO scores and 
stopped gathering “soft information” about income or assets, with the result that the lenders’ and 
underwriters’ risk models became increasingly unreliable); Benjamin Keys et al., Did Securitization 
Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence from Subprime Loans 2–4, 20–23 (December 25, 2008) (unpublished 
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1093137 (finding that subprime loans to borrowers 
with FICO scores slightly above 620—the widely accepted minimum score for securitized loans—
defaulted at a 20% higher rate than similar loans made to borrowers with lower FICO scores, because 
the latter loans were typically held on the lenders’ balance sheets and involved greater screening by the 
lenders). 
311 See Dell’Ariccia et al., supra note 287, at 2, 23–28. 
312 See Mian & Sufi, supra note 287, at 3–5, 27–30. 
313 Purnanandam, supra note 131, at 2–5, 13–17, 21–22. 
314 See MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 64–69, 82–87, 120–25, 263–65; Peter S. Goodman 
& Gretchen Morgenson, Saying Yes to Anyone: WaMu Built Empire on Shaky Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
28, 2008, at A1 (“WaMu gave mortgage brokers handsome commissions for selling the riskiest loans, 
which carried higher fees, bolstering profits and ultimately the compenstation of the bank’s 
executives”); Gretchen Morgenson, Inside the Countrywide Lending Spree, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2007, 
§ 3, at 1 (“The company’s incentive system . . . encouraged brokers and sales representatives to move 
borrowers into the subprime category, even if their financial position meant that they belonged higher 
up the loan spectrum.”).  Lenders and loan brokers frequently misled unsophisticated nonprime 
borrowers as to the true cost of their loans.  For example, the lender or broker could focus the 
borrower’s attention on the low introductory teaser rate (and low monthly payment) offered by 2/28 
and 3/27 ARMs, while the lender’s or broker’s extra compensation remained hidden in a complex maze 
of terms.  McCoy Testimony, supra note 251, at 8–11. 
315 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 84, at 2041; Günter Franke & Jan Pieter Krahnen, The Future 
of Securitization 11, 17–18 (Ctr. For Fin. Studies Working Paper No. 2008/31, 2008), available at 
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Securitizers (i.e., underwriters of private label RMBS) faced a similar 
conflict of interest in pooling nonprime loans and selling RMBS to 
investors.  Like the lenders, RMBS underwriters were tempted to engage in 
adverse selection and sell “lemons” to investors if the underwriters did not 
retain a significant portion of the risks of the transferred loans.316  During 
the subprime lending boom, as further discussed in the next section, 
underwriters of nonprime RMBS were successful in transferring the 
riskiest equity tranches (i.e., the “first loss” tranches) of RMBS to hedge 
funds and other investors.  This development greatly diminished the 
underwriters’ incentives to control and monitor the risks of loans contained 
in securitized nonprime pools.317  Thus, nonprime lenders and RMBS 
underwriters faced perverse incentives to maximize their fee income by 
originating nonprime mortgages and packaging them into RMBS with little 
regard for the default risks of the underlying loans.318    
Investors in private label RMBS relied on the underwriters to perform 
due diligence to ensure that the securitized loans would not experience 
excessive default rates.319  During the housing boom, investors had very 
limited opportunities to perform their own due diligence.  A significant 
percentage of nonprime RMBS were issued in Rule 144A private 
placement offerings that (i) were sold to institutional investors with limited 
disclosures and (ii) were quickly arranged and gave investors little time to 
scrutinize the terms of the offerings.320  Since most investors did little or no 
checking for asset quality, RMBS underwriters frequently cut costs and 
boosted profits by doing minimal due diligence of their own.321   
Investors in nonprime RMBS also relied on investment grade credit 
ratings provided by credit ratings agencies.  However, those ratings were 
solicited and paid for by the underwriters, creating yet another conflict of 
interest that compromised the protections provided to investors.322  
                                                                                                                          
http://www.ifk-cfs.de/fileadmin/downloads/publications/wp/08_31.pdf; Purnanandam, supra note 313, 
at 2–3. 
316 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 84, at 2048–50; Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 83, at 5–
7; Franke & Krahnen, supra note 315, at 10–15. 
317 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 84, at 2065–67; Franke & Krahnen, supra note 315, at 15–17; 
see also infra Part III.B.3.d. 
318 See Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 83, at 5–7; Franke & Krahnen, supra note 315, at 10–
17; Purnanandam, supra note 313, at 1–5. 
319 See Engel & McCoy, supra note 84, at 2068–70. 
320 Id. at 2070–73; see also MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 219–20 (noting that nonprime 
RMBS sold in Rule 144A offerings were “not really public securities that had any genuine scrutiny 
behind them,” because Rule 144A offerings involved “less paperwork and less scrutiny by the SEC”). 
321 MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 86–87, 122–25, 183–84; Engel & McCoy, supra note 
84, at 2068–70; Rajan et al., supra note 312, at 1–3.  Wall Street underwriters of RMBS typically hired 
outsourcing firms to perform due diligence and then pressured them to do quick, cursory reviews of 
nonprime loan pools.  MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 228–34, 298–99. 
322 MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 217, 224, 280–85; Press Release, U.S. Sec. Exch. 
Comm’n, SEC Examinations Find Shortcomings in Credit Rating Agencies’ Practices and Disclosures 
to Investors (July 8, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-135.htm); see also 
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Investors who bought senior tranches of RMBS further believed that their 
investments would be protected by the sequential payment priorities 
attached to those tranches.323  However, as further explained in the next 
section, investors holding senior tranches of structured-finance products 
derived from nonprime loans suffered large losses because of their 
“extreme exposure . . . to declines in aggregate economic conditions (in 
other words, systematic risk).”324 
Between 2001 and 2007, the amount of outstanding nonprime RMBS 
increased nearly tenfold, rising from $160 billion to $1.5 trillion.325  RMBS 
accounted for about three-quarters of the approximately $2 trillion in 
nonprime mortgages that were outstanding in 2008.326  It seems clear in 
retrospect that the tremendous surge in securitization of nonprime 
mortgages after 2001 resulted in a steady deterioration of credit standards 
by both lenders and RMBS underwriters.327  Above all, it was the dominant 
RMBS underwriters—the large financial conglomerates—that drove the 
nonprime lending boom.328  
  d.  LCFIs Multiplied the Risks of Securitization Through 
CDOs, CDS and SIVs 
Financial conglomerates used structured-finance techniques to create 
                                                                                                                          
U.S. SEC. EXCH. COMM’N, SUMMARY REPORT OF ISSUES IDENTIFIED IN THE COMMISSION STAFF’S 
EXAMINATIONS OF SELECT CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 23–27, 31–32 (2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2008/craexamination070808.pdf (finding evidence of “conflicts of 
interest due to the ‘issuer pays’ model in rating structured finance products”).  For studies confirming 
that conflicts of interest were created by the LCFIs’ payment of fees to credit ratings agencies for 
assigning investment ratings to nonprime RMBS and related CDOs, see, for example, Patrick Bolton et 
al., The Credit Ratings Game passim (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper 14712, 2009); 
Joshua Coval et al., supra note 82, at 19–22; Jeffrey Manns, Rating Risk After the Subprime Mortgage 
Crisis: A User Fee Approach for Rating Agency Accountability, N.C. L. REV. (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 3–4, 26–34), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1199622; Frank Partnoy, How and 
Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers (Univ. of San Diego Sch. of Law Leg. 
Stud. Res. Paper No. 07-46, May 2006) (manuscript at 60, 68-80, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=900257); Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2008, § 
MM (Magazine), at 36, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. 
323 Engel & McCoy, supra note 84, at 2047–48, 2060–61; see also supra notes 86–87 and 
accompanying text (discussing the sequential payment priorities and subordination features used in 
tranched RMBS).   
324 Coval et al., supra note 82, at 19–20; see also infra Part III.B.3.d. 
325 Gorton, supra note 87, at 14 tbl.2; see also Kate Berry, Bankruptcy Bill Seen Forcing Losses 
on High-Rated MBS, AM. BANKER, Feb. 13, 2009, at 1 (citing Barclays’ estimate that $1.45 trillion of 
private label (nonagency) RMBS were outstanding).  
326 Levy & Ivry, supra note 293 (stating that $1 trillion of Alt-A mortgages and $855 billion of 
subprime mortgages were outstanding); Paul Muolo, Subprime Overdues Hit 33%, NAT’L MORTGAGE 
NEWS, Dec. 8, 2008, at 1 (reporting that $850 billion of subprime mortgages were outstanding); 
Finance & Economics: Mortgage losses: Move Over, Subprime, ECONOMIST, Feb. 7, 2009 (reporting 
that $1.3 trillion of Alt-A mortgages were outstanding).   
327 MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 166–68, 180–91, 216–25, 254, 263–65, 277–81, 295. 
328 Id. at 281 (concluding that, during the nonprime lending boom, “Wall Street was in charge – 
lending money to nonbank originators (thorugh warehouse lines), buying and securitizing the loans, 
designing the loan products, and then eventually owning some of the rank-and file lenders”); see also 
supra Part III.B.3.a (reaching same conclusion). 
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several categories of investment instruments whose risks and returns were 
derived from nonprime mortgages.  As a practical matter, these structured-
finance instruments created an inverted pyramid of risk, because the 
combined face values of the structured-finance instruments (representing 
the inverted “base” of the pyramid) were much larger than the “apex” of 
nonprime mortgages whose performance dictated the value of the 
instruments.  Put another way, LCFIs used structured-finance instruments 
to pile multiple layers of financial bets on top of nonprime mortgages.  In 
addition, while LCFIs spread the risks of those bets among a large universe 
of investors, LCFIs also retained significant risks in two ways.  First, 
LCFIs “warehoused” nonprime mortgages, RMBS and CDOs until they 
could be sold to investors.  Second, LCFIs transferred RMBS and CDOs to 
off-balance-sheet structured investment vehicles (SIVs) that relied on 
explicit or implicit support from the LCFIs.  When the subprime crisis 
broke out, LCFIs incurred large losses from their exposures to 
“warehoused” instruments and SIVs.  
As indicated above, about $1.5 trillion of nonprime RMBS were 
outstanding in 2007, accounting for roughly three-quarters of outstanding 
nonprime mortgages.329  Eighty percent or more of nonprime RMBS were 
structured as senior tranches with “AAA” ratings, while approximately 
eighteen percent were packaged as mezzanine tranches (with investment 
grade ratings ranging from “BBB-” to “AA+”) and two percent or less 
were labeled as unrated junior tranches.330  Credit rating agencies (CRA) 
agreed to give “AAA” ratings to senior tranches of nonprime RMBS, based 
on the agencies’ conclusion that senior tranches faced low risks of default 
due to (i) diversification produced by pooling large numbers of nonprime 
mortgages from different geographic regions, (ii) credit protection 
provided to the senior tranches by the subordinated junior and mezzanine 
tranches, and (iii) additional credit enhancements included in structured-
finance RMBS.331  Investors were eager to buy AAA-rated senior tranches 
of RMBS because they offered significantly higher yields than other types 
of AAA-rated investments and carried the same imprimatur from the credit 
rating agencies.332 
                                                                                                                          
329 See supra notes 325–26 and accompanying text. 
330 APRIL 2008 IMF GFS REPORT, supra note 86, at 59–60 (Box 2.2); Gorton, supra note 87, at 24 
& fig.3; Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 83, at 30 fig.6 (showing that the “Average Subprime MBS 
Structure” included nearly eighty percent of “AAA” tranches, while the “Average Alt-A Capital 
Structure” included more than ninety percent of “AAA” tranches). 
331 See Coval et al., supra note 82, at 5–7; Gorton, supra note 87, at 19–23; Lowenstein, supra 
note 324; supra note 87 and accompanying text (describing structuring and credit enhancements for 
structured-finance RMBS). 
332 TURNER REVIEW, supra note 185, at 14–15; APRIL 2008 IMF GFS REPORT, supra note 86, at 
55, 56–57 (Box 2.1); Paul Mizen, The Credit Crunch of 2007–2008: A Discussion of the Background, 
Market Reactions, And Policy Responses, FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV., Sept.–Oct. 2008, at 
521, 532, 538, 540, available at http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/08/09/Mizen.pdf; 
Bethel et al., supra note 85, at 15–16; see also Ashcraft & Schuermann, supra note 83, at 37 (quoting 
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Financial conglomerates did not stop with nonprime RMBS.  They 
transformed many of the lower-rated tranches of nonprime RMBS into 
AAA-rated investments by re-securitizing RMBS into ABS CDOs.  For 
example, LCFIs pooled tranches of RMBS rated “A” or above to create 
“high grade” CDOs.  Ninety percent or more of the tranches of high grade 
CDOs received “AAA” ratings.333  LCFIs acted even more aggressively by 
pooling “BBB” and “BBB-” tranches of RMBS to create “mezzanine 
CDOs” (so named because their portfolios consisted mainly of mezzanine 
tranches of RMBS).  Approximately three-quarters of the tranches of 
mezzanine CDOs received “AAA” ratings.334   
Financial conglomerates used the same re-securitization process to 
transform mezzanine tranches of CDOs into higher-rated securities issued 
by “CDOs-squared.”  Mezzanine tranches of CDOs were pooled and 
placed in CDOs-squared, which issued tranched securities that consisted 
primarily of AAA-rated securities.  As explained in a 2008 report issued by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), “[m]ost of the A- and BBB-rated 
CDO tranches [were] recycled into . . . [CDO-squared] securities,about 85 
percent of which [were] comprised of AAA-rated senior and super-senior 
tranches.”335   
LCFIs had two major reasons for transforming mezzanine tranches of 
nonprime RMBS and CDOs into AAA-rated securities issued by CDOs 
and CDOs-squared.  First, re-securitization allowed LCFIs to create ever-
higher percentages of AAA-rated investments based on nonprime 
mortgages.  Many institutional investors (including banks, insurance 
companies, mutual funds and pension funds) were limited to buying AAA-
rated securities by legal requirements or their investment mandates.  Such 
investors were eager to buy AAA-rated CDO and CDO-squared bonds, 
because their yields were among the highest available on AAA-rated 
securities.336   
                                                                                                                          
(i) a statement by Moody’s in 2004 affirming the “comparability of [its rating] opinions . . . regardless 
of . . . [the] asset class, or type of fixed-income debt”; and (ii) a statement by Standard & Poor’s in 
2007 declaring that “[o]ur ratings represent a uniform measure of credit quality . . . across all types of 
debt instruments.  In other words, an ‘AAA”rated corporate bond should exhibit the same degree of 
credit quality as an ‘AAA’ rated securitized issue”); supra note 322 and accompanying text (discussing 
problems resulting from conflicts of interest faced by credit ratings agencies in assigning investment 
grade ratings to nonprime RMBS).    
333 2008 BASEL CRT REPORT, supra note 83, at 4–5, 49; APRIL 2008 IMF GFS REPORT, supra 
note 86, at 59–60 (Box 2); Gorton, supra note 87, at 23–24; Gergory A. Krohn & William R. Gruver, 
The Complexities of the Financial Turmoil of 2007 and 2008, at 9 (Working Paper Oct. 7, 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1282250; see also supra note 105 and accompanying text 
(discussing ABS CDOs).  
334 See authorities cited supra note 333. 
335 APRIL 2008 IMF GFS REPORT, supra note 86, at 59 (Box 2). 
336 See MORRIS, supra note 172, at 76–79, 113; April 2008 IMF GFS Report, supra note 86, at 
59–60 (Box 2); 2008 BASEL CRT REPORT, supra note 83, at 7–9, 42–45; Bethel et al., supra note 85, at 
15–16; Coval et al., supra note 82, at 4, 19; see also Michael Lewis, The End, PORTFOLIO (Condé Nast, 
Inc.), Dec. 2008, available at  http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/ 
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Second, mezzanine tranches of RMBS and CDOs were not easy to sell 
to investors.  As noted above, many traditional institutional investors were 
limited to buying AAA-rated securities, and many hedge funds preferred to 
buy junior unrated tranches of RMBS and CDOs because those tranches 
offered the highest yields.337  Mezzanine tranches of RMBS and CDOs 
were less attractive to investors, evidently because mezzanine tranches 
were viewed as too risky in comparison to their yields.  However, the risks 
of mezzanine tranches could be obscured—and the potential universe of 
investors for such tranches could be greatly expanded—if mezzanine 
tranches of RMBS and CDOs were repackaged as AAA-rated tranches of 
CDOs and CDOs-squared.338   
Thus, the ability of LCFIs to re-securitize mezzanine tranches of 
RMBS and CDOs apparently played an important role in their marketing 
and distribution of structured-finance RMBS and CDOs.  By re-
securitizing the mezzanine tranches, LCFIs did not have to retain them on 
their balance sheets.  Nor did they have to retain the junior “first loss” 
tranches, because hedge funds were eager to buy those tranches.  However, 
LCFIs often retained indirect exposures to the risks of junior tranches of 
RMBS and CDOs, because LCFIs extended credit to hedge funds to 
finance their purchases of those tranches.  Thus, LCFIs created the illusion 
that they had transferred all of the risks of the subordinated tranches of 
RMBS and CDOs, but they often failed to do so in reality.339 
In addition to ABS CDOs, financial conglomerates created hybrid and 
synthetic CDOs.  Hybrid CDOs managed pools of assets that included 
nonprime RMBS as well as CDS that provided credit protection with 
respect to the performance of nonprime RMBS or indices based on 
nonprime RMBS.  Synthetic CDOs managed pools consisting entirely of 
CDS that provided credit protection with reference to the performance of 
                                                                                                                          
2008/11/11/The-End-of-Wall-Streets-Boom (quoting hedge fund manager Steve Eisman’s conclusion 
that the re-securitization of BBB-rated mezzanine tranches of RMBS into AAA-rated tranches of CDOs 
created an “engine of doom” because AAA-rated CDO bonds could be sold to “investors—pension 
funds, insurance companies—who were allowed to invest only in highly rated securities”). 
337 See MORRIS, supra note 172, at 113–18; BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, COMMITTEE ON THE 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM, RATINGS IN STRUCTURED FINANCE: WHAT WENT WRONG AND WHAT 
CAN BE DONE TO ADDRESS SHORTCOMINGS? 11 n.16 (CGFS Papers No. 32, July 2008), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs32.htm [hereinafter 2008 CGFS STRUCTURED FINANCE PAPER]; Gorton, 
supra note 87, at 29; Bethel et al., supra note 85, at 15–16. 
338 See MORRIS, supra note 172, at 79; April 2008 IMF GFS REPORT, supra note 86, at 59 (Box 
2.2.); Gorton, supra note 87, at 25. 
339 See MORRIS, supra note 172, at 113–23; see also Carrick Mollenkamp & Serena Ng, Housing, 
Bank Troubles Deepen: Hedge Funds Squeezed as Lenders Get Tougher, WALL ST. J., Mar. 7, 2008, at 
A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (reporting that (i) “[l]oans from banks and 
brokerages had allowed hedge funds, which manage $1.9 trillion in clients’ money, to amass many 
times that amount in investments,” and (ii) the recent failure of a London hedge fund had left “14 
lenders—including [Deutsche, Goldman, Lehman, Merrill, Morgan Stanley and UBS]—holding as 
much as $17 billion in problematic mortgage securities”).  
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nonprime RMBS or related indices.340  In practical effect, the packaging of 
CDS into synthetic CDOs enabled LCFIs to create a new class of 
investments that mimicked the performance of nonprime mortgages, even 
though the CDOs did not own either the mortgages themselves or 
nonprime RMBS.341  
Approximately $1.5 trillion of CDOs were issued in global markets 
between 2004 and 2007, and about $2 trillion of CDOs were outstanding in 
2007.342  While precise figures are not publicly available, it appears that 
half of more of those CDOs included exposures to nonprime mortgages.343  
Between 2005 and 2007, ABS CDOs, hybrid CDOs and synthetic CDOS 
assembled portfolios that increasingly focused on actual or synthetic 
exposures to subprime RMBS, because investors’ demand for exposures to 
subprime RMBS “exceeded supply by a wide margin” during those 
years.344  The growth of hybrid and synthetic CDOs meant that “the actual 
supply of real subprime mortgages . . . [was] no longer a limit to creating 
CDOs based on those instruments.”345 
In addition, insurers created additional financial bets related to 
nonprime mortgages by writing CDS to protect against defaults on ABS, 
RMBS and CDOs.  Monoline bond insurers wrote more than $1 trillion of 
CDS with respect to ABS, RMBS and CDOs from 2002 to 2007, including 
$450 billion of CDS protecting holders of super-senior tranches of 
CDOs.346  AIG wrote $80 billion of CDS to provide similar protection for 
super-senior tranches of CDOs with exposures to subprime mortgages.347  
                                                                                                                          
340 See Morris, supra note 172, at 75–76, 113–14; 2008 BASEL CRT REPORT, supra note 83, at 5, 
36; Gorton, supra note 87, at 28–29. 
341 See MORRIS, supra note 172, at 75–76, 113–14; see also Lewis, supra note 338 (quoting Steve 
Eisman’s explanation that synthetic CDOs allowed Wall Street firms to create out of “whole cloth” the 
equivalent of investments based on nonprime mortgages). 
342 See MORRIS, supra note 172, at 76; Gorton, supra note 87, at 26 tbl.5 (“Total issuance” 
column). 
343 See MORRIS, supra note 172, at 78 (stating that “[i]n the boom years of 2005 and 2006, 
probably 80 percent of the securities in CDOs were mortgage-backeds, possibly 70 percent of those 
were below top-grade, and at least half were subprime or second-lien home equity lines”). 
344 2008 BASEL CRT REPORT, supra note 83, at 5; see also Gorton, supra note 87, at 27 (stating 
that “over the period 2005–07 . . . ABS CDO portfolios became increasingly concentrated in US 
subprime RMBS”); id. at 28 tbl.7 (showing that $330 billion of subprime-related ABS CDOs were 
issued between 2005 and 2007); id. at 29 (stating that “mezzanine CDOs issued in 2005–07 used CDS 
to take on significantly greater exposure to the 2005 and 2006 vintages of subprime BBB-rated RMBS 
than were actually issued”). 
345 MORRIS, supra note 172, at 114. 
346 2008 BASEL CRT REPORT, supra note 83, at 15 (reporting that monoline insurers “have written 
roughly $450 billion of super-senior protection on CDOs in the form of CDS contracts”); Review and 
Outlook: The Other $1 Trillion, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 2008, at A26, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, WSJNL File (editorial) (explaining that the monoline bond insurance industry had traditionally 
“focused on bonds issued by state and local governments”; however, “[s]ince 2001, the industry has 
insured more than $1 trillion in asset-backed securities, including mortgage-backed securities and 
collateralized debt obligations”).  
347 Robert O’Harrow Jr. & Brady Dennis, Downgrades and Downfall, WASH. POST, Dec. 31, 
2008, at A01, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File; see also supra note 130 and 
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Additional subprime-related CDS were written by other financial 
institutions.  According to one estimate, CDS with gross notional values of 
$45 trillion were outstanding in mid-2007, and about a third of those CDS 
protected holders of “structured finance instruments, like CDOs and 
CLOs.”348  In addition to the CDS provided by insurance companies, it 
appears that hedge funds and banks also wrote significant volumes of CDS 
to protect against defaults on nonprime-related debt instruments.349   
Based on the foregoing analysis, a conservative estimate of the 
outstanding financial bets placed on nonprime mortgages as of 2007 would 
include (i) $500 billion of nonprime mortgages that were not securitized 
and were instead held on lenders’ balance sheets, (ii) $1.5 billion of 
nonprime RMBS, (iii) at least $1 trillion of CDOs with nonprime 
exposures, and (iv) at least $1 trillion (and probably much more) of CDS 
protecting against default of nonprime-related debt instruments.350  Thus, 
the total volume of financial instruments with exposures to nonprime 
mortgages was at least twice as large as the $2 trillion of outstanding 
nonprime mortgages. 
Citigroup and Merrill were the two largest managers of CDOs between 
2004 and 2007.351  Their leading positions in the CDO market reflected the 
decision of each company to create a “beginning-to-end subprime 
mortgage factory,” which included (i) originating and securitizing 
subprime mortgages and (ii) underwriting and distributing RMBS and 
CDOs, while collecting lucrative fees at each step of the process.352  UBS 
also established a large presence in the subprime RMBS and CDO markets 
during the same period, because UBS decided to pursue pursue a “growth 
at any cost” strategy in those markets in order to catch up to the leading 
U.S. investment banks.353 
Citigroup, Merrill, UBS and other LCFIs faced multiple exposures to 
loss when the subprime crisis broke out in August 2007.  LCFIs confronted 
“warehouse risk” because they held nonprime loans that they had not yet 
securitized as well as tranches of CDOs and RMBS that they had not yet 
                                                                                                                          
accompanying text (identifying AIG as the largest life insurer and second largest property and casualty 
insurer in the U.S.). 
348 MORRIS, supra note 172, at 130–31 (citing estimate by Peter L. Bernstein). 
349 Id. at 131, 113–18. 
350 See supra notes 328–29, 345–49 and infra notes 50–52 and accompanying text. 
351 MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 220; see supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
352 MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 220, 222; see also Eric Dash & Julie Creswell, 
Citigroup Pays for a Rush to Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2008, at A1, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, NYT File; Gretchen Morgenson, The Reckoning: How the Thundering Herd Faltered and Fell, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, § BU (Money & Bus.), at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File. 
353 MUOLO & PADILLA, supra note 214, at 260, 308; Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson, supra note 
200, at 90–93; Allison Pyburn, ML Leads Banner CDO Year, ASSET SECURITIZATION REP., Jan. 8, 
2007, available at LEXIS, News Library, ASTSRP File (reporting that “UBS made notable strides in 
2006” in the U.S. CDO market).  
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distributed to investors.354  In addition, Citigroup, Merrill, UBS and other 
LCFIs deliberately retained super-senior tranches of CDOs in their 
investment portfolios and purchased CDS protection for those tranches 
from insurers in order to engage in “profitable negative basis trades.”355   
In addition, Citigroup, HSBC, Societe Generale, and several other 
major banks set up structured investment vehicles (SIVs) and SIV-lites, 
which were off-balance-sheet (OBS) entities designed to purchase AAA-
rated securities from their bank sponsors.  SIVs and SIV-lites were 
exposed to severe liquidity risks because they relied, for a substantial 
portion of their funding, on short-term, asset-backed commercial paper 
(ABCP) that had to be renewed every few months. To offset those liquidity 
risks, the bank sponsors typically provided either partial or full credit lines 
to assure funding for the SIVs and SIV-lites if their ABCP could not be 
renewed.356  By 2007, SIVs and SIV-lites held $400 billion of assets 
consisting of ABS, CMBS, RMBS, CLOs, CDOs, and debt issued by 
LCFIs.357  After the subprime crisis broke out, SIVs suffered significant 
losses and, in many cases, were unable to roll over their ABCP.  Citigroup, 
HSBC and Societe Generale were forced to rescue their SIVs, thereby 
brining $130 billion of assets back onto their balance sheets.358   
The SIV rescues showed that LCFIs felt obliged, for reasons of 
“reputation risk,” to support OBS entities that they had sponsored, even 
when they did not have explicit contractual commitments to do so.359  
Thus, in the same way that LCFIs created major risks when they 
“warehoused” nonprime mortgage-related assets, LCFIs exposed 
themselves to significant losses when they transferred similar assets to 
sponsored OBS entities.  In both cases, LCFIs did not follow a true OTD 
                                                                                                                          
354 2008 BASEL CRT REPORT, supra note 83, at 2, 9, 14, 16; BRIAN GORDON & ADRIAN D’SILVA, 
HEDGES IN THE WAREHOUSE: THE BANKS GET TRIMMED, CHICAGO FED LETTER NO. 249 (2008), 
available at www.chicagofed.org/economic_research_and_data/chicago_fed_letter.cfm. 
355 Gorton, supra note 87, at 25–26 & n.13.  In a typical negative basis trade, the bank bought a 
super-senior CDO tranche and a CDS providing protection for the tranche.  The bank treated the 
transaction as a simultaneous purchase and sale of the tranche and recognized income equal to the net 
present value of the difference between (i) the stream of payments expected from the tranche and (ii) 
the smaller stream of premium payments payable on the CDS.  Id.; see also David Henry & Matthew 
Goldstein, Death of a Bond Insurer, BUS. WEEK, Apr. 14, 2008, available at LEXIS, News Library, 
BUSWK File. 
356 April 2008 IMF GFS REPORT, supra note 86, at 69–72; 2008 BASEL CRT REP., supra note 83, 
at 45; Gorton, supra note 87, at 29–30. 
357 April 2008 IMF GFS REPORT, supra note 86, at 70–71 (Box 2.5); Gorton, supra note 87, at 30 
& n.18. 
358 April 2008 IMF GFS REPORT, supra note 86, at 73–74 (Box 2.6) (stating that Citigroup 
absorbed $84 billion onto its balance sheet from seven SIVs); Paul J. Davies, SocGen joins SIV bail-out 
banks in grip of funds crisis, Fin. Times (Asia ed.), Dec. 11, 2007, at 26 (reporting that HSBC and 
Societe Generale had absorbed $50 billion of assets onto their balance sheets from SIVs). 
359 2008 BASEL CRT REPORT, supra note 83, at 16, 26.  Citigroup rescued its SIVs despite having 
publicly declared that that “it had ‘no contractual obligation’ to provide full support to any of its SIVs.”  
Robin Sidel et al., Citigroup Alters Course, Bails Out Affiliated Funds, WALL ST. J., Dec. 14, 2007, at 
A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (quoting SEC filing made by Citigroup).   
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strategy.  Instead, LCFIs pursued an “originate to not really distribute” 
strategy, which prevented financial regulators and analysts from 
understanding the true risks created by the LCFIs’ involvement with 
nonprime mortgage-related assets.   
By 2008, Citigroup, Merrill, UBS and several other major LCFIs were 
crippled by losses resulting from their exposure to nonprime mortgages 
and related instruments.360  Why did LCFIs and CRAs fail to appreciate the 
risks they were assuming by creating multiple layers of financial bets that 
depended on the performance of nonprime mortgages?  At least five 
factors appear to explain the failure of risk analysis at LCFIs and CRAs.  
First, both LCFIs and CRAs assumed that U.S. housing prices would 
continue to rise indefinitely.  The risk models used by financial 
conglomerates and CRAs failed to include any scenario that calculated 
potential losses resulting from a significant nationwide reduction in 
housing prices.361  Second, CRAs assumed that senior tranches of RMBS 
and CDOs derived from large pools of nonprime mortgages would have 
very low default risks, due to the benefits of (1) risk diversification from 
pooling and (2) payment seniority from tranching.  CRAs failed to 
recognize that senior tranches of nonprime RMBS and CDOs were 
exposed to significant systematic risks because (i) the intense demand for 
nonprime-related investments caused lenders to relax their standards for 
nonprime loans as the housing boom continued, and (ii) a serious and 
widespread recession in the U.S. economy would inflict large losses on 
holders of RMBS and CDOs, given the highly vulnerable financial 
condition of most nonprime borrowers.362 
Third, the ability to earn lucrative fees from distributing and rating 
nonprime RMBS and CDOs evidently blinded both LCFIs and CRAs to 
the embedded risks in those instruments.363  Fourth, senior managers and 
                                                                                                                          
360 See infra notes 424-30 and accompanying text.  
361 See, e.g., SHILLER, supra note 195, at 54–55, 69 (stating that “banks . . . absolutely did not see 
the [subprime] crisis coming” because of the “speculative bubble” in housing, which “encouraged 
public belief in a long-standing myth . . . [that] the price of real estate must inevitably trend strongly 
upward through time”); id. at 65 (noting that U.S. housing prices declined in 1991 but “increased every 
year from 1997 to 2006”); Dash & Creswell, supra note 352 (reporting that “Citigroup’s risk models 
never accounted for the possibility of a national housing downturn”); Coval et al., supra note 82, at 20 
(stating that Fitch, one of the leading CRAs, “used a model that assumed constantly appreciating home 
prices,” and Fitch representatives reportedly admitted, during an investor call on March 22, 2007, that 
their risk models would “break down completely” if national housing prices “decline[d] 1% to 2% for 
an extended period of time”); Lowenstein, supra note 322 (reporting that Moody’s, another leading 
CRA, “continued to envision rising home values” when it rated a subprime RMBS in June 2006); 
Lewis, supra note 336 (stating that in the fall of 2006 a Standard & Poor’s representative reportedly 
admitted to Steve Eisman that “its model for home prices had no ability to accept a negative number” 
because S&P assumed that “home prices would keep going up”). 
362 See, e.g., 2008 CGFS STRUCTURED FINANCE PAPER, supra note 337, at 4–10, 22–24; Coval et 
al., supra note 82, at 3–4, 15–23; Lowenstein, supra note 322. 
363 See, e.g., Coval et al., supra note 82, at 4–5 (stating that “[b]y 2006, structured finance 
issuance led Wall Street to record revenue and compensation levels” while “Moody’s Corporation 
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investment bankers at LCFIs received incentive-based compensation that 
strongly encouraged them to incur excessive risks in order to produce 
short-term profits.364  Fifth, some of the institutions that suffered the 
greatest losses (for example, Citigroup, Merrill and UBS) were driven by 
management’s willingness to take excessive risks to “catch up” with more 
profitable competitors like Goldman and Morgan Stanley.365 
  e.  LCFIs Created Additional Dangers by Securitizing 
Subprime Credit Card Loans 
As previously discussed, the three biggest U.S. banks—BofA , Chase 
and Citigroup—are the three largest credit card lenders, and they control 
more than half of the U.S. credit card market.  The big three and the fourth- 
and fifth-ranked credit card lenders (Capital One and American Express) 
control two-thirds of the U.S. credit card market.366  Between 2001 and 
2007, total outstanding credit card loans rose by more than forty percent, 
from $675 billion to $970 billion.367  By 2007, slightly less than half of the 
outstanding credit card loans had been securitized.368 
Major banks gained dominant positions in the credit card market 
                                                                                                                          
reported that 44 percent of its revenues came from rating structured finance products, surpassing the 32 
percent of revenues from their traditional business of rating corporate bonds”); Dash & Creswell, supra 
note 352 (reporting that Citigroup’s senior managers embraced a strategy focused on CDOS and other 
nonprime mortgage-related securities because, according to one CDO staff member, “senior managers 
got addicted to the revenues”); Morgenson, supra note 352 (reporting that “Merrill seemed unafraid to 
stockpile C.D.O.’s to reap more fees” because the C.D.O. business “appeared to be a cash register”); 
Gretchen Morgenson, House Panel Scrutinizes Rating Firms, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at B1, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (reporting that Frank L. Raiter, former head of mortgage 
ratings at Standard & Poor’s for 10 years, testified during a congressional hearing that “[p]rofits were 
running the show”).  For discussion of the conflicts of interest resulting from the fact that issuers of 
mortgage-related investments paid for the ratings issued by CRAs, see Malini Manickavasagam, Credit 
Rating Agencies: Ratings Firms Testify on Revenue Sources as Lawmakers Note SEC’s Oversight 
Failure, 40 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1731 (Oct. 27, 2008) (summarizing congressional hearing 
dealing with alleged conflicts of interest at CRAs, and quoting opening statement by Rep. Henry 
Waxman, in which he noted that CRAs “doubl[ed] their collective revenues from $3 billion in 2002 to 
more than $6 billion in 2007” and Moody’s “enjoyed the ‘highest profit margin of any company in the 
S&P 500 for five years in a row’”), and other authorities cited supra in note 322. 
364 See, e.g., Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson, supra note 200, at 88–91 (explaining the adverse 
impact of incentive-based compensation at UBS); John Cassidy, Subprime Suspect: The Rise and Fall 
of Wall Street’s First Black C.E.O., NEW YORKER, Mar. 31, 2008, at 78, 78 (discussing the perverse 
effects of bonus-based compensation at Merrill); Creswell & Dash, supra note 352 (providing similar 
analysis with respect to Citigroup). 
365 See, e.g., Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson, supra note 200, at 88–91 (discussing UBS); Cassidy, 
supra note 368 (discussing Merrill); Dash & Creswell, supra note 352 (reporting on Citigroup). 
366 See supra notes 236–37 and accompanying text; see also Daniel Wolfe, Top Issuers, with Less 
Appetite for Risk, Slashing Credit Lines, AM. BANKER, Dec. 2, 2008, at 7, available at LEXIS, News 
Library, AMBNKR File (reporting that BofA, Citigroup, Chase, Capital One and American Express 
were the five largest credit card lenders, with the top three “account[ing] for more than half of the U.S. 
credit card market” and the top five controlling “roughly 68% of the U.S. card market”). 
367 See Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 395 (providing 2001 figure); supra note 232 (providing 2007 
figure). 
368 See supra note 232 (stating that $450 billion of credit card loans were held in securitized pools 
at the end of 2007). 
 1036 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:963 
through mass marketing campaigns, automated loan processing and 
securitization.  In addition, federal preemption gave large federally-
chartered banks a decisive advantage over smaller, state-chartered 
consumer lenders.  Federal preemption of state usury laws and other state 
consumer protection laws enabled federally-chartered credit card lenders to 
charge unlimited interest rates, late fees, over-the-limit fees and other 
penalty fees on credit card loans.369  Between 2003 and 2007, the average 
late fee charged by large credit card lenders increased by seventeen percent 
to $35.24, and the average over-the-limit fee increased by twenty-three 
percent to $26.88.  During the same period, total penalty fees charged by 
credit card lenders increased more than two-thirds and reached $18.1 
billion, an all-time record.370 
As in the mortgage market, the increasing trend toward securitization 
encouraged credit card lenders to provide larger amounts of credit to 
subprime borrowers.  Large credit card lenders raised their credit limits and 
expanded their lending to subprime customers because those customers 
typically paid higher interest rates and larger amounts of penalty fees.  
New credit cards issued to subprime borrowers rose by 137% between 
2003 and 2006, and high-risk borrowers accounted for thirty percent of the 
outstanding credit card debt in 2008.371 
During the housing boom, big credit card lenders encouraged 
borrowers to use mortgage refinancings and home equity loans to pay off 
their credit card balances so that they could take on additional credit card 
debt.  The banking “industry’s eagerness to issue mortgages—and to boost 
[credit] card limits simultaneously—created a ‘double financial 
                                                                                                                          
369 See supra Part III.B.2; Kathy Chu, Some Say Credit Card Rule Isn’t Enough, USA TODAY, 
Dec. 18, 2008, at 9A, available at LEXIS, News Library, USATDY File; Kathy Chu & Byron 
Acohido, Why Banks Are Squeezing Credit Card Holders, USA TODAY, Nov. 10, 2008, at 1A, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, USATDY File; see also supra notes 238–55 and accompanying 
text (discussing the impact of federal preemption). 
370 Chu & Acohido, supra note 369. 
371 Kathy Chu & Byron Acohido, How Rising Home Values Placed Your Finances at Risk, USA 
TODAY, June 18, 2008, at 1A, available at LEXIS, News File, USATDY File; Jessica Silver-
Greenberg, The Credit-Card Blowup Ahead, BUS. WEEK, Oct. 20, 2008, at 24, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, BUSWK File; see also Robert Berner, Cap One’s Credit Trap, BUS. WEEK, Nov. 6, 
2006, at 34, 36, available at LEXIS, News Library, BUSWK File (reporting that (i) Capital One was “a 
major lender to the subprime market” and “30% of its credit card loans are subprime,” and (ii) Capital 
One was seeking to maximize its fee income by issuing multiple credit cards with low credit limits to 
subprime borrowers, thereby increasing the likelihood that such borrowers would (A) have trouble 
keeping current with payments on multiple cards and (B) pay a higher number of late fees and over-the-
limit fees); Robin Sidel, J.P. Morgan to Expand Reach of Card Business, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2005, 
at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (reporting that (i) Chase was expanding its 
credit card lending to reach “consumers who are considered less credit-worthy—and who pay bigger 
fees and higher interest rates—than its traditional cardholders,” and (ii) Citigroup, Capital One, HSBC 
and Barclays were already providing credit card loans to subprime borrowers). 
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bubble.’”372  Securitization also encouraged major banks to expand their 
lending to subprime borrowers, because “[w]hen banks package and sell 
card debt, they pass along to investors some of the risk the debt will go 
bad.  Yet banks often get to pocket much of the profit from rate and fee 
increases on [credit card] accounts.”373 
The market for ABS backed by pools of credit card receivables “froze” 
in late 2008, cutting off the ability of major lenders to securitize their credit 
card loans.374  At the same time, delinquencies and defaults increased 
sharply on credit card loans, due to rising unemployment and falling home 
prices (which cut off the ability of many borrowers to use home equity as a 
source for paying their credit card bills).375  In late 2008, one analyst 
predicted that banks would incur $140 billion of losses from defaulted 
credit card loans in 2008 and 2009.376  As in the case of residential 
mortgages, it appears that securitization encouraged reckless lending by 
LCFIs in the credit card market.377 
4.  Financial Conglomerates Promoted a Reckless Expansion of High-
Risk Commercial Real Estate Debt and Corporate Debt 
As previously discussed, LCFIs used securitization techniques to 
promote a dramatic increase in commercial mortgage lending and 
leveraged corporate lending between 2003 and 2007.378  In both markets, 
as with nonprime home mortgages and credit cards, LCFIs applied 
increasingly lax lending standards and created an unsustainable credit 
boom, followed by a sharp rise in loan delinquencies and defaults.   
  a.  Commercial Mortgages and CMBS 
The aggressive underwriting of CMBS by financial conglomerates 
produced rapid growth in the U.S. CMBS market and spurred a boom in 
commercial real estate prices.  Outstanding CMBS increased from $360 
billion in 2003 to $780 billion in 2007,379 accounting for more than a third 
of the rise in outstanding commercial mortgages from $2.1 trillion to $3.3 
                                                                                                                          
372 Chu & Acohido, supra note 371 (quoting Robert Manning); see also supra notes 214–15 and 
accompanying text (discussing homeowners’ withdrawal of home equity during the housing boom in 
order to pay off credit card debts). 
373 Chu & Acohido, supra note 369; see also Silver-Greenberg, supra note 371 (stating that the 
largest credit card issuers “offload[ed] roughly 70% of their credit-card debt” until late 2008).  
374 Hugh Son, Bank of America, AmEx May Suffer on Card Defaults, BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 19, 
2009. 
375 Id.; Eric Ruth, Next Big Worry: Credit Cards, NEWS J. (Wilmington, DE), Nov. 3, 2008, at 7B, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, NEWJNL File. 
376 See Silver-Greenberg, supra note 371, at 24 (citing estimate by Innovest); see also Son, supra 
note 374 (reporting that Citigroup and BofA recorded more than $17 billion of charge-offs on credit 
card loans during 2008). 
377 See Chu & Acohido, supra note 369; Silver-Greenberg, supra note 371. 
378 See supra notes 70–76, 101–04 and accompanying text. 
379 See supra notes 101, 104 and accompanying text. 
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trillion.380  Prices for office buildings rose sharply in relation to production 
costs in several major cities—including Las Vegas, Miami, Phoenix and 
Tampa—that experienced simultaneous housing booms.381  More 
generally, price increases for office buildings were closely connected to 
housing price increases in thirty-two U.S. metropolitan markets between 
2003 and 2008.382  During that period, average office prices rose by nearly 
sixty percent in the central business districts of those markets.383 
A recent study concluded that “lenders . . . became more optimistic 
during the boom” and loan underwriting standards declined as the boom 
reached its peak.384  “[B]etween 2003 and 2007, the fraction of 
[commercial real estate] loans with either partial or full interest-only 
periods skyrocketed from less than 10% to nearly 90%.”385  Similarly, “pro 
forma” loans—i.e., loans in which “the loan amount and terms were based 
on prospective rents, not actual in-place rents”—represented “at least 10% 
of all commercial mortgages securitized in 2007.”386  During the height of 
the real estate boom, many commercial mortgage loans were made with 
loan-to-value ratios of ninety-five percent.387 
Like other securitization markets, the market for CMBS shut down in 
2008 following the outbreak of the subprime financial crisis.  Issuances of 
CMBS in the U.S. fell from $237 billion in 2007 to $12 billion in 2008, 
and no CMBS were issued after June 2008.388  Delinquencies and defaults 
on commercial mortgages increased in late 2008 and early 2009, amid 
signs that many owners of office buildings and retail properties were 
experiencing serious financial distress because of the deepening 
recession.389  A particularly ominous development occurred in April 2009, 
                                                                                                                          
380 See 2007 FLOW OF FUNDS REPORT, supra note 92, at 93 tbl.L217 (showing outstanding 
multifamily residential mortgages and other commercial mortgages at the end of 2003 and 2007). 
381 Joseph Gyourko, Understanding Commercial Real Estate: Just How Different From Housing 
Is It? 4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 14708, Feb. 2009), available at 
www.nber.org. 
382 Id. at 13–14. 
383 Id. at 23. 
384 Id. at 28. 
385 Id; see also Parke M. Chapman, Weathering the Storm, NAT’L REAL ESTATE INVESTOR, Sept. 
2007, at 22, 26  (reporting an increase in interest-only commercial real estate loans in 2006 and 2007). 
386 Gyourko, supra note 381, at 29; see also Kris Hudson & Lingling Wei, Small Creditors Hurt 
Mall Owner—General Growth’s Bankruptcy Case Signals Pain for Others; Defaults Rise, WALL ST. J., 
Apr. 17, 2009, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (reporting that “[b]y 2007, . . . 
many [CMBS] offerings were underwritten on the assumption that property cash flows and values 
would rise”). 
387 See Chapman, supra note 385, at 24. 
388 See Scott Lanman, Fed Said to Weigh Changing Higher Rates for Longer TALF Loans, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 8, 2009; Hui-yong Yu, CMBS Loans at Risk as U.S. Rents Decline, Reis Says, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Feb. 3, 2009. 
389 See, e.g., Hudson & Wei, supra note 386; David M. Levitt, Defaults Rise as Worst Is Yet to 
Come for Commercial Property, BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 2, 2009; Ari Levy & Daniel Taub, Defaulting 
Commercial Properties Hit Banks on Vacancy-Rate Rise, BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 23, 2009; Lingling 
Wei & Jon Hilsenrath, Developers Ask U.S. For Bailout As Massive Debt Looms, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 
2008, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File. 
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when General Growth, the second-largest owner of U.S. shopping malls, 
filed “the biggest real estate bankruptcy in U.S. history after amassing $27 
billion in debt,” including $5 billion of bank debt and $14 billion of 
CMBS.390   
Analysts warned in early 2009 that “[a]n unusually high number of 
[commercial] mortgages that are going bad were written and securitized 
[during 2006 to 2008], a sign that investors overpaid and that underwriting 
standards were too loose.”391  A major bank predicted that default rates on 
outstanding CMBS could reach thirty percent.392  Commercial real estate 
lenders and investors in CMBS faced the prospect of large losses because 
$530 billion of commercial mortgages were scheduled to become due for 
payment between 2009 and 2011, and the availability of credit for 
refinancing was “practically nonexistent.”393  The ten largest U.S. banks 
held $330 billion of commercial mortgages in early 2009, with Wells 
Fargo and BofA holding about half of those loans.394  Both LCFIs and 
smaller regional banks were exposed to significant losses as a result of 
their exposures to commercial real estate loans and CMBS.395   
  b.  Leveraged Corporate Loans and Junk Bonds 
Loose underwriting by universal banks produced a boom-and-bust 
cycle for leveraged corporate loans and high-yield (junk) bonds that was 
similar to the reckless lending patterns for nonprime residential mortgages, 
credit cards and commercial mortgages.  Leveraged loans and junk bonds 
represent subprime corporate debt, because those instruments are debt 
obligations issued by below-investment-grade firms.  LCFIs underwrote 
approximately $5 trillion of leveraged loans and $800 billion of high-yield 
bonds in global markets between 2003 and 2007.396  During the same 
period, $500 billion to $700 billion of leveraged loans were pooled and 
tranched to create CLOs.397  Higher-rated tranches in CLOs were sold to 
                                                                                                                          
390 Daniel Taub & Brian Louis, General Growth Files Biggest U.S. Property Bankruptcy (Update 
1), BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 16, 2009; see also Hudson & Wei, supra note 386. 
391 Hudson & Wei, supra note 386. 
392 Id. (citing prediction by Deutsche Bank). 
393 Wei & Hilsenrath, supra note 389; see also Yu, supra note 388. 
394 See Levy & Taub, supra note 389. 
395 See id.; Linda Shen, Synovus, Comerica May See Commercial Real Estate Bust (Update 1), 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Jan. 13, 2009 (reporting that (i) “regional banks . . . face a second wave of real-
estate loan losses, this time for shopping centers and residential construction projects” and (ii) the 
fraction of overdue commercial real-estate loans had risen to 4.73%, “the highest level since 1994”); 
see also Stein, supra note 102 (reporting that Lehman, Morgan Stanley and Citigroup had significant 
loss exposures due to their large holdings of commercial real estate loans and CMBS in early 2008). 
396 2008 CGFS Private Equity Paper, supra note 71, at 11 graph 2.2; see also MORRIS, supra note 
172, at 123–27 (describing the subprime and highly risky characteristics of junk bonds and leveraged 
loans); Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 326–30, 381–84 (same); supra note 70 (describing “higher-
yielding, higher-risk” nature of leveraged loans). 
397 See supra notes 106–08 and accompanying text (describing CLOs); supra note 128 (citing 
source stating that $543 billion of CLOs were issued from 2002 to 2007).  Compare 2008 CGFS 
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insurance companies, pension funds and other investors who desired high-
yielding, investment-grade debt.398  At the same time, junk bonds, 
participations in leveraged loans and lower-rated tranches of CLOs were 
sold to hedge funds and other institutional investors with a higher tolerance 
for risk.399  
Leveraged loans and junk bonds provided financing for a wide variety 
of merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions, including LBOs.  Between 
2002 and 2007, $15.5 trillion in M&A transactions occurred in global 
markets, representing “the biggest stretch of deal making in history.”400  
Due to the rapid expansion of LBO financing, private equity firms 
completed more than $1.8 trillion of global LBOs between 2004 and 
2007.401 
As the LBO boom reached its peak between 2004 and the first half of 
2007, LBO deals became increasingly risky for investors.  The proportion 
of junk bonds rated “B-” or below rose above forty percent after 2004 and 
reached an all-time high of forty-seven percent during the first half of 
2007.402  Between 2000 and 2003, only ten percent of leveraged loans were 
issued with the most risky credit rating (CCC). However, the share of 
leveraged loans with CCC ratings rose above forty percent beginning in 
2004 and reached “a truly remarkable 50% in 2006.”403  Average prices 
paid for LBO targets increased from 7.7 times cash flow in 1999 to 8.6 
times cash flow in 2006 and 9.8 times cash flow during the first half of 
2007.404  
During the peak of the LBO boom, leveraged loans—especially those 
securitized in CLOs—were frequently issued with interest-only, “PIK” and 
“covenant lite” terms.  Interest-only loans allowed borrowers to defer 
paying any principal until maturity.  “PIK” loans also allowed borrowers to 
defer paying interest by issuing new debt to cover accrued interest.  
“Covenant lite” loans exempted borrowers from standard loan covenants 
that typically require firms to limit their debt and to maintain minimum 
                                                                                                                          
Private Equity Paper, supra note 71, at 28 graph 4.1 (indicating that nearly $700 billion of CLOs were 
issued during the same period), with Pierre Paulden & Neil Unmack, JP Morgan Adds to $14 Billion 
CLO Bet Amid Downgrades, BLOOMBERG.COM, Dec. 19, 2008 (citing a Chase estimate that $606 
billion of CLOs backed by levereaged loans were issued between 2002 and 2008). 
398 2008 CGFS Private Equity Paper, supra note 71, at 26–27. 
399 See 2008 CGFS Private Equity Paper, supra note 71, at 7–10, 14–15, 26–28; Altman, supra 
note 70, at 24. 
400 Dennis K. Berman, Quarterly Markets Review: Merger Frenzy Winds Down After 6 Years, 
WALL ST. J., Oct. 1, 2007, at C5, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File. 
401 See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text; see also Kaplan & Stromberg, supra note 73, at 
121–27 (describing private equity firms and LBO transactions). 
402 See Altman, supra note 70, at 27. 
403 Id. 
404 Dennis K. Berman, The Game: Debt Reckoning Is Also Looming for LBO Shops—Overpaying 
for Deals Aided by Loose Credit Puts Borrowers at Risk, WALL ST. J., Dec. 4, 2007, at C1, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File. 
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levels of cash flow coverage and interest payment coverage.405  The risky 
features of leveraged loans during the LBO boom resembled the interest-
only, negative amortization and low- or no-documentation provisions of 
nonprime residential mortgages that LCFIs issued during the simultaneous 
housing boom.406  As a practical matter, the LBO financing packages 
underwritten by LCFIs represented the same kind of “Ponzi finance” as 
nonprime residential mortgages, because many LBO firms and 
homeowners with nonprime mortgages could not satisfy their debts unless 
they were able to refinance those debts on more favorable terms.407  
The ability to transfer corporate loans to investors (through CLOs and 
secondary trading of syndicated loans) apparently created the same types 
of perverse incentives for LCFIs as occurred with respect to their 
securitization of nonprime residential mortgages, credit cards and 
commercial mortgages.  A recent study found that corporate borrowers 
whose syndicated loans were sold and actively traded in the secondary 
market performed significantly worse, over a three-year period, compared 
to corporate borrowers whose loans were retained by the lending banks.  
The authors concluded that the poor performance of the loans that were 
sold probably resulted from a combination of the following two factors: (i) 
the lending banks deliberately sold “lemon” loans to investors, and (ii) the 
lending banks failed to monitor the borrowers whose loans were sold and 
thereby allowed those borrowers to exploit investors who purchased the 
loans.408  In explaining the “progressive deterioration in underwriting 
standards” for leveraged loans that were packaged into CLOs, a prominent 
asset manager noted that “[t]he banks making the [leveraged] loans don’t 
have a continuing interest in how the loans play out because they don’t 
have much money at risk.”409 
                                                                                                                          
405 Acharya et al., supra note 72, at 49; 2008 CGFS Private Equity Paper, supra note 71, at 30; 
Credit Markets: You Only Give Me Your Funny Paper, ECONOMIST, June 30, 2007, at 83, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, ECON File; Shawn Tully, Why the Private Equity Bubble Is Bursting, 
FORTUNE, Aug. 20, 2007, at 30, available at LEXIS, News Library, FORTUN File (describing the risks 
posed by “covenant lite” loans for LBOs and other private equity deals). 
406 See Morris, supra note 172, at 124–25; Tully, supra note 405; supra notes 289–301 and 
accompanying text (describing high-risk features of nonprime mortgages). 
407 See Emily Thornton, What Have You Done to My Company?, BUS. WEEK, Dec. 8, 2008, at 40, 
42, available at LEXIS, News Library, BUSWK File; supra notes 302–04 and accompanying text 
(describing the “Ponzi finance” inherent in nonprime residential mortgages).  
408 See Berndt & Gupta, supra note 131, at 4–6, 16–24; see also Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson, 
supra note 200, at 63 (concluding that “it was quite easy for [banks] to sell ‘lemons’ [i.e., bad loans] 
into the capital markets” because the investment-grade ratings assigned to such loans by CRAs “g[a]ve 
comfort to investors,” notwithstanding the CRAs’ “natural moral hazard” resulting from the payment of 
their fees by issuers of ABS). 
409 Serena Ng & Henny Sender, Easy Money: Behind Buyout Surge, a Debt Market Booms—
CLOs Spark Worries of Volatility and Risk; Loan Standards Loosen, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2007, at 
A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (quoting Dan Fuss, vice chairman of Loomis 
Sayles); see also Acharya et al., supra note 72, at 46 (stating that “if loans do not remain the economic 
risks of the banks that originate them, the originating bankers’ incentives to engage in effective 
screening and monitoring of deals are naturally weakened”). 
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LCFIs (as well as their regulators) apparently believed that they were 
transferring to investors most of the risks of LBO financing.410  In fact, 
however, that was not altogether true—just as it was not entirely the case 
with respect to nonprime RMBS and CDOs.411  Because LCFIs were so 
eager to earn investment banking fees from LBOs, LCFIs agreed to make 
bridge loans to provide temporary financing for LBOs until investors could 
be found to purchase the requisite amounts of leveraged loans and junk 
bonds.412  In the late summer and early fall of 2007, investor demand for 
LBO securities suddenly collapsed, due to the outbreak of the subprime 
mortgage crisis.413  LCFIs were left holding nearly $400 billion of 
commitments to provide bridge financing for pending LBOs.414 
Universal banks made strenuous efforts to reduce their LBO 
commitments by finding investors to buy leveraged loan participations and 
junk bonds.  Universal banks frequently provided price guarantees and 
below-market-rate loans to induce hedge funds and private equity firms to 
purchase LBO securities.  By early 2008, LCFIs had reduced their LBO 
commitments to about $200 billion.415  Even so, banks recorded more than 
$110 billion of losses on leveraged loans by the fall of 2008 (a figure  
representing more than a tenth of their losses from subprime-related 
problems).416 
By early 2009, as the recession deepened, U.S. corporations faced debt 
problems that were comparable to the plight of homeowners with nonprime 
                                                                                                                          
410 See Ng & Sender, supra note 409 (reporting that (i) “[t]hese days, banks that arrange large 
buyout financings hold on to very little of the loans themslevers,” and (ii) “CLOs have been lauded by 
former [FRB] Chairman Alan Greenspan and others for dispersing risk”). 
411 See supra notes 339, 354–60 and accompanying text (discussing LCFIs’ retention of 
significant exposures to losses from RMBS and CDOs despite their ostensible OTD strategy). 
412 See Dana Cimilluca & David Enrich, Deal-Making Ties Unravel: Underwriters Retreating 
from Backing Buyouts, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2007, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL 
File; Steven Rattner, The Credit Crunch Continues, WALL ST. J., Sept. 20, 2007, at A13, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File; supra notes 74–76 and accompanying text.  Federal regulators did 
not publicly express any misgivings about LCFIs’ bridge financing commitments until May 2007.  See 
Greg Ip, Fed, Other Regulators Turn Attention to Risk in Banks’ LBO Lending, WALL ST. J., May 18, 
2007, at C1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File.  
413 See Tully, supra note 405 (describing the “bursting” of the LBO financing “bubble” after 
“rising defaults in the subprime mortgage market . . . served as a wake-up call”); Rattner, supra note 
412 (providing similar analysis). 
414 See 2008 CGFS Private Equity Paper, supra note 71, at 16; Henny Sender, Debt on Sale: 
Banks Grease the Leveraged-Loan Machine, WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 2007, at C1, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, WSJNL File. 
415 See 2008 CGFS Private Equity Paper, supra note 71, at 16, 30; Pierre Paulden & Cecile 
Gutscher, Pandit’s ‘Closer to End’ Means No Escaping LBO Loans (Update 3), BLOOMBERG.COM, 
Apr. 29, 2008; David Reilly, Banks Use Quirk as Leverage Over Brokers in Loan Fallout, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 27, 2008, at C1 & “On the Hook” tbl., available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (reporting 
that Citigroup, Chase, Goldman, Lehman, Morgan Stanley, Merrill and BofA had more than $170 
billion of combined leveraged-lending exposures); Sender, supra note 414. 
416 See Pierre Paulden, Lenders Squeeze Companies Amid $112 Billion of Losses (Update 1), 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 7, 2008; see also infra notes 422–23 and accompanying text (reporting that 
banks in global markets lost $910 billion from subprime-related problems, including leveraged loans, 
between mid-2007 and March 2009).  
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mortgages.  Nearly two-thirds of domestic nonfinancial firms carried 
below-investment-grade credit ratings—a situation described by an S&P 
executive as “the most toxic mix of U.S. corporate ratings we’ve seen.”417  
The three leading CRAs predicted that default rates on junk bonds would 
rise in 2009 to the highest levels since 1933.418  Analysts estimated that 
U.S. companies were struggling with $2.5 trillion of high-risk corporate 
debt and were likely to default on as much as $500 billion of that debt 
during 2009 and 2010.419  Observers also warned that European firms 
would default on significant amounts of their own debt.420  Thus, the OTD 
strategy pursued by LCFIs in the subprime corporate debt market produced 
the same kind of painful legacy that has tarnished the markets for 
residential and commercial mortgages and credit card debt. 
C.  Financial Conglomerates Became the Epicenter of the Subprime 
Financial Crisis  
The huge losses reported by LCFIs since the outbreak of the subprime 
financial crisis have confirmed that (i) LCFIs were the primary private-
sector catalysts for the credit boom that led to the crisis, and (ii) LCFIs 
have become the epicenter of the world’s financial turmoil.  In April 2009 
it was reported that “[f]inancial institutions worldwide ha[d] amassed 
                                                                                                                          
417 Jeffrey McCracken & Vishesh Kumar, Wave of Bad Debt Swamps Companies, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 13, 2009, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File (quoting Diana Vazza, head of 
S&P’s fixed-income research); see also MORRIS, supra note 172, at 123 (stating that “[o]nly 39 percent 
of nonfinancial issuers now have investment-grade ratings”); Finance and Economics: Buttonwood: 
Debtors’ Prison, ECONOMIST, Feb. 21, 2009, at 74, available at LEXIS, News Library, ECON File 
(reporting that “[i]n 2007, junk-bond issuers made up most of the [American bond] market for the first 
time”). 
418 McCracken & Kumar, supra note 417 (reporting that the three leading CRAs predicted junk-
bond default rates of fourteen percent or higher in 2009, the highest level since 1933); see also Altman, 
supra note 70, at 20 fig.4 (showing that the highest annual default rate on junk bonds between 1971 and 
2007 occurred in 2002, when 12.8% of junk bonds defaulted). 
419 See MORRIS, supra note 172, at xix–xx, 136–37 (estimating, as of Oct. 2008, that (i) U.S. 
corporations had outstanding debt obligations that included $1 trillion of junk bonds and $1.5 trillion of 
leveraged loans, (ii) $400 billion of that high-risk debt would default, and (iii) total losses from 
corporate debt defaults and writedowns would be $515 billion); see also INT’L MONETARY FUND, 
GLOBAL FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: RESPONDING TO THE FINANCIAL CRISIS AND MEASURING 
SYSTEMIC RISK 28 tbl.1.3 (2009), available at http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/ 
2009/01/pdf/text.pdf [hereinafter APRIL 2009 IMF GFS REPORT] (estimating that $430 billion of 
writedowns would be recorded between 2007 and 2010 with regard to U.S. corporate loans and 
securities, with banks incurring $265 billion of those writedowns); McCracken & Kumar, supra note 
417 (citing estimates in early 2009 that $450 to $500 billion of U.S. corporate loans and junk bonds 
would default during the next two years); see also Private Equity: Return to Earth, ECONOMIST, Feb. 
14, 2009, at 1, available at LEXIS, News Library, ECON File (citing estimate by Hieno Meerkatt that 
half of the companies acquired in LBOs might default, resulting in $300 billion of losses). 
420 See Ewing et al., supra note 184, at 38 (reporting that “European corporations are deeply in 
hock, with $801 billion of corporate debt maturing this year—nearly one-third more than in the U.S.”); 
Carol Matlack, Debt Is Hobbling Europe Inc., BUS. WEEK, Feb. 23, 2009, at 28, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, BUSWK File (discussing problems with European corporate debt, and citing an S&P 
estimate that European companies could default on $65 billion of loans during 2009 and 2010). 
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$1.32 trillion of losses . . . since the U.S. subprime mortgage market 
collapsed.”421  Commercial and investment banks incurred $910 billion of 
the reported losses, and insurance companies accounted for an additional 
$220 billion.422  More than half of the losses reported by banks and insurers 
were incurred by the sixteen LCFIs identified above as the world’s leading 
financial conglomerates and by AIG.423 
A detailed analysis of the performance of those seventeen institutions 
is beyond the scope of this Article.  However, the following summary 
shows that twelve of the seventeen institutions suffered severe damage, 
and, of those twelve, (i) six institutions (Wachovia, Lehman, Bear Stearns, 
Merrill, AIG and RBS) essentially failed or were nationalized, and (ii) 
three other institutions (Citigroup, BofA and UBS) are continuing to 
operate on government-funded life support: 
• Two of the three largest U.S. banks—Citigroup and BofA—
suffered massive losses and received huge bailout packages 
from the U.S. government that included $90 billion of capital 
infusions and more than $400 billion of asset price 
guarantees.424 
• The fourth largest U.S. bank—Wachovia, a top nonprime 
lender—essentially failed and was acquired in an emergency 
takeover by Wells Fargo.  Similar outcomes occurred with 
respect to three other large U.S. depository institutions that 
were also leading nonprime lenders—(i) Washington Mutual, 
which failed and was acquired by Chase; (ii) National City, 
                                                                                                                          
421 Elena Logutenkova, Credit Suisse Seen Returning to Profit After Overtaking UBS, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Apr. 22, 2009. 
422 See Dave Pierson, Subprime Mortgage-Related Losses Top $1.259.9 Billion (Corrected), 
Bloomberg.com, Mar. 25, 2009 (tbl. listing losses for “Banks & brokers” and “Insurers”); see also 
APRIL 2009 IMF GFS REPORT, supra note 419, at 34 tbl.14 (showing that U.S., U.K. and European 
banks recorded $850 billion of writedowns by the end of 2008, and estimating that those banks would 
incur an additional $1.6 trillion of writedowns during 2009 and 2010). 
423 See Pierson, supra note 422, tbl. & n. (showing that the 17 institutions incurred $631.3 billion 
of “credit losses or writedowns of mortgage assets . . . as well as charges taken on leveraged-loan 
commitments since the beginning of 2007”); supra notes 129–30 and accompanying text (identifying 
the 16 leading financial conglomerates and AIG);.  AIG recorded $87.3 of those losses and writedowns, 
compared to $544 billion for the remaining 16 universal banks.  Pierson, supra note 421, tbl. & n. 
Like the four largest U.S. securities firms, AIG was a de facto universal bank because it owned an 
FDIC-insured thrift and was regulated by the OTS.  See Patricia A. McCoy et al., Systemic Risk 
Through Securitization: The Result of Deregulation and Regulatory Failure, 41 CONN. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 37, on file with Connecticut Law Review) (discussing AIG); supra 
notes 45–49 and accompanying text (describing the four largest U.S. securities firms as “de facto 
universal banks” due to their ownership of FDIC-insured thrifts and ILCs).   
424 See Pierson, supra note 422, tbl. (showing that Citigroup reported $88.3 billion of subprime-
related losses and BofA reported $42.7 billion of such losses); CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111TH 
CONG., APRIL OVERSIGHT REPORT: ASSESSING TREASURY’S STRATEGY: SIX MONTHS OF TARP 20 
fig.1 & nn.39–46, available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-040709-report.pdf [hereinafter 
APRIL 2009 COP TARP REPORT] (summarizing the federal government’s bailout packages for BofA 
and Citigroup). 
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which was threatened with failure and forced into a federally-
assisted “shotgun marriage” with PNC; and (iii) Countrywide, 
which was forced into a similar emergency takeover by 
BofA.425 
• All five of the largest U.S. securities firms encountered major 
problems.  Lehman filed for bankruptcy.  Bear Stearns and 
Merrill faced imminent failure and agreed to emergency 
takeovers by Chase and BofA, respectively.  Goldman and 
Morgan Stanley hastily converted to financial (bank) holding 
companies in order to “assure permanent access to the [FRB’s] 
discount window.”426 
• AIG reported nearly $90 billion of subprime-related losses and 
was effectively nationalized by the U.S. government.427 
• RBS reported large losses and was nationalized by the U.K. 
government, while Barclays narrowly avoided a similar fate.428 
• UBS incurred more than $50 billion of subprime-related losses 
and received a $60 billion bailout package from the Swiss 
government.429 
• HSBC suffered more than $40 billion of subprime-related 
losses and announced a shutdown of its subprime mortgage 
lending operations in the U.S.430 
                                                                                                                          
425 See McCoy et al., supra note 423 (manuscript at 19, 25–30); see also MUOLO & PADILLA, 
supra note 214, at 14–21, 269–70, 301 (describing BofA’s rescue of Countrywide); Eric Dash, PNC 
Gets National City in Latest Bank Acquisition, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2008, at 4A, available at LEXIS, 
News Library, NYT File (reporting on PNC’s federally-assisted acquisition of .National City); Theresa 
D. Murray, National City Sale Staved Off Fed Shutdown, PLAIN DEALER (Cleve. OH), Nov. 11, 2008, 
at A1 (same). 
426 McCoy et al., supra note 423 (manuscript at 31); see also Susanne Craig et al., The Weekend 
That Wall Street Died: Ties That Long United Strongest Firms Unraveled as Lehman Sank Toward 
Failure, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2008, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WSJNL File. 
427 See APRIL 2009 COP TARP REPORT, supra note 424, at 19 fig.1 & 19–20 nn.37–38 
(summarizing the federal government’s bailout package for AIG); McCoy et al., supra note 423 
(manuscript at 37); Testimony of FRB Vice-Chairman Donald L. Kohn, supra note 130; Pierson, supra 
note 422, tbl. (showing that AIG reported $87.3 billion in subprime-related losses).  
428 See Pierson, supra note 422, tbl. (showing that RBS reported $21.1 billion of subprime-related 
losses, while Barclays reported $14.5 billion of such losses); Anthony Faiola & Mary Jordan, British 
Bank to the World Takes Its Cash Back Home, WASH. POST, Mar. 28, 2009, at A01, available at 
LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File (reporting on RBS’ problems and its nationalization by the U.K. 
government); Bonnie Sinnock, Aid May Quell RBS’s Continuing Asset Woes, and Boost Lending 
Authority, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, Mar. 9, 2009, at 17, available at LEXIS, News Library, NMN 
File (same); Britain: High-street High-Roller: Barclays in the Money, ECONOMIST, May 2, 2009, 
available at LEXIS, News Library, ECON File (discussing Barclays’ avoidance of nationalization and 
its continued financial vulnerability). 
429 See Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson, supra note 200, at 88–93; Pierson, supra note 422 tbl. 
(showing that UBS reported $50.6 billion in subprime-related losses); Daniel Pruzin, International 
Banking: Switzerland Airs Plan to Bail Out UBS, Shore Up Financial System, 91 BNA’S BANKING 
REP. (BNA) 686 (Oct. 20, 2008) (reporting on Swiss government’s bailout of UBS). 
430 Pierson, supra note 422 tbl. (showing that HSBC incurred $42.2 billion of subprime-related 
losses); Jon Menon, HSBC to Raise $17.7 Billion as Subprime Cuts Profit, BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 2, 
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Governments and financial regulators have taken extraordinary 
measures to rescue their leading banks and prop up their financial systems.  
The IMF reported in April 2009 that U.S., U.K. and European central 
banks and governments had committed nearly $9 trillion to support their 
financial institutions and markets, including $2 trillion of emergency 
central bank liquidity assistance, $2.5 trillion of government asset purchase 
commitments, and almost $4.5 trillion of financial guarantees.431  U.S. 
authorities have extended about half of that support.432 
The IMF also warned that the current financial crisis is far from over.  
While banks and insurers have already reported $1.13 trillion of losses, the 
IMF estimated that the total writedowns for banks and insurers from 2007 
through the end of 2010 would be $3.1 trillion.433  The IMF therefore 
concluded that banks and insurers are only a third of the way through the 
painful process of recognizing and coping with losses from the subprime 
meltdown.434 
IV.  CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
LCFIs were the primary private-sector catalysts for the destructive 
credit boom that led to the subprime financial crisis, and they have become 
the epicenter of the current global financial mess.  The enormous losses 
suffered by LCFIs and the extraordinary governmental assistance they 
have received reveal a stunning failure of financial regulation and an 
unprecedented expansion of government support for financial markets.  A 
detailed discussion of both topics is beyond the scope of this Article but 
will be the subject of future work. For present purposes, I wish to make 
two basic points concerning financial regulatory policy and government 
bailouts. 
First, during the past two decades financial regulators in developed 
nations (particularly the U.S. and U.K.) implemented policies based on the 
following five regulatory choices:  
                                                                                                                          
2009 (reporting on UBS’ decision to shut down U.S. subprime mortgage unit); Bonnie Sinnock, HSBC 
Abandons Financial Units, NAT’L MORTGAGE NEWS, Mar. 9, 2009, at 18 (same). 
431 See APRIL 2009 IMF GFS REPORT, supra note 419, at 38, 39 tbl.1.7. 
432 See id. at 39 tbl.1.7 (indicating that U.S. authorities have provided $4.66 trillion of support, 
including $980 billion of central bank liquidity assistance, $1.85 trillion of asset purchase 
commitments, and $1.83 trillion of financial guarantees); see also APRIL 2009 COP TARP REPORT, 
supra note 424, at 24 fig.1 (indicating that the U.S. Treasury, FRB and FDIC have provided a total of 
$4.44 trillion of support for financial institutions, including $520 billion of “Outlays,” $2.04 trillion of 
“Loans,” $1.76 trillion of “Guarantees,” and $110 billion of “Uncommitted TARP Funds”). 
433 See APRIL 2009 IMF GFS REPORT, supra note 419, at 27, 28 tbl.1.3 (indicating that “Banks” 
are expected to record $2.8 trillion of writedowns on loans and securities through 2010, while 
“Insurers” are expected to record $300 billion of such writedowns); supra note 422 and accompanying 
text (stating that banks had lost $910 billion and insurers had lost $220 billion as of March 2009). 
434 See APRIL 2009 IMF GFS REPORT, supra note 419, at 32 (stating that “we project banks could 
incur roughly $2.8 trillion in credit-related writedowns over 2007–2010 . . . of which about one-third 
have already occurred”). 
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• To rely primarily on market mechanisms and “soft” 
supervisory guidance in order to direct the conduct of LCFIs, 
while giving little or no attention to the adoption and 
enforcement of binding rules (including rules that would 
protect consumers from deception and other abusive practices 
by financial institutions);  
• To promote the use of quantitative risk models—such as FICO 
credit scores for consumers and internal “value at risk” (VAR) 
models for LCFIs—as substitutes for traditional methods of 
evaluating the risks of customers and financial institutions;  
• To allow LCFIs to replace traditional methods of credit 
intermediation—in which banks screened and monitored 
borrowers and held loans on their balance sheets—with an 
OTD strategy that used structured-finance securitization and 
OTC derivatives to transfer the risk of loans to far-flung 
investors who had little or no opportunity to screen and 
monitor borrowers;  
• To support decisions by LCFIs to shift away from traditional, 
deposit-based, relationship-based business lines toward novel 
fee-based, transaction-based business lines that (i) were closely 
tied to the capital markets and (ii) relied on continuous funding 
from the capital markets; and  
• To promote the continued consolidation of the financial 
services industry based on the belief that larger and more 
diversified financial conglomerates would be safer and more 
profitable.435   
A number of critics have argued that the regulatory policies of the past 
two decades were counterproductive and harmful.  Critics have alleged that 
those policies impaired the safety and soundness of financial institutions 
and undermined the stability of financial markets and the general economy, 
because they encouraged:  
• An excessive reliance by LCFIs and regulators on quantitative, 
market-sensitive measures of risk and capital, which had the 
effect of accentuating booms and aggravating busts in the 
                                                                                                                          
435 See, e.g., TURNER REVIEW, supra note 185, at 14–25, 39–49; CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 111th 
Cong., SPECIAL REPORT ON REGULATORY REFORM: MODERNIZING THE AMERICAN FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY SYSTEM: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVING OVERSIGHT, PROTECTING CONSUMERS, 
AND ENSURING STABILITY, 2–5, 8–21 (2009), available at http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-
012909-report-regulatoryreform.pdf [hereinafter JANUARY 2009 COP REGULATORY REFORM REPORT]; 
Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson, supra note 200, at 55–56, 70–77, 90–99; McCoy et al., supra note 423 
(manuscript at 9–10, 16–23, 28–35); Wilmarth, supra note 13, at 437–69; see also supra notes 16–49 
(describing governmental encouragement for consolidation and conglomeration in the financial 
services industries of the U.S., U.K. and Europe); supra notes 230 and 293 and accompanying text 
(discussing heavy reliance by residential mortgage lenders on the FICO credit scores of borrowers). 
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business cycle;  
• An overuse of structured-finance securitizations and OTC 
derivatives, which created complex and opaque risk exposures 
and a fragile web of interconnections among LCFIs and 
various sectors of the financial markets;  
• A greater dependence by LCFIs on access to continuous 
funding from the capital markets, which increased the 
vulnerability of the financial system to liquidity shortages and 
panics;  
• A failure to restrain the growth of systemic risk within LCFIs; 
and  
• A misplaced confidence in market discipline as an effective 
restraint on excessive risk-taking and abusive practices by 
LCFIs.436   
On the last point, observers have highlighted that market discipline is 
inherently procyclical, because it is too lax during euphoric “bubbles” and 
too extreme during panic-induced “busts.”437  In addition, the effectiveness 
of market discipline is undermined by “self reinforcing herd and 
momentum effects,” which cause market participants to follow the herd 
even when they have doubts about the wisdom of the course the herd is 
pursuing.438   
Two striking examples of the power of herd mentality appeared in 
public statements made by the chief executive officers of BofA and 
Citigroup shortly before the LBO financing boom collapsed in the late 
summer and early fall of 2007.439  In May 2007, Kenneth Lewis gave a 
speech in Zurich, Switzerland, in which he boasted that BofA had 
participated in seven of the fifteen largest LBOs during 2007.440  However, 
during the question-and-answer period after his speech, Mr. Lewis 
admitted that “[w]e are close to a time when we’ll look back and say we 
                                                                                                                          
436 See, e.g., TURNER REVIEW, supra note 185, at 39–49; JANUARY 2009 COP REGULATORY 
REFORM REPORT, supra note 434, at 22–37; Blundell-Wignall & Atkinson, supra note 200, at 96–101; 
Borio, supra note 98, at 10–14, 21; McCoy et al., supra note 423 (manuscript at 16–34); Wilmarth, 
supra note 13, at 444–69; see also DANIEL K. TARULLO, BANKING ON BASEL: THE FUTURE OF 
INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL REGULATION 98–108, 120–21, 131–35, 139–41, 149–90 (2008) 
(presenting a critique of the Basel II capital accord, including the accord’s heavy reliance on internal 
risk models developed by LCFIs). 
437 TURNER REVIEW, supra note 185, at 41–42, 45–47; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., How Should We 
Respond to the Growing Risks of Financial Conglomerates?, in FINANCIAL MODERNIZATION AFTER 
GRAMM-LEACH-BLILEY 65, 110–13 (Patricia A. McCoy ed., 2002); see generally Shiller, supra note 
190. 
438 TURNER REVIEW, supra note 185, at 40–41; see also Shiller, supra note 190, at 157–72. 
439 See supra note 412 and accompanying text (discussing the collapse of the LBO financing 
boom in 2007). 
440 Ip, supra note 412 (reporting on Mr. Lewis’ speech in Zurich, in which Mr. Lewis declared 
that “[t]here is tremendous value in being able to provide a strong balance sheet to arrange large, 
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did some stupid things . . . . We need a little more sanity in a period in 
which everyone feels invincible.”441  Two months later, Chuck Prince of 
Citigroup famously declared, during an interview with the Financial 
Times, that “[w]hen the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things will be 
complicated.  But, as long as the music is playing, you have got to get up 
and dance.  We are still dancing.”442  The statements by Messrs. Lewis and 
Prince demonstrate that even the top executives of the world’s largest 
banks feel compelled to follow the herd. 
On the second point concerning government bailouts, I have 
previously argued—in an article published three years after GLBA’s 
passage—that the “too big to fail” (TBTF) policy is “the great unresolved 
problem of bank supervision.”443  In that article, I contended that GLBA 
was likely to make the TBTF problem much worse by “extend[ing] the 
scope of the TBTF subsidy to reach nonbank affiliates of large financial 
holding companies.”444  GLBA’s authorization of large financial holding 
companies also increased the likelihood that “major segments of the 
securities and life insurance industries will be brought within the scope of 
the TBTF doctrine, thereby expanding the scope and cost of federal ‘safety 
net’ guarantees.”445  I further warned that the risk control measures relied 
upon by GLBA’s supporters were inadequate.446  I predicted that the new 
financial holding companies would almost certainly exploit TBTF 
subsidies because  
the unmistakable lessons of the past quarter century are that 
(i) regulators will protect major financial firms against failure 
whenever such action is deemed necessary to preserve the 
stability of financial markets; and (ii) financial institutions 
will therefore pursue riskier and opaque activities and will 
increase their leverage, through capital arbitrage, if 
necessary, as they grow in size and complexity.447  
Unfortunately, the subprime financial crisis has confirmed all of the 
foregoing predictions.  Over the past decade, regulators in developed 
nations encouraged the expansion of large financial conglomerates and 
failed to restrain their pursuit of short-term profits through increased 
leverage and high-risk activities.  As a result, LCFIs were allowed to 
                                                                                                                          
441 Id. (quoting Mr. Lewis’ remarks as reported by Bloomberg News). 
442 Counting the reasons not to be cheerful, INVESTMENT ADVISER (FT Business), July 23, 2007 
(quoting from Mr. Prince’s interview, and observing that “[c]ommentator RJH Adams nicely described 
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promote an enormous credit boom, and that boom precipitated a worldwide 
financial crisis.  In order to avoid a complete collapse of global financial 
markets, central banks and governments have already provided almost $9 
trillion of support  (in the form of emergency liquidity assistance, capital 
infusions, asset purchase programs, and financial guarantees) for major 
banks, securities firms and insurance companies.448  Those support 
measures—which are far from over—establish beyond any doubt that the 
TBTF policy now embraces the entire financial services industry.449  
Accordingly, there is a pressing need to reform the regulation of financial 
institutions and financial markets with the goal of (i) eliminating (or at 
least greatly reducing) TBTF subsidies and their moral hazard effects, and 
(ii) establishing effective control over LCFIs.450  I intend to evaluate 
potential reform measures in future work.   
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